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Abstract  
  
Contextualised in food security literature and globalisation literature and NGO and 
agency reports on food security, Sating Hunger argues that ineffective global food 
governance is one of the causes of worsening global hunger, in addition to issues such 
as the commoditisation of food, climate change effects, the financialisation of 
agriculture and land degradation.  The global food governance literature suggests that 
global governance is vital to establishing a stable and effective food security regime, 
yet to date, no overall description of the global food governance field exists and the 
dynamics of the field have remained largely unexamined.  Bourdieu’s Field Analysis 
is modified and used as a method to map out the current food governance field and 
identify key actors and their positions, according to measures of economic capital, 
political capital and ‘democratic legitimacy’ capital.  Four sectors in the field are 
delineated; the ‘agrifood’ Trans National Corporation sector, the International 
Organisation sector, the Aid and Charitable Organisation sector and, marginalised at 
the outer limits of the field, Civil Society Organisations.  The dominance of private 
actors in the global food governance space is revealed, and the Field Analysis also 
presents the Gates Foundation as a dominant governor in the field.   
The results from the Field Analysis are combined with interviews with ten executives 
from these sectors to reveal a siloed food governance field with conflicting agendas.  
One organisation from each sector is also examined by case study to illustrate their 
practices and detail the attribution of the symbolic capitals in the Field Analysis.  
The problem of food insecurity is then reframed and recommendations are made 
including establishing the Right to Food, regulation and scrutiny of agrifood 
corporations, reform of the food governance field and establishing a new central body 
in the governance space.  Some policy recommendations are also made.   
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Chapter One:   The Hunger Problem  
  
 “At the dawn of the twenty-first century, after fifty years of development policies…a 
third of humanity continues to live in abject poverty” (Thomas, 2000:10).  
Introduction  
  
The world’s population is predicted to reach nine billion by 2050 and demand for 
food will increase substantially.  A high proportion of the current global population of 
7.5 billion already suffers from chronic food insecurity due to the iniquitous 
distribution of food and an increasing number suffer from transient food insecurity 
due to the global financial crisis.  In 2009 more than one billion people were 
chronically hungry, more than any year since 1970 (McDonald, 2010: 80).  With 
global food reserves at their lowest for 30 years, it is estimated that production of 
cereals alone needs to increase by 50% and meat production by 85% over the next 20 
years to keep apace with demand (FAO, 2009).  Organisations such as Oxfam suggest 
that food prices themselves may double in the next 20 years (Oxfam, 2012).  Yet the 
picture is more complex.  Chronic hunger is not due primarily to a lack of food.  
Spikes in hunger and famine do not necessarily directly correlate to food shortages 
but instead can reflect an “inequitable distribution of food outputs and a lack of 
political, social and economic entitlements” (Death, 2001: 35; see also Keen, 2008).   
In other words, “starvation is the characteristic of some people not having enough to 
eat.  It is not the characteristic of there not being enough to eat” (Sen, 1981).  
Exploring this rapidly growing size and scale of the problem is one of the imperatives 
for this research. The same number die every two years from hunger related causes as 
died in the nine years of World Wars One and Two (based on a calculation of 30 
million world war casualties) (Thomas and Reader, 1997:109).  Another imperative is 
that food crises can be both a cause and effect of state and civil violence, creating a 
hunger-violence vicious circle that drives the hungry deeper into conflict and further 
from a solution to starvation.  The good governance of food is an issue that affects all 
and could avert further crises and avoid cataclysmic humanitarian catastrophe.    
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Research Objectives and Questions  
The principal research question arising from this topic is ‘how can global governance 
best address food insecurity? This research is an analytical study which argues that 
neoliberal ideology, the interests of corporate actors and the democratic deficits and 
lack of plurality in international governance  are major obstacles to establishing food 
security.  These factors will be analysed separately but consideration will also be 
given to how these factors relate to each other and combine to inhibit global 
governance.  
  
This approach questions not only the practices and position of the governance 
members but investigates the need for reform of the global governance field itself is 
to establish food security.   It is also proposed that the intensity and scale of future 
food insecurity and food crises may themselves be game-changers for global 
governance overall.  
Implicit in the principal question are a number of subsidiary questions. For example, 
which actors currently govern food security?  In whose interest do these international 
actors govern? Global food governance (GFG) is defined here as,  “…[the] multiple 
governmental and intergovernmental efforts to ‘organize and coordinate the 
production and consumption of food in the current era of globalization.” (Cooke in 
Curran et al, 2010:2).  As the primary, most relevant governance space for food 
security, the examination of GFG’s performance in  resolving the food security crisis 
to date is one of the key research objectives.  There is also a normative question at the 
heart of this issue, namely, how should global food governance be reformed to 
address food insecurity?  Global governance needs to mitigate the factors that cause 
food crises to perpetuate, so the overall question is what has to change to ensure so it 
can be effective in mitigating food insecurity, and how can any barriers or obstacles 
be overcome?    
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An assumption underpins this overall research question - that the laissez faire 
mechanism of neoliberalism will not resolve food insecurity, i.e. the free market will  
not ‘fix’ food insecurity.  It is also important to state  that the research as a whole is 
underpinned by a much more fundamental question and the most significant 
imperative for the research. With one in seven of the population already going hungry 
and this possibly set to increase to one in three by 20501 (should the current trend 
continue), what will be the human cost of not addressing the effective governance of 
food insecurity?  
Scoping the Problem 
  
To scope the problem it is useful to examine the background and extent of food 
insecurity.  The world grows more fragile and unstable with the increasing volatility 
of food prices.  Not only are one billion chronically hungry but more than two billion 
experience inconsistent food access and availability (Parry et al, 2009). Sharp rises in 
particular of the price of staple foods significantly affect the hungry both as food 
producers and food consumers (Food and Agricultural Organisation, 2011).  The 2008 
food crisis saw staple food prices rise dramatically (wheat by 130%, sorghum by 87% 
and rice 74%) (FAO, 2009) plus there were food riots in 36 countries and the 
government of Haiti was overthrown.   This hunger-violence cycle exacerbates hunger 
further.  14 out of 53 African countries saw mass disturbances during the 2008 food 
crisis (Berazneva and Lee, 2011).  Each erupted in response to lack of food access and 
perceived governmental corruption but varied in duration, organisation and severity 
(Berazneva and Lee, 2011). Food riots are repeated claims for local food security. In 
each case they are protests against hunger but because conflict is also a cause of food 
insecurity, ongoing conflict worsens food insecurity. There are also many examples 
from history of political elites manipulating food supplies and hunger for political 
objectives.  So the 2008 food crisis had many consequences but it also revealed 
                                                
1 Author’s calculation based on estimates of the number of hungry increasing by 20% by 2050 (Parry et 
al, 2009). It is currently one in seven (as at 2009-12).  Based on 2009 figures of population of 6.8 
billion = 0.97 billion).  A 20% increase would give a ratio of just over one in three by 2050. Adjusted 
for a 2050 projected population estimate of 9 billion would mean just over 3 billion hungry in 2050 
(estimates from UN population projection figures).  For comparison, if the population were to stay the 
same, the number of hungry in 2050 would increase to 2.33 billion.  If the ratio were to stay the same 
as 2009-12 levels (at one in seven) but with the population increase to 9 billion by 2050, the number of 
hungry would be 1.28 billion.  Therefore the number at risk from hunger could triple over the coming 
generation/thirty-seven years). Any multiplier effect of the population increase itself worsening hunger 
have not been included in this illustration.    
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anomie at the heart of global food governance at a time when effective governance 
was needed more than ever to meet the demands of the present and the future 
degrading food insecurity situation. 2  
  
Over the short term recurring food price rises and crises offer unique opportunities to 
scope the structural and agency factors which determine the scale and frequency of 
these crises, to assess the corollary between food insecurity and global governance 
and to evaluate global food governance strategies to achieve food security.  For the 
longer term, results of  population forecast studies suggest that agricultural crisis will 
become severe after 2020, and critical from 2050 (Pimentel & Giampietro, 1994). 
Although others argue that the peaking of oil along with the peak of natural gas 
production could provoke an agricultural crisis much sooner than expected (INRAN,  
2012). The impact of the global population ‘explosion’  on food security, however, 
has been criticised as a neo-Malthusian proposition by the food justice movement, 
who point out that the inequitable distribution and access to food is a key driver of 
food insecurity, rather than the population increase per se (Death, 2010).  
  
Whilst the last century saw  substantial increases in global per capita food production, 
this rate of growth is now slowing (World Resources Institute, 2012). The ‘green 
revolution’ did transform agriculture around the globe with world grain production 
increasing by 250% since the 1950s.  Due to its dependence on fossil fuels for 
fertilisers and pesticides it was not sustainable and from the 1980s onwards 
agricultural improvements have decreased, particularly when the replacement rate of 
fossil fuels dipped. This results in lower crop yields unless other fertilisers are used. 
                                                
2 Every agricultural economy has experienced rising price trends since the millennium.  For example, 
between 2004 and 2008 alone, world rice prices increased by 255%, whilst wheat and maize prices 
increased by 90%  (Heady and Fan, 2008).    
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Therefore the Trans National Corporations (TNC) practices of buying then shelving 
patents for new forms of fertilisers, described in the later sections on TNC practices, 
also reduce crop yields.  The growth of biofuel cultivation by the West also needs 
taken into account in considering future food production forecasts.   
     
Food insecurity can be identified in geographic patterns with over 60% of the world's 
undernourished living in Asia and 25% in Africa (two-thirds of the projected increase 
by 2050 may occur in Africa) (Parry et al, 2009) and the proportion of people who are 
hungry is already greater in Africa (33%) than Asia (16%).  There are 22 countries 
(16 in Africa) where over 35% of the population are undernourished (Ayalew, 2012).  
Some forecasts predict more dramatic food insecurity trends with Sub-Saharan Africa 
and South Asia hit more severely by climate change, with Africa possibly losing 47% 
of its agricultural income by 2100 as a result of climate change (Toulmin, 2009:64; 
also see FAO Report, 2012).  Food insecurity is also prevalent in the globalised 
north.3  
  
Measuring hunger is, however, more complex than agricultural, demographic, and 
economic forecasts can accurately predict because food access and entitlement to food 
are often politically determined, sometimes with the threat of hunger used 
instrumentally as a political weapon.  There is general agreement in the food security 
discourses though, that food crises, those sudden, volatile price-spiking  
manifestations of food insecurity, will proliferate as the boundaries of the Earth’s 
capacity in the 21st Century are reached.    
  
To arrive at a stable, effective food security governance regime, it is important to 
identify the many contributing factors of food insecurity.  There are factors at each 
level of analysis. Sub-national factors include regional land-law and gender 
inequality,  national level factors are numerous and include per capita income, health 
and nutrition, population size, urban agglomerations, civil society and political 
                                                
3 Rates of food security vary significantly by race, class and education. For example, in the USA one in 
six people are food insecure (USAID, 2012).  In both kindergarten and third grade, 8% of the children 
were classified as food insecure, but only 5% of white children were food insecure, while 12% and 
15% of black and Hispanic children were food insecure, respectively (Kimbro, Denney  and Panchang, 
2012).   
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culture, religion and secularity, geopolitics, state fragility and post-conflict status 
(Clapp and Fuchs, 2009).  Global-level pressures include commoditisation of food, 
environmental factors, financial crisis and population explosion, oil and water crises, 
violent conflict and more (Smith, K., 2008 ‘2008: The Year of Global Food Crisis’ 
Sunday Herald 8 March p1).  These are outlined in detail in Chapter Two.  
Motivation for this Research and Biographical Position 
  
The motivation for this research arises from my time as an investigative journalist, 
when I wrote a front-page story on the 2008 food crisis for the UK’s Sunday Herald 
newspaper.  This was subsequently nominated for a British Press Award (see 
Appendix 1 for the article).  The article become one of the definitive explanations of 
the food crisis.  Drawing on detailed journalistic research my article set out multiple 
reasons for food crises and unpacked the complexity of the issue and contributing 
factors, explaining that these contributing factors are worsening, ratcheting up food 
insecurity. I had also witnessed food crises first-hand whilst working in Yaroslavl,  
Russia in the early 1990’s when entire towns and villages endured prolonged 
starvation during the transition from Communism to Capitalism.   At that time, the 
formal food distribution of the Soviet regime had collapsed and the Rouble was in 
free-fall and the post-Soviet version of commercial food distribution was not yet 
established.  A well-judged political solution could have averted the food insecurity I 
witnessed.  This regime vacuum of 1991 chimes with the apparent anomie of global 
food governance, uncovered by the 2008 global food crisis.    
  
I continued to write articles on food security and the food crises in 2008 and 2009 but 
one question recurred. With such apparently apocalyptic consequences for humanity, 
why were there no solutions in sight?  Which begged the question ‘why is there no 
effective food security regime?’    
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As well as this professional engagement with the topic my personal biography also 
influences my position in relation to food security.  Attending high school in one of 
the most notorious poverty zones in Scotland in the late 1970s and early 1980s gave 
me a number of vantage points from which to witness food poverty.  Public health 
screening identified those of my classmates who were already stunted from 
malnutrition.  The mass public health approach to services was not an ineffective top 
down solution for food poverty.  I came to understand that food  poverty was 
symptomatic of deeper, often intergenerational poverty and accompanied by health  
issues, fuel poverty and impaired childhood experiences since all in the family were 
affected and entirely focussed on finding  contingent measures to resolve the food 
insecurity.  Crime and violence often, but not always, resulted.  Yet it was often also 
transient, caused by vulnerability and lack of resilience to food and fuel price 
volatility.  Amongst my classmates’ families there was no attribution of their 
vulnerability to the structural unemployment nor socio-economic causes and contexts, 
such as the collapse in manufacturing, coal mining and shipping on which so many of 
the families, including my own, depended.  Instead food poverty fuelled a sense of 
individual failure and familial shame.    
 I also witnessed the welfare state intervene although it was then rule-bound, 
unbending and seemingly compassionless in its application and so interventions were 
rarely successful.  A more individual-centred welfare service which engaged and 
responded rather than dictating solutions would have had more success but 
Thatcherism was rolling back the welfare state and, like many Scots, this had a 
politicising experience on me as I watched crime levels and social discord increase 
directly as a result of Thatcherite policies.  Taking this understanding of food 
insecurity and poverty as vulnerability to the systemic and political, I became active 
in student journalism and politics and then active in public governance spaces such as 
the Civil Society Forum in Scotland which, in the 1990s, advocated discursive 
democracy and constitutional change.  The civil society contribution to public forums 
resulted in political change and, ultimately, differentiated policies such as free care for 
the elderly.  Poverty and food insecurity may be systemic but are far from inevitable.  
Solutions that mitigate food insecurity and poverty could be designed from civic 
engagement and bottom-up deliberative democratic discussion about prevention rather 
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than boilerplate solutions or interventions.  For this reason I value interviews as a 
method, to avoid solipsism and understand other world views and positions.     
 As an investigative approach, journalism can only go so far.   As well as being subject 
to sometimes capricious news agendas, it is sans theory and Critical Analysis.  
Academic research, however, offers the opportunity to critically analyse, to interrogate 
the food governance structures and address what can be done to avert the apparently 
inevitable catastrophe.  This thesis is my attempt to address that question.   
With the research question set out, the first step is to review the literature.  
Original Contributions 
 
To define the research puzzle the main bodies of literature reviewed include food 
security, global governance, human security, globalisation and some International 
Political Economy literature on advanced capitalism.  Similarly, the research design 
and methodology draws on literature from Field Theory, Bourdieusian Field Analysis 
and qualitative research methods and discusses Bourdieu in International Relations. 
This research argues that ineffective global food governance is one of the causes of 
worsening global hunger, in addition to issues such as the commoditisation of food, 
climate change effects, the financialisation of agriculture and land degradation.  The 
global food governance literature suggests that global governance is vital to 
establishing a stable and effective food security regime and yet no overall description 
of the global food governance field exists and so  the dynamics of the field have 
remained largely unexamined.  Bourdieu’s Field Analysis is modified and used as a 
method to map out the current food governance field and identify key actors and their 
positions, according to measures of economic capital, political capital and ‘democratic 
legitimacy’ capital.  Four sectors in the field are delineated; the ‘agrifood’ Trans 
National Corporation sector, the International Organisation sector, the Aid and 
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Charitable Organisation sector and, marginalised at the outer limits of the field, Civil 
Society Organisations.  The dominance of private actors in the global food 
governance space is revealed, and the Field Analysis also presents the Gates 
Foundation as a dominant governor in the field.   
Food security is also part of a much larger intellectual map, located in a nexus 
between Anthropology, Agricultural and Welfare Economics, Development Studies 
(for Human Security theories plus the understanding of asymmetrical development). 
Human Geography, International Political Economy, Sociology (for the literature on 
globalisation and the discourse of domination), and finally, and the most relevant for 
this thesis, International Relations, for analysis of the dynamics of global governance.  
 
Although not the primary disciplinary locus of this research, the intersection between 
economics and sociology is useful for food security because analysis of the social 
structures of the economy is key for the study of global food governance.  This  
underscores Bourdieu’s perspective that economics and sociology are part of a single 
discipline, rather than two different disciplines with economic transactions being just 
one aspect (Bourdieu 2005:17).  
 International Relations is the disciplinary locus because the central question and 
focus is global governance, the international actors in food security governance .  This 
responds to a gap described as the ‘silence’ of International Relations discipline in 
face of the growing inequality and widespread poverty that characterises the 
neoliberal era, the result of the uneven benefits of globalisation process (Thomas, 
2009). Addressing the issue of the effectiveness of global food governance also 
speaks to this silence.  International Relations is the most relevant discipline to 
answer this research question, offer a review of the current global and regional 
governance of food and also address the overarching question of how global 
governance responds to food security causes. Therefore, International Relations is the 
discipline of best fit.  The ‘practice turn’ in International Relations has seen an 
increasing use of Bourdieu’s work by International Relations scholars in the last few 
years.  Bourdieu’s work correlates to the structure agency debate in International  
Relations and there is increasing recognition of the applicability of Bourdieu’s terms 
of field and habitus to the structure/agency debate in International Relations.  For 
example and of most relevance to this research is the concept of field, where 
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structures and architecture of  hierarchy are objectively mapped out  and strategies for 
positioning within the field represents structure and the ongoing ‘structuring’ 
dynamics of the field can be seen to be an agent in change, or in perpetuating the 
status quo.   
Over his lifetime’s work Bourdieu frequently analysed the transmission of power, 
conflict and sovereignty:   
“Bourdieu’s sociology provides us with an opportunity to rethink international 
politics in ways not offered by these other thinkers. Bourdieu helps us 
rediscover the everyday practices, symbolic structures and arenas of conflict 
that bring many other actors into perspective, rather than just focusing on 
nation states that produce (what we call) international politics. An engagement 
with his work redirects our discipline from being influenced by overly 
abstracted and simplified reifications of world politics…” (Adler Nissen, 
2013:6).  
 
This study builds on existing research on food security, specifically Clapp and Fuchs, 
McKeon, Margulis, Bne Saad, and Sen.  Clapp and Fuchs outlined the effect of 
corporate power in the Food System; McKeon set out the importance of 
democratisation for the food security field; Margulis’s work covers the global 
governance of food security; Bne Saad’s research attributes the causes of food 
insecurity to the political and economic system and Sen’s work on the structural and 
political origins of hunger and famine is the fountainhead of this work.  Each of these 
are outlined further in the pages following immediately and discussed in detail in 
Chapter Two.  In addition a number of practitioner reports are included, specifically 
from the FAO, GRAIN and Oxfam.  These sources offer some key factors for the 
analysis of the research questions. For example, the impact on governance of the 
neoliberal turn and neoliberal approach of international actors such as IOs and TNCs, 
the financialisation of agricultural trade and the increasing commoditisation of food’s 
effect on food security governance.  Other causes of food insecurity mentioned in the 
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food security literature include the decrease in food trade and exchanges, biofuels 
cropping and the impact of the peak oil crisis (Clapp and Fuchs, 2009).  Climate 
change in particular is a very significant multi-dimensional cause of food insecurity.  
It is widely identified across the global food governance literature overall, both 
academic and practitioner literature, that there is no overall description of the global 
food governance field (see McKeon, 2015) so this research addresses that omission by 
providing an overall view of the food governance field.   Mapping out the food 
governance field is a key rationale for the research design to enable investigation into 
the ineffectiveness of the global food governance field.  In doing so it provides an 
original empirical contribution to the study of food security governance.  The 
approach through which this is done, i.e. by modifying and empirically applying 
Bourdieu’s  Field Analysis in analysing power distribution and effects in global 
governance, makes a methodological contribution to the study of food security. 
 
Three Main Discourses in Food Security  
  
These factors and causes are presented in a variegated way across the key discourses 
in food security, which can be grouped into three main approaches.  The first is 
productivism, which essentially links agriculture, food supply and hunger: McKeon 
succinctly describes this as: “a judicious mix of  state support + capital + science” 
pitted against the Malthusian scenario of population growth exceeding growth of 
agricultural output” (McKeon, 2015: 72).  To date the main Western view of food 
security has been a neoliberal productivist discourse: that maximising farmers' profits 
means maximizing agricultural production.   By enabling farmers with resources and 
tools, for example, accurate weather forecasts, improved production techniques, 
improved seeds, secure land tenure etc., then the individual farmer will decide which 
tools to use, and how to use them, as farmers have intimate knowledge of their own 
land and local conditions.   What is grown is sold to markets or food distributors such 
as supermarkets.    
  
The limitations of the productionist approach is that it overlooks a number of factors 
such as the role of TNCs and the socio-political dimensions of food security.  There is 
also a dissonance evident in that the wine lakes and butter mountains of the Common  
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Markets in the 1970’s and 1980’s proved that good agriculture is more than simply 
increasing production, which in turn can lead to oversupply and gluts.  As the hitherto 
dominant approach to food security, however, understanding the productionist 
discourse is important.  This is one of the main approaches of food security (McKeon, 
2015).  
  
The productivist discourse has been heavily critiqued on environmental, energetic and 
nutritional grounds (Lang, 2011:272) so in response the current productivist 
description is “sustainable intensification” which uses GMO and chemical fertiliser 
(McKeon, 2015) and focuses on productivity per unit of water, focusing on providing 
smallholders with the ‘right’ seeds or information.  Sustainable intensification is 
discussed in more depth in the section on agroecology in Chapter Four.   The 
Productivist discourse is promoted by all TNCs, International Institutions such as the  
World Bank and IMF and some but not all International Organisations and Aid 
Organisations and also, increasingly, private organisations such as the Gates 
Foundation.  
The second approach is the food sovereignty discourse which argues that this 
productionist view of yield per acre/person/crop is neoliberal, technologist and views 
peasant-based production as inefficient and basic.  It counters with four ‘pillars’ of 
food security.  These are the Right to Food and food sovereignty; mainstreaming 
family farming; the defence of access to and control over natural resources and food 
trade sovereignty (McKeon, 2015).  Food sovereignty aims to change the existing  
“inequitable social political and economic structures and politics that peasant 
movements believe are the very cause of the social and environmental destruction in 
the countryside” (Wittman, Desmarais and Wiebe, 2010: 3).  As part of promoting 
people, households  and communities rights over food production,  La Via 
Campesina, who developed the concept of food sovereignty, mainstream gender in 
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their policies and campaigns. The nutritional and cultural appropriateness of food is a 
growing part of the food sovereignty discourse.    
The food justice approach views food security as a basic human right and advocates 
farmer-led distribution of food, grain crops in particular, as well as pointing to the 
political will as the key to ensuring the fair distribution of food.  The core of the food 
justice movement is the belief that what is lacking is not food, but the political will to 
fairly distribute food regardless of the recipient’s ability to pay.  The limitation of the 
food justice approach is that whilst there are many stakeholders who fight for food 
justice, the model for achieving change is neither clearly defined nor well organised.   
Citing the examples of ‘food deserts’ in the US, (where there is little access to 
nutritious affordable food in some communities) it was noted that some food justice 
organisations,    
“…identify policy leaders as primary targets for their efforts and activities. In 
doing so, many of the stakeholder organizations who work in this way 
approach community change from a top-down perspective, believing that a 
policy focus will shift health outcomes. Further, collaboration between 
stakeholder organizations is inhibited by the inability to branch out beyond 
each organization’s operational silos. Most often, these organizations are not 
focused on changing community outcomes per se, but instead, are focused on 
meeting their funding or political priorities” (Alkon and Agyeman, 2011:46).    
This top-down model of food justice prevents efficacy due to the ‘operational silos’ of 
NGOs.   
The food sovereignty approach overlaps with the food justice perspective and also 
asserts that food is a basic human right.   The ‘food sovereignty’ position advocates 
banning the production of many cash crops in developing nations, leaving  local 
farmers to focus on subsistence agriculture.  Farmers, the movement proposes, should  
have sovereignty over their own produce. They also oppose ‘import dumping’ when 
low-cost subsidised food is imported from industrialised nations into developing 
countries.  Import dumping also occurs in food aid distribution through programs like 
the USA's ‘Food for Peace’ initiative.  One of the limitations of the food sovereignty 
approach is that, as with all rights-based movements, whilst the justice can be 
established as a right, it also needs to be established as fact.  Some commentators 
have pointed to the 2008 global food crisis, climate change and the Global Financial  
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Crisis as having ‘jolted’ existing paradigms and the food governance system (DFAIT 
policy document, 2011)  such as the food justice or climate change approaches.   That 
there is no single international institution responsible for the management of food 
security was revealed by the 2008 food and financial crises.  As a result there is a 
small but growing trend away from the free market/neoliberal discourse towards a 
civil society approach.  The food sovereignty and food justice discourse is promoted 
by some Aid Organisations, such as Oxfam, and Civil Society Organisations.  
  
Over its fifteen year existence the food sovereignty discourse is increasingly seen as  
“fighting against…corporate controlled globalised food system” which is “defended 
by some intergovernmental institutions – with the World Bank, the IMF, and the 
WTO on the frontline – and by an array of governments whose line-up has expanded 
from the G8 core to include a number of emerging economies” (McKeon, 2015:80).  
The contested discourses are between “proponents and opponents of a global system 
that impact negatively on small-scale producers and consumers in all parts of the 
world.” (McKeon, 2015:80).  Critiques of the food sovereignty discourse centre 
around the need to solve issues such as how markets would work to meet the needs of 
small farmers and food consumers in a food sovereignty regime (Bernstein, 2013).   
Also, whose realm is sovereign and ‘who is the sovereign in food sovereignty?’ is a 
current trend in discussion.  The Food Sovereignty discourse places the community 
and smallholder at the centre with the Right to Food and choice over the food trade 
but there is some recognition that it also needs to be “supported by policies adopted at 
higher governance levels” (McKeon, 2015:84).  
The third main discourse in the food security literature is the civil society discourse.  
With its genesis in the freedom from want school of thought this approach draws on 
the food justice and food sovereignty approaches promoting a civil society approach 
to governance, to encourage deliberative democracy.  McKeon (2009) details the UN 
Commission on Global Governance which started in 1992 and reported in 1995 
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urging that Cold War politics be replaced by core values which unite people of all 
backgrounds, which was aimed at bringing civil society into UN discussions and 
governance processes, rather than only sovereign states.  Since then some UN 
programs and agencies developed more interactions with the NGOs and some civil 
society but “many central bodies were more resistant and policy dialogue forums 
remain dominated by governments” (McKeon, 2015: 90-92).  An example of this are 
the Millennium Development Goals (MDGs) which many civil society actors believe 
were formulated behind closed doors (green-rooming) and since then there is a 
growing criticism from civil society actors that the neoliberal approach of institutions 
increasingly dominates and that the World Bank, WTO, and  IMF contest and 
compete with the civil society discourse, rather than dialogue with it (McKeon, 2009: 
10-11).   Civil Society Organisations such as La Via Campesina and FIAN and 
farming coalitions such as Navdanya and support this discourse, with varying degrees 
of Food Sovereignty or Food Justice perspectives.  
  
These discourses are championed by different groups of actors who compete for 
dominance via the food governance field.   The discourses also vie against each other, 
interrelating and reacting against each other and also in response to the wider agri-
economic, political and international community contexts and so settling on 
definitions is key to obtaining clarity on the competing discourses.  
Definitions from the Food Security Literature  
  
Setting out key definitions also helps clarify the research.  More than 30 definitions of 
food security have been identified (Maxwell and Frankenberger, 1992). At the most 
general level, food security definitions denote the availability of food and access to it 
from an individual perspective.  The original foundational definition had a supply 
only focussed view (UN, 1975)  which later evolved to include physical and 
economic access.  The World Food Programme then conceptualised food security as 
an "assurance of supplies and a balanced supply-demand situation of stable foods in 
the international market" (WFP report, 1979:22; see also FAO, 1983; WFP Report, 
1979; Rome Declaration, 1996).  It then migrated in the 1990’s to include ‘social 
access’, as in the contemporary definition: “Food security exists when all people, at 
all times, have physical, social and economic access to sufficient, safe and nutritious 
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food that meets their dietary needs and food preferences for an active and healthy life” 
(FAO, 2009:8).  National definitions are mostly constellated around this definition: 
“the assured ability to acquire acceptable foods in socially acceptable ways” (LSRO 
1990:1560; see also Sen, 1982, MacDonald, 2012).  The World Food Summit of 1996 
defined food security as existing when "all people at all times have access to 
sufficient, safe, nutritious food to maintain a healthy and active life."  
The USDA defines food security from a household perspective; “a household-level 
economic and social condition of limited or uncertain access to adequate food”  
(United States Agriculture Department, 2012).          
Three main pillars of food security are identified in the food justice literature as; food 
access, food availability and food use.  Generally, food access is taken to mean having 
sufficient resources to appropriate foods.  Food availability means availability of 
sufficient quantities of food on a consistent basis and food use is the appropriate use, 
(based on  basic knowledge of nutrition with adequate water and sanitation). An 
added dimension to this is the stability of these three dimensions over time (FAO, 
2009).  Price volatility disrupts food access in both the short and medium term.   
Stages of food insecurity vary from transient food insecurity to full-scale famines 
although all are degrees of food insecurity:  
   
"Famine and hunger are both rooted in food insecurity. Food insecurity can be 
categorised as either chronic or transitory. Chronic food insecurity translates 
into a high degree of vulnerability to famine and hunger; ensuring food 
security presupposes elimination of that vulnerability. [Chronic] hunger is not 
famine. It is similar to undernourishment and is related to poverty, existing 
mainly in poor countries" (Ayalew, 2012:3).   
Defining food crises is also important to understanding food security.  A food crisis 
occurs when,   
“…rates of hunger and malnutrition rise sharply at local, national, or global 
levels. This definition distinguishes a food crisis from chronic hunger, 
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although food crises are far more likely among populations already suffering 
from prolonged hunger and malnutrition. A food crisis is usually set off by a 
shock to either supply or demand for food and often involves a sudden spike 
in food prices” (Timmer, 2010: 224).     
Therefore food crises can be understood as a sudden spike in rates of hunger and 
malnutrition correlated to supply or demand shocks whereas food security is the 
assured access to safe, nutritious food in sufficient quantities over time.    
  
Definitions of Famine and Hunger  
Definitions of famine and hunger also differ from the definition of food security.  
Whilst food security refers to the availability of food, famine and hunger refer to the 
physical effect of the non-availability of food, a product of food insecurity. As with 
the definition of food security, the definition of famine has also migrated. One 
frequently used definition of famine is a “sudden, sharp reduction in food supply 
resulting in widespread hunger” (Brown and Eckholm, 1974:25). Unlike definitions 
of food security, there are also mortality-based definitions: “Unusually high mortality 
with unusually severe threat to food intake of some segments of a population” 
(Ravallion, 1997:1).  Definitions of famine which are food consumption-based  
include: “sudden collapse in level of food consumption of large numbers of people” 
(Scrimshaw, 1987:2).   Food safety, an important element in food access, is outwith 
the scope of this research project although it should be highlighted that each year,  
“over two million children die… from diarrhoeal illness caused by contaminated food 
and water.  These preventable deaths are rarely discussed in terms of food and water 
security but perhaps they should be” (Death, 2011: 35).  
Amartya Sen, who witnessed the Bengali famine of 1943, defines famine as  
“Starvation is a matter of not having enough food to eat, not a matter of there being 
enough food to eat” (Sen, 1981:10).  Sen’s famine definition follows the concept of  
‘entitlement failure’ which Sen defines as the failure of food entitlement when one’s 
entitlement set does not contain enough food to avoid starvation, if non-entitlement 
options such as charity or food aid are not present (Sen, 1981).  Famine results when a 
significant number of people suffer from such entitlement failures at the same time.  
This dovetails with another assumption of this thesis that all food insecurity (and 
hunger) is political,  using the Senyan conceptualisation of famine where  the 
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entitlement set is engendered politically.  Sen’s conceptual approach to both famine 
and economic development plus his own belief in the political genesis of hunger are 
outlined further in Chapter Two.  Famine is on a continuum with food insecurity but 
food insecurity is not just a chain of causation where food shortage causes starvation 
that then leads to famine.  A contemporary concept of causation is that food shortages 
lead to initiating/ intervening factors which may themselves result in pre-famine or 
famine (Sen, 2013).  Remembering the definition of hunger and famine as referring to 
the physical effects of non-availability, then hunger and famine can now be 
understood as ‘products’ of food insecurity.   
  
The assumption is also held in this thesis that chronic and transitory forms of food 
insecurity differ, with chronic food insecurity being long-term and persistent and 
transitory food insecurity being short-term and temporary. When analysing food 
insecurity, the duration of the problem, which groups it effects plus the intensity or 
severity impact on the overall food security and nutrition status are important.   
Different ‘scales’ or ‘phases’ to ‘grade’ or ‘classify’ food security have been 
developed by food security analysts using various indicators and ‘benchmarks’ such 
as the severity of undernourishment (Stamoulis and Zezza, 2003).  The most well-
known scale is the Integrated Food Secure Phase Classification scale (IPC) (see Table 
1 below).  Food insecurity that is severe but transient can be remedied by harvest 
yields, adroit policies or effective governance.  Severe chronic food insecurity can 
also be mitigated by these remedies but they have to be enduring and sustained.  
The Integrated Food Security Classification scale and Famine Scales  
  
The IPC scale, or Integrated Food Security Phase Classification (IPC), is a 
standardised scale that integrates food security, nutrition and livelihood information to 
gauge the severity of a crisis (http://www.ipcinfo.org/). Using international standards 
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of human welfare and livelihoods, situations can be geographically or temporally 
compared (ibid). The sliding scale is as follows (taken from the IPC).  
Generally Food Secure: More than 80% of households can meet basic food needs without 
atypical coping strategies.  
Borderline Food Insecure: For at least 20% of households, food consumption is reduced but 
minimally adequate without having to engage in irreversible coping strategies. These 
households cannot fully meet livelihoods protection needs.  
Acute Food and Livelihood Crisis: At least 20% of households have significant food 
consumption gaps or are marginally able to meet minimum food needs only with irreversible 
coping strategies such as liquidating livelihood assets. Levels of acute malnutrition are high 
and above normal.  
Humanitarian Emergency: At least 20% of households face extreme food consumption 
gaps, resulting in very high levels of acute malnutrition and excess mortality; or households 
face an extreme loss of livelihood assets that will likely lead to food consumption gaps. 
extreme loss of livelihood assets that will likely lead to food consumption gaps.  
Famine/Humanitarian Catastrophe: At least 20% of households face a complete lack of 
food and/or other basic needs and starvation, death, and destitution are evident; and acute 
malnutrition prevalence exceeds 30%  and mortality rates exceed 2/10000/day.  
 Table 1: The Food Security classification scale. Source:  www.ipcinfo.org.  
    
Famine Scales  
  
Famine is measured here by the Howe-Devereux intensity and magnitude scales 
(Howe and Devereux, 2004).  The Intensity Scale is 0 (Food Secure) to 5 (extreme 
famine).   
  
  
  
  
  
  
  	  	   30	   
 
0 has a crude mortality rate of less than 0.2 per 10k of population per day with stable 
food prices.    
1 is Food insecure with 0.5 per 10k per day and reversible coping strategies with 
unstable food prices.   
2 is Food Crisis with 1 fatality per 10k per day, prevalence of oedema and irreversible 
coping strategies.    
Famine is level 3 with Crude mortality rate of 5 per day per 10k, wasting at less than 
40% of the population with coping strategies exhausted and survival strategies (e.g. 
migration) adopted.    
Severe Famine is level 4 with a CMR of 15 per 10k per day, wasting greater than 40% 
and widespread social breakdown.    
The final stage, 5, is extreme famine with a CMR of greater than 15 per 10k per day 
and widespread mortality.    
Intensity scales are used for specific areas. Magnitude scales give a designation of 
how widespread famine is:    
Category A famine is called a minor famine with fatalities in the range of 0-999.    
Category B (moderate famine) has fatalities at 1000-9999.    
Category C is a major famine (10,000-99,999).    
A great famine is category D (100,000-999,999).  
A catastrophic famine (E) is measured as 1,000,000 and over.    
For example, the Southern Sudan famine of 1998 was a category C, Major Famine 
with an intensity of 5.  
Table 2: Famine Scales. (Source: Howe and Devereux , 2004: 370)  
 Defining ‘the Field’  
It is also useful to define the other key terms in the principal question.  The concept of  
‘regime’ is key to investigating a stable and secure food security regime.  The 
definition of regime used here is “ …the principles, norms, rules and decision-making 
procedures around which actor expectations converge in a given issue-area (Krasner 
1982: 185).  In the context of this thesis it means a food security regime.  In this 
research the global food governance field is also used, aligning with Bourdieu’s use of 
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the term to mean a structuring, contested ‘space’, a setting which locates actors/agents 
and their social position (Bourdieu, 1984). The position of each particular agent in the 
field is a result of interactions between the specific rules of the field plus the actor’s  
habitus and social, economic and political capital and fields interact are hierarchical, 
interacting with each other (ibid).   
 Using field allows examination of the convergence of actors and power dynamics on 
a given issue-area and enables some analysis of the principles, rules and decision-
making procedures along with other issues such as membership.  Positioning the 
actors, those involved in the food security regime, in a food governance field in this 
way allows for the research method of Field Analysis to outline how the food security 
governance space is constituted and, by looking further into some of that membership, 
some of the dynamics across the field can be identified. For example, the Field 
Analyses in this research show that private actors are significant in the field.  The 
interviews with actors from the food governance field undertaken for this research 
indicate that many are unaware of the extent of private actors  in the food governance 
field.  To facilitate the Field Analysis the term field is mostly used from here to 
discuss food security governance, although it should be noted it is not transposable 
with the term regime.  
Another key term, Global Governance here   
“…implies a change in the fundamental political units that rule our word, 
incorporating new forms of authority that recognise the technical complexity of a 
world characterised by economic integration” (Rosenau, 1992:66).   Others comment 
that the new emphasis on global governance offers the opportunity to undermine 
“established elites and traditions of inequality”, by expanding democracy (Sinclair, 
2013:6; see also Sinclair, 2012:6; Dryzek, 2010 and Higgott and Erman, 2010).    
Defining Food Governance  
  
Food governance, defined as, “the institutionalised economic processes that organise 
and coordinate food activity among a wide variety of economic actors” (Campbell & 
Lindberg, 1990:636)4 is narrower than Cooke’s definition of global governance given 
                                                
4 The main institutions for food security and governance are (in chronological order); the Food and  
  
  
  
  
  	  	   32	   
earlier which included the governmental and intergovernmental efforts to organise 
and co-ordinate food activity including consumption (Cooke in Currant et al, 2010).  
The large range of actions within global food governance includes more than just 
economic processes.  It encompasses policy-making, emergency food aid responses 
and adjustments to agro-ecological and technological changes:   
  
“As the division of agricultural labour expands, food commerce intensifies, 
and traditional norms and customs fail by the wayside, public officials with a 
variety of often contradictory motives step in and attempt to fill the regulatory 
gap.  Agencies and institutions like the World Bank, the United Nations, the 
General Treaty on Tariffs and Trade (GATT), and the World Trade 
Organisation (WTO) loom large here but so do local policymakers who are 
forced to confront the changing global food regime head on-and thus find 
themselves in a juggling act with the fates of their communities, their careers, 
and their ecosystems in their hands” (Cooke in Curran et al, 2010:2).   
 
Defining Effectiveness  
  
It is also useful here to define ‘effectiveness’.  When applied to governance outputs,  
‘effectiveness’ or ‘ineffectiveness’ are general, euphemistic, falsely dualistic terms 
with ‘ineffectiveness’ typically associated with ‘benign failure’.  How efficacious 
governance is in resolving food insecurity is perhaps better categorised as being one 
of four measures drawn from legal definitions (here the terms are borrowed from Tort 
law where nonfeasance means a failure to act which causes injury to another (Kionka,  
                                                                                                                                       
Agricultural Organisation (founded 1944), the World Food Programme (1961),  the Organisation for 
Economic Co-operation and Development (1961), the UN Centre on Transnational Corporations (1974, 
abolished 1992), the Consultative Group International Agricultural Research (CGIAR, est. 1971)  , 
World Food Council (1974, abolished 1993), the International Fund for Agricultural Development 
(IFAD, 1974) and, in reaction to the 2008 Global Food Crisis,  the UN High Level Task Force on the 
food security crisis (HLTF, 2008), The Global Partnership of Agriculture and Food security (GPAFS, 
2008) was created by the G8 in 2008. HLTF is a technical initiative with a membership of  secretariat 
heads, technical staff of specialised agencies, Bretton Woods institutions and parts of the OECD.   
GPAFS has no real existence to date.  The extent and overlapping remits of these institutions does 
seem to suggest a diffuse institutional architecture.  
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1988)).5 Misfeasance is defined as neglect of duty which is ‘injurious’ to another (so it 
is ‘legal’6 but improperly informed), in which, through mistake or carelessness, there 
are errors or an unfortunate result.  Misfeasance is without evil intent and/or violation 
of law (Kionka, 1988). Unlike misfeasance, ‘malfeasance’ is conduct in violation of 
the law and dishonesty, illegality, or knowingly exceeding authority for improper 
reasons are always factors of malfeasance (ibid). These terms and definitions are 
useful as a shorthand, a typology of global governance effectiveness although the 
illegality does not yet transfer from the domestic to international juridical realms.  For 
the purposes of this typology, if it is the case that some GFG actors intentionally (i.e. 
knowingly) disrupt the establishment of an effective food security system then the 
ineffectiveness is ‘malfeasance’ since it involves intentionality - doing something 
either legally or ‘morally’ wrong (ibid). 7 8    
Malfeasance, as an output or effect of global governance, arises from intentionality of 
one or more actors in the global governance field to disrupt the authority of the field. 
Malfeasance can also vary in magnitude depending on the dominance of those actors 
in the field.   Of course when a governance issue-area is based on an issue as critical 
to life as climate change, food or water then any type of ineffectiveness; nonfeasance, 
misfeasance or malfeasance can cause fatalities.9  Which is an argument for further 
scrutiny of global governance to create a legal framework to outlaw malfeasant 
actions of international actors.  Unfortunately the international law aspect of global 
                                                
5 Since Tort is civil law then these terms are designed for civil cases, in domestic courts against tortious 
actions and is applied here only to inform a typology of  ‘effectiveness’, against which to evaluate a 
range of possible global food governance outcomes.  
6 Here ‘legal’ is defined in relation to the relevant jurisdiction.   
7 A definition of moral  is, of course, culturally relative and is a much fought over definition in its own 
right in international ethics, where Cosmopolitanism, Realism, Liberalism and Marxism offering 
competing definitions.  In Tort, morality is understood as an alternative normative domain than law, 
where there is no underwriting by coercive power of the state.  Law and morality are not necessarily 
separate domains since they both relate to responsibility (Cane, 2002)   
8 The jurisdiction for regulation of any malfeasance in/by global governance regimes is not 
straightforward.  Possible options include international  law, regional law (such as the EU Court of 
Justice), or national jurisdiction, that of either the host nation-state of the injured parties or the home 
nation-state or the organisation. The applicability of international, rather than civil domestic law is in 
the international norms, rules, standards, and practices that affect corporate responsibilities.  These 
issues are discussed in further detail in the section on corporate and organisational accountability of 
Trans National Corporations.   
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governance is outwith the scope of this research but would offer a good opportunity 
for future research.  
With this in mind the next step in setting out the research question is to review the 
global governance literature with the aim of  identifying the food governance space, 
followed by the setting out of the research design.  
Global Governance 
  
Since the mid-1990s, global governance has increasingly taken a more central in 
International Relations (IR) and the key theorists in the literature, such as Rosenau, 
aims to account for the sources, nature and effects of governance efforts organized by 
networks of state and non-state actors operating beyond state borders (Rosenau, 
2002).  Focussing on a wider range of non-state actors as well as a state-level of 
analysis, it examines the diffusion of power from state to non-state actors at the 
transnational level and the resultant increase of power and role-taking of those 
transnational actors.  States are now only one type of actor (Katzenstein et al, 1998).    
Some scholars, such as Held and Hale (2001) countenance the discussion that global 
governance is not working with the argument that global governance is constantly 
adapting and readjusting.  Biermann and Pattberg (2008) develop this argument 
further by pointing out the dynamic features of contemporary governance; the 
emergence of new types of  actors, the emergence of new mechanisms and non-state 
led institutions, and increasing fragmentation and segmentation across all levels and 
functional spheres.    
Transnational governance states that territorial and national sovereignty can no longer 
be assumed (Djelic and Sahlin –Andersson, 2006) and the phrase ‘governance without 
government’ (Rosenau and Czempiel, 1992) represents the view in the International 
Relations literature that there are many other actors in contemporary governance 
processes in addition to national-level actors.  Networks of actors are formed as new 
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issues arise (Hancher and Moran, 1989)  and how these actors emerge, interrelate and 
enter the governance ‘field’ is of current research interest.  Capturing which actors are 
present in the global food governance field is of prime interest for this thesis.  In 
addition to network of actors discursive networks exist (Marcussen, 2000; Kogut and 
Macpherson, 2004) where expertise and knowledge claims legitimise actors so 
networks and governance processes are institutionally embedded.  
The two systems, government and governance also represent different democratic 
models with the authority system of government based on coercive rules – hard law – 
whereas the authority system of governance is based on non-legally binding rules, 
agreed with multiple authorities  who can be public or private, and the various private 
actors can take part in authoritative regulatory processes (Cutler et al, 1999) which 
result in soft law and soft regulation. The common themes of governance are that of a 
process rather than a system of rule with measures of control, measures and managing 
made up of inter-subjective norms, principles and rules (Jessop, 1998; Rosenau, 1999 
and 2002).  Specific focus on international law in global governance is provided in the 
work of Reus-Smit (2004) and issues of patenting and intellectual property law and 
environmental treaties, so key to global food governance, are soft laws and norms 
(Karns and Mingst, 2009).   As with the private actors in global food governance; 
TNCs, private voluntary organisations, civil society organisations and private 
foundations, the private actors in global governance more generally “regulate both 
states and much of transnational economic and social life” (Murphy, 2000:793) via 
the soft laws and norms.  Dahlberg pointed out two purposes in global governance, 
purpose (directing and guiding) and regulating (managing, restraining and 
controlling) whilst pursuing the “deeper purposes that groups and societies pursue” 
(Dahlberg, 2001:136). Duncan situates the global governance of food within a context 
of embedded neoliberalism to examine the legitimacy, accountability and 
categorisation questions of global governance (Duncan, 2015).   It is useful then, at 
this point to identify the portion of the global governance ‘space’  that governs food 
insecurity.  
The Global Food Governance ‘Space’  
  
To examine the effectiveness of global food governance, the next step is to set out the  
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GFG ‘space’.  The provenance of GFG can be traced to the creation of the United 
Nations’ Food and Agriculture Organization (FAO) in 1944 and its aim had to ‘ensure 
freedom from hunger’. The FAO’s entry was into a post war world where the food 
situation was in crisis.  In 1946 it produced a World Food Survey, the findings of 
which caused its director-general, Sir John Boyd- Orr to propose “a new global 
mechanism to provide a means of acting together, as well as consulting together” 
(Staples, 2006:86).  Boyd-Orr proposed a World Food Board with strong executive 
power to deal with production, distribution and consumption with aims of stabilising 
prices, establishing a world food reserve, providing “funds for the disposal of surplus 
agricultural products on special terms” and, lastly, to co-operate with industrial and 
agricultural organisations regarding trade and commodity policies (Staples, 2006:86;  
see FAO 1946).  The proposal was seen as being ‘inimical’ to trade interests of the 
hegemonic nations (Staples, 2006:88) and so failed.  Although the FAO was not 
invested with the powers of a food board it was given a mandate for ‘global food and 
agriculture’ (although the Soviet Union did not ratify its membership) (Clapp and 
Cohen, 2009).    
  
The FAO and the UN set up the World Food Program (WFP), established in 1963 to 
be a multilateral food aid initiative channelling food surpluses but since the efforts in 
their early years arose out of donor country surpluses, the redistribution of these 
surpluses, even based on humanitarian motives, brought criticisms that the disposal of 
these surpluses relieved downward pressure on prices in the donor’s own country and 
created food import dependency in developing countries, opening up new export 
markets (Clapp, 2012:30). In addition to economic benefits for donors, food aid has 
also been criticised for serving political objectives, particularly of the US although 
this critique has also been applied to Food aid from Canada and the EU (Clapp, 2012).  
  
Following the food crisis of the 1970s the 1974 World Food Conference led to the 
establishment of the International Fund for Agricultural Development (IFAD) in 
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1977, as a lender and implementer of agri-development projects.  The World Food 
Council was established by the General Assembly of the UN in 1974 to be a 
coordinating body for national ministries of agriculture but it was officially suspended 
in 1993.  Its function (which included global policy) returned to FAO in all matters 
except for agriculture and food trade, which were taken over by WFP.  Following the 
Uruguay round in 2000, the WTO took over responsibility for global agreements on 
agricultural trade.  Along with the World Bank and United Nations Development 
programme (UNDP), FAO  co-sponsored the Consultative Group on International 
Agricultural Research (CGIAR) in 1971 to develop agricultural research although this 
became dominated by the World Bank and eventually the role of FAO in technical 
agricultural research diminished.  In the 1980’s WFP became an ‘autonomous 
programme’ and resources available to the FAO decreased by 31% from 1994-2005, 
(not including crisis interventions) (Gustafson and Meikle in Clapp and Cohen (eds), 
2009:184).   
In independent external evaluations, FAO was critiqued as making ‘fragmented 
efforts’ and it has been ‘ conservative and slow to adapt’ with a ‘heavy and costly 
bureaucracy’ (FAO, 2007). The 2007 evaluation did conclude that the role of the FAO 
is crucial to the global governance space, particularly for global policy coherence and  
also for ensuring that the interests of the rural agricultural sector and the ‘hungry’ are 
not overlooked in global governance discussions. Over 100 changes were  
recommended in FAO’s 2007 evaluation which were incorporated into a Plan of 
Action which is currently being implemented.  The involvement of the OECD-G77 
members was a sign of a positive step yet others point out that reform is not a goal in 
itself, that the reduction of the hunger across the world is the aim:   
“most of the key players have now had comprehensive evaluations, including 
in addition to FAO, IFAD and the CGIAR system of international agricultural 
research centres…Most of the architecture is in place…But, despite the best 
efforts of all, the recent evaluations demonstrated that the international 
system, your international system is not working as a coherent whole.  The 
number of the world’s poor and hungry continues to grow instead of 
decreasing in line with the World Food Summit and Millennium Development 
Goals”  (Mohammad S. Noori-Naeini, Chair of the FAO Council, FAO, 
2008).  
  
  
  
  
  
  	  	   38	   
These eight decades have seen the proliferation of international institutions all 
charged with addressing the complex causes of hunger.  There are, at present, over a 
dozen international institutions active in the field of food security.  Numerous 
regional, non-governmental and private organisations work alongside these 
institutions: “This decentralized patchwork of institutions constitutes what may be 
best described as global food security governance” (Margulis, 2012: 231).   This over 
proliferation of actors can contribute to weak governance:  
"Along with the general intensified globalization of social relations in 
contemporary history has come an unprecedented expansion of regulatory 
apparatuses that cover planetary jurisdictions and constituencies. On the 
whole, however, this global governance remains weak relative to pressing 
current needs for global public policy. Shortfalls in moral standing, legal 
foundations, material delivery, democratic credentials and charismatic 
leadership have together generated large legitimacy deficits in existing global 
regimes" (Scholte, 2007).  
Although the UN system has traditionally been charged with addressing global 
hunger, principally through its three food agencies, the FAO, IFAD and the WFP, the 
World Trade Organisation (WTO) also effects GFG and since the UN and WTO have 
dramatically competing organisational rationales there are:  
“Major tensions between these two regimes, with WTO trade rules making 
agriculture and food increasingly subject to market forces, while, in sharp 
contrast, the UN advances a human rights approach to food and a greater role 
for states and deeper constraints on the market. The WTO’s expanding 
authority over food security has prompted this counter-movement by the UN 
system, with UN institutions actively seeking to shape WTO trade rules in an 
attempt to limit the negative impacts of trade liberalisation on world food 
security” (Margulis, 2012:1).  
This demonstrates the countervailing pulls of free trade neoliberalism and pro-rights 
international institutions across the food governance space.  Margulis sets out an 
image of international organisations as ‘semi-autonomous actors’ who “influence 
outcomes at competing institutional sites of global governance” (Margulis, 2012:1).  
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This also includes the World Bank and the IMF, and illustrates a point developed later 
in Chapter Two, that there is a lack of accountability and little oversight or democratic 
input of these institutions, “no matter how well intentioned” (Harvey, 2006:68).  With 
this patchwork of democratically weak institutions, the counter-pull of neoliberalism 
trade rules on the food system is more significant, meaning that the governance is 
contradictory and conflicted.  
At each of the ‘competing institutional sites’ that Margulis defines, varying 
configurations of state and non-state actors pursue competing objectives and 
regulatory outcomes.  From examining new efforts to govern land grabbing at the 
global level, Margulis asserts that a better understanding of the intrinsics of global 
governance can be gleaned from how different actors such as civil society 
organisations (CSO), IOs and  private sector actors and Nation-States (N-S) exercise 
power in transnational negotiations and how they shape an emergent global 
governance regime (Margulis, 2013).     
Therefore, changes to the food governance space are possible.  Another comparable 
governance area of interest is the institutional negotiations around Climate Change, 
which illustrates the potential of a dynamic governance regime. In this parallel 
Human Security issue, the scientific intergovernmental body, the International Panel 
of Climate Change (IPCC), was set up in 1988 at the request of member governments 
and by two UN organisations; the United Nations Environment Programme (UNEP) 
and the World Meteorological Organization (WMO) (more than 120 governments are 
currently involved in the IPCC).  The IPCC was subsequently endorsed by the UN 
General Assembly.  Thousands of experts including scientists and environmentalists  
contribute on a voluntary basis, writing a ‘Summary for Policymakers’ which is 
subject to detailed approval by the governments.   
At the regional level  and also of interest to GFG is the European Court of Justice’s 
legal judgment on the applicability of criminal sanctions for bodies who breach EU 
legislation on Climate Change 9 and also a second legal judgement on the issue of 
                                                
9 Norman notes that the ‘environmental crimes case’ was against the explicitly stated preferences of a 
vast majority of member state governments. The Community gained the competence to impose on 
member states the enforcement of Community law via the use of criminal sanctions. The political 
significance of the decision at the time was considerable since national systems of criminal law are 
generally regarded as sovereign.  (Norman, 2014).   
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light arms control 10 (Norman, 2014).  The Commission effectively brought these two 
policy issues from the area of intergovernmental cooperation into the supranational 
framework of the European Community.  Can these recent developments in the 
governance of land grabs, climate change and gun control be reproduced for food 
security?  At the European level some political will amongst member states for 
addressing food security is evident from recent developments such as the land grabs 
ruling which outlaws grabs by the EU in 2013. Also the recent discussion about the 
non-commoditisation of food in the EU is directly relevant.  It is interesting to note 
another countervailing pull on global governance, this time by the EU.    
Mapping out the food governance field is the first step for the research design to 
enable investigation into the ineffectiveness of the global food governance field.   
Theoretical Perspectives and Research Design  
  
With the assumptions, definitions and theoretical context to this research question 
outlined, the next point is to briefly set out the theoretical perspectives and research 
design drawn from the bodies of literature. It will first outline the theoretical 
perspectives, then the research design, and then discuss the constraints on designing 
such a research project, mindful that certain theoretical approaches demand specific 
methodologies and different theories may explain the same events differently  “all 
theories include varying levels of structural understanding” (Wight, 2006:288).    
A Marxist perspective is drawn upon to understand the current food insecurity 
situation in that structural factors drive the current food system, factors which have 
arisen due to the anarchical international society.   There is enough food produced 
                                                
10 In this second case, the ‘small arms case’, the Commission gained the right to enact measures in the 
field of non-proliferation and disarmament of small arms and light weapons (SALW) in the 
Community’s development  policy framework (Norman, 2014).  In both examples the Commission, 
which is an international administrative body, successfully challenged the Council and the member 
states in the European Court of Justice (Norman, 2014).  
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annually to feed the world so one of the key questions is why is there an apparent lack 
of political will to fairly distribute food (Battisti, 2014).   Dependency theory, the 
differentiation between core, peripheral and semi-peripheral countries, and the global 
economy, specifically the global organisation of production and global finance (see  
Cox in Gill, 1993) and the smallholder/peasant’s commuted role due to the 
international division of labour are all key influences in this thesis.  Marxism and 
global governance studies examine the challenges of globalisation through 
examination of the means of production and power (see Callinicos, 2002).    Some 
elements from the food sovereignty perspective, that the business practices of the 
TNCs are a form of neo-colonialism, are also taken into account, specifically in 
contextualising the current food security situation and enabling Critical Analysis.   
Field Theory is also drawn upon as a theoretical perspective and is  used as the 
methodological approach to understand the organisation of the food governance field, 
and this is covered in more depth in Chapter Three.  
The Research Design and Methods  
  
This investigation uses the following research methods.  Firstly, a Bourdieusian Field  
Analysis of the global food governance field, to set out the main actors in the field  
and to define, their ‘governance criteria’ such as their economic capital.  The second 
research method is qualitative research, consisting of semi-structured interviews with 
senior executives in the global food governance field.  The third method is case 
studies with one organisation from each of the four sectors of the global governance 
field.  These four case studies will illustrate the findings from the Field Analysis and 
qualitative research.   
The selection of these methods is justified on the basis that the global governance of 
food security is a multi-factored problem with many levels of ‘structural 
understanding’, and many variables, too many independent variables to run a 
positivist quasi-experiment or establish a causative link between any one factor and 
food security.   If we perceive that there are two ways to test theories - either 
experimentation or observation - then with experimentation not being viable, 
observation is the required approach (Van Evera, 1997).     
  
  
  
  
  	  	   42	   
Alternative research designs were also considered.  A comparative case-study 
approach was considered as the major methodology for the research design but this 
would have investigated a variable of commonalities and differences between, say 
food crises and insecurity, rather than addressing the variable of effective governance 
of food insecurity.  The scale and imperative in the problem of global governance 
itself needs a more direct attempt at addressing the issue of ineffective food security 
governance.  So rather than a comparative case study, the use of methods  in this 
thesis involves Field Analysis, interviews and brief case studies which together will 
inform a map of the structure and practices of the international institutional system.  
This combination of research methods will allow both explanation and analysis.  It 
will yield the data needed to answer the research question with specificity, for 
example, what are the obstacles to attaining a stable food system?  What is the 
architecture of the global food governance field?  This research design will allow for a 
description of the current global food governance space and, using a Critical 
Approach in interpreting the data, an interpretative analysis of the remedies needed to 
establish a stable and effective food security governance system.   This will be done 
in sequence over the middle chapters with a view to identifying and then analysing 
the field.   This is a standard approach in research because “There are always two 
stories to tell, one explanatory and the other interpretive, and that they cannot finally 
be combined” (Hollis and Smith, 1994, cited in Wight, 2006:255).  Robert Cox 
articulates a distinction between critical and problem-solving theories with the former 
“raising questions about the historical location of both the theorist and his or her 
theory” (Fierke, 2007:1) and the latter reckoning the world as it is and attempting to 
find solutions (Cox, 1981)  
As has been set out so far, the overall research objective is to investigate the global 
food governance field with a research design that identifies the main actors and 
architecture, analyses global food governance issues through the viewpoint of 
interviews with actors involved in the global governance field and depicts one 
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organisation from each sector of global food governance by case study. The research 
is constructed this way in an attempt to answer the research questions.  Combining 
methods can be a powerful approach, “as each method can, to some degree, offset the 
limitations of other methods” (Bennett, 2007:171).  The original conceptualisation of 
the research design did not include the Field Analysis but when the search for a ‘map’ 
of the global food governance field to enable the selection of respondents for the 
interviews proved fruitless, then its necessity became apparent.  A modification of 
Bourdieusian Field Analysis was chosen as the method due to the disparate 
architecture of the field, (which ranges from NGOs through TNCs to peasant 
networks as each have some role in the global food governance).  
Therefore, the research is looking for ‘structural understanding’, by examining the 
actors, processes and issues in global food governance.  It outlines any causal 
mechanism in food security and crises or the governance of them but is not setting out 
to establish causation per se.  So the research design aims to support the research 
puzzle drawn from the literature review to explain, understand and interpret the global 
governance of food insecurity, based on the question of how food insecurity is 
governed.  Individual introduction to each of the three components and methods now 
follows.  
Field Analysis: Mapping The Global Food Governance Field  
  
A map of the global food governance space and the relevant institutions and actors is 
essential.  Field Analysis enables a scoping of the main remit and main actors 
involved in the GFG.  Bourdieu’s Field Theory allows the examination of the field as 
a contested space, the rules of the ‘game’ (doxa) and the habitus of those who occupy 
the field.  Effectiveness of the International Organisations overall will also be 
evaluated in the elite interviews.  Other organisations evaluated include Non-
Governmental Organisations (NGO), Trans National Corporations (TNC), who fulfil 
a political role in food security as well as Civil Society Organisations (CSO), who are 
largely marginal   Chapter Three contains the results and findings from the Field 
Analysis.   
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Qualitative Interviews  
  
Chapter Four contains the interview results and case studies. The ten interviews 
evaluate the global food governance field and are also used for corroborative and 
additive purposes, to provide new information on the real-world experience of food 
insecurity. As semi-structured interviews they allow for deeper qualitative insights 
and have many benefits, allowing for flexibility, such as being centred around a 
cluster of themes and issues.  Semi-structured interviews can also test official 
statistics and by not restricting respondents to a set list of questions and can allow for 
respondent questions, comments, further qualitative points and even counter 
narratives to the hegemonic narrative to be expressed (Cresswell, 2007).  The 
interviews are looking for a critical analysis of the global food governance field itself.   
Case Studies  
  
The four case studies are each drawn from a sector in global food governance and are 
the World Food Programme (IO/NGO), Monsanto (TNC), the Gates Foundation 
(Charity) and La Via Campesina (Civil Society Organisation).  In addition to 
corroboration, an aim of the case study can also be illustrative: “Case study methods, 
especially the combination of process tracing and typological theorizing, have 
considerable advantages in studying complex phenomena” (Bennett & Elman, 
2007:171).  The case study can also provide an opportunity for a close focus on the 
issue of food security and to also usefully intensively illustrate the theories. David  
Collier points to the special contributions of “researchers who are experts at  
‘extracting new ideas at close range’…these scholars are deeply engaged both with 
theory and with the close analysis of cases, giving them an unusual capacity to see the 
general in the particular… [and develop] differentiated and more closely focused 
concepts” (Collier, 1999: 4).  The fifth and final chapter offers a synthesized analysis 
and recommendations to achieve effective global governance of food security.  
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In summary, this chapter has introduced the topic, set out the research questions, key 
definitions and assumptions, established the disciplinary locus, scoped the food 
security problem and food governance space, and described the research approach, 
objectives and design.  It also reviews the most relevant bodies of literature. It then 
sets out the theoretical perspective and sets out the research design, outlining each of 
the three methods.   
Chapter Two continues the discussion on food security discourses by reviewing 
bodies of literature which are more contextual to the topic, namely the globalisation, 
human security, development and international political economy literatures.  The 
wider point that all hunger is political is established as a core understanding.  The 
politics of hunger and famine are also discussed.   
In conclusion, with one in seven currently going hungry and this possibly worsening 
to one in three in the next 40 years, food security is of paramount importance to the 
future of human security and the globe.  Biofuel cropping, climate change, 
globalisation, peak oil and the commoditisation of food have all contributed to the 
degrading food security situation as has the ineffective governance of food insecurity 
at national, international and global levels.  Since the 2008 food crisis it has become 
apparent that the effectiveness of the global governance of food, along with climate 
change governance, is now at the very centre of humanity’s fate.  
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Chapter Two   The Lie of the Land: The Politics of Food security.  
  
"There is no such thing as an apolitical food problem" Amartya Sen (1982).  
  
As established in the last chapter, food insecurity is a key element of Human Security 
and is one of the dominant threats of the 21st Century.  Interrogating the global 
governance of food security in this context needs to first identify the political 
contexts.  Understanding food security as food access rather than just supply of food 
per se alters both the conceptualisation of food security and the questions about the 
governance of food.  If, as Sen proposes in the opening quote of this chapter, no food 
problem is apolitical, then to what extent is food insecurity driven by political factors? 
And to what degree can these political drivers and contexts be improved to mitigate 
food insecurity?  How is entitlement to access of food decided and by whom?  
Additionally, how important is the political dimension of food security to evaluating 
the global governance of food?       
Political Contexts of Food Security  
  
To answer these questions, this chapter continues the literature review on 
globalisation to set out the political contexts to food insecurity and delineate  
obstacles to establishing an effective food security regime.   The second section in this 
chapter has a further discussion on the main relevant discourses in global governance, 
such as the role and scope of International Organisations and asks what could 
effective global governance of food security achieve? This description further defines 
the research puzzle, forms the platform into the research results and analysis in the 
subsequent chapters of this thesis.    
  
McDonald suggests that solutions to food insecurity can be classified as two-fold: 
either addressing the causes (cause-focussed) or addressing the manifestations of food 
insecurity (effects-focussed) (McDonald, 2012). Yet challenges to achieving food 
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security arise from not addressing not only the causes and effects of food crises and 
food insecurity but also the political dimension of food insecurity.  Many 
commentators frequently point out that there is enough food to feed the world’s 
population but “it is increasingly evident that the problem is not so much a technical 
one of producing more food as a political one of ensuring that food is available to 
those who need it” (McKeon, 2011:1).   The levels of global governance responses to 
these factors vary from none/ad-hoc/some/full response and, it is argued here, are 
themselves often shaped by political agendas and motivations.  Therefore the 
effectiveness of global governance policy solutions vary across causes, effects and 
political dimensions of food insecurity and as such, are often neither as urgent nor as 
effective as the degrading food security situation demands. 11  This ‘cause-or-effects’ 
solution categorisation is an important distinction, which is useful as a ready reckoner 
for quickly identifying the type of solution.  Food aid, for example is effects-focussed 
whilst food trade stimulation measures are cause-focussed.  Initiatives which 
empower women are examples of a solution which addresses the ‘political’ dimension 
of food insecurity.   
     
                                                
11 Over-nutrition, or excessive net energy intake, is often taken as being the other side of the coin from 
under-nutrition and both often classed as malnutrition (McDonald, 2012). Malnutrition is a form of 
structural violence, as defined by Galtung’s definition of an impairment of fundamental human needs 
and Gilligan’s of  "the increased rates of death and disability suffered by those who occupy the bottom 
rungs of society, as contrasted with the relatively lower death rates experienced by those who are above 
them" (Gilligan, 1997: 89; see also Galtung, 1969).  .    
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Food Insecurity Factors and causes  Food 
insecurity 
Cause?  
Food insecurity 
Challenge  
Current Global 
Governance policy 
response?  
Whose 
remit?  
(i.e.  
which 
Sector)  
Biofuels  Yes  Yes  Exacerbated by GG 
policy  
GG + N- 
S  
Commoditisation of food  Yes  Yes  Exacerbated by GG 
policy  
GG + NS, 
TNC  
Decrease in food trade and exchanges  Yes  Yes  None  GG + TNC  
Effects of Global Credit Crisis  No  Yes  None  GG + TNC  
Effects of Peak Oil & oil crisis  Yes  Yes  Biofuels  GG+N-S 
+TNC  
Effects of the Water crisis  Yes  Yes  None  GG + TNC  
Environmental factor: crop failure  Yes  Yes  Ad hoc/reactive  GG + N- 
S  
Environmental factor: land degradation 
(deforestation/desertification)  
Yes  Yes  Yes –some 
mitigating policies  
GG+ 
NS+CS  
Environmental factor: droughts  Yes  Yes  Ad hoc/reactive  GG, N-S CS  
Financialisation of agricultural trade  Yes  Yes  Exacerbated by GG 
policy  
GG  
+TNC   
Financialisation of poverty  No  Yes  Exacerbated by GG 
policy  
GG+  
N-S  
+TNC  
Fossil fuel dependent agriculture   Yes  Yes  None  GG + N- 
S +TNC  
Interest of corporate actors  No  Yes  Exacerbated by GG 
policy  
TNC  
Lack of plurality of International actors  No  Yes  Exacerbated by GG 
policy or practice  
GG+CS  
Land deals/land grabs  Yes  Yes  Exacerbated by GG 
policy or practice  
GG  
+NS+  
TNC  
Neoliberal policies  Yes  Yes  Exacerbated by GG 
policy  
GG + N- 
S +TNC  
Population Explosion  Yes  Yes  None  N-S  
Climate Change  Yes  Yes  Some/piecemeal  GG +N-S  
Corruption/kleptocracy/dictatorship  Yes  Yes  No  N-S  
 
Table 3 Food Insecurity Factors and Causes (compiled from multiple sources). Key:  
GG=Global Governance level. N-S =Nation-State.  TNC-Trans National Corp. CS=Civil Society.  
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Compiled in Table 3 above are 19 causes and factors which are challenges to 
establishing a stable food security governance system.  These are drawn from food 
security literature.  Each factor is also a food insecurity challenge but not necessarily 
a cause  of food insecurity in itself for example the effects of the global financial 
crisis are not directly a cause of food insecurity (but are a challenge).   Neither is the 
lack of plurality of actors in global governance a cause but it is a challenge (although 
this later thesis argues that it is also a cause).  The level of global governance 
response is estimated from the literatures and indicated. Seven of these factors and 
causes  have no current global governance response, four have some sort of global 
governance policy response (of which three have an ad hoc or piecemeal policy 
response). As for the balance, the remaining eight causes/factor are exacerbated by 
global governance policy response. For example biofuels cropping, which uses arable 
land to grow biofuels rather than food is exacerbated by the global governance policy 
which saw this as a route to replacing fossil fuel dependence.  The column on the 
extreme right of Table 3 displays the remit (not in a self-conferred meaning of remit 
but in a statutory sense (for IOs), or ‘who has responsibility’ sense) and it can be seen 
that most of these have IOs, TNCs (as commercial actors) or Nation-States down as 
the global governance sector holding responsibility.  This is not equal to taking 
responsibility but more of a mechanism to start to appraise and equate the multiple 
causes of food insecurity with a sector.  As new policies initiate and develop, this 
table will change but it is a snapshot of the food security causes and factors discussed 
offered in the literatures.  
  
To aid analysis of the effectiveness of global food governance policies, a 
‘performance gap’ in global governance is identified, arising from a number of 
questions on how effective global food governance has been to date.12  To fully 
address these questions, the next step is to outline the politics of food insecurity and 
famine.  Then the political contexts of the causes and obstacles are critically analysed  
                                                
12 Principally, what is currently being done by the global food governance actors and how effective are 
these measures?  What needs to be done to establish a stable and effective food security regime?  How 
can global governance effectively address these causal factors and impediments to establishing food 
security?  How can the causes and drivers of food insecurity be overcome and should global 
governance first develop cause-focussed solutions or effects-focussed solutions  (or both, given their 
sometime overlap) and what are the constraints  to them doing so?  Given the forecasted exponential 
rise of the human cost of this problem, what should the targets of effective governance be?  Lastly, 
which political agenda and political culture changes need to be made to enable International 
Organisations to fully face and address the devastating food security crisis?  
  
  
  
  
  	  	   50	   
before moving on to reviewing the current global governance food security field 
asking, who are the actors and ‘in whose interest do they act’?   
  
In line with the Food Justice approach to food security, the view that food insecurity 
is caused by inequity in food access, food use and distribution of food makes a case 
that hunger is political.  To analyse what this means for establishing an effective and 
stable food security governance regime, it is useful to first deepen the understanding 
of the political dimension of food insecurity, that is the politics of hunger and famine.  
The Politics of Hunger 
  
As introduced earlier, Sen’s main argument is that famine is not only a lack of food 
but also arises from inequalities in the mechanisms for distribution of food (Sen, 
1981) and that food insecurity (and the hungry) are manifestations of these legal and 
economic inequalities (Sen, 1982).  Examining the Bengal Famine of 1943, Sen 
argues that it was caused by an economic boom predominantly in urban areas which 
resulted in food prices increasing.  Earning wages which could not purchase the 
amount or quality of food required, millions of rural workers in Bengal died of 
starvation.  Famines do not always necessarily mean that food supplies are 
significantly reduced.  Instead, Sen argues, famine was lack of monetary means to 
buy food as prices increased due to buying behaviours and factors caused by the war.  
These behaviours included hoarding, panic buying and acquisition by the British 
military (Sen, 1981).  This entitlement approach argued against the Malthusian 
tradition of undersupply of food instead emphasising the restricted access to food, 
through lack of entitlements which consist of endowments and entitlements.  
Endowment equates to the control of assets and some resources such as labour power. 
Entitlement refers to “the set of alternative commodity bundles that a person can 
command in a society using the totality of right and opportunities that he or she faces” 
(Sen, 1984, p. 497, cited in Devereux, 2001, p. 246).  
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Initiating Factors Of Famine  Common Policy Responses For Famine  
Food Availability Decline  Tax Relief  
Market Dynamics  Pastoral Protection  
Government Response  Early Warning System  
International Response  Food Support Mechanisms  
Conflict Or War  Good National Governance  
Crop Failure  Freedom Of Speech/Press  
Market Failure  Microfinance  
Failed Economy    
Table 4:   Factors of Famine and Responses.  
Source: Compiled from: West, 2005; Sen, 1981.  
  
As can be seen from Table 4 above initiating factors of famine include measures of 
ineffective government and governance therefore ineffective governmental and 
international responses can cause famine and food insecurity.  Signals of famine 
include drops in food availability, crop failure and a failing economy.   The ratio of 
these factors may vary from case to case but they are each factors which initiate 
famine.  However, the conventionally proscribed common policy solutions for famine 
(right hand column, Table 4) include measures of democratisation, such as freedom of 
speech but no social protection policy to shore up ineffective governments, nor 
redress of the failure of international response (or any other governance performance 
gap).  There is a mismatch between the initiating factors of famine and the common 
policy solution for famine (and therefore extreme food insecurity) as mentioned in the 
literatures.  The initiating factors are cause-focussed and the solutions are effects-
focussed and this is a pairing typical of food insecurity resolution.  There are 
economic measures in the policy solutions but no governance measures.  This 
mismatch may represent a lack of cognisance or political will to reform global 
governance, a rejection of the food justice approach and its assertion that hunger is 
political or perhaps even devolution of the responsibility for addressing famine to the 
nation-state.   
   
Critics of Sen’s entitlement approach point to its food perspective, which ignores 
other contextual factors to famine such as social disruption (deWaal, 1990; Osmani, 
1993). Critics of Sen have also commented that a significant decline in food 
availability may have contributed significantly to the Bengal Famine after all.  In 
response, Sen states that food production had been higher that year than the 
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production in previous years and a number of socio-economic factors, namely 
declining wages, poor food-distribution systems, rising food prices  and 
unemployment were also at play (Sen, 2009).  These factors led to starvation and, Sen 
comments, it is important to note that it was only certain groups in society who were 
affected, namely those who did not have the capability to pay for the high food prices.   
This analysis of famine is also relevant to food insecurity and food crises.  It is the 
cost of food and inequalities in the distribution of food that are the drivers for food 
insecurity.  The price spikes in food crises impacts on those low-paid groups without 
the capability to endure even a short-term rise in prices.  It is not the freedom to buy 
food that is affected but the freedom to have the capability to buy food.   
  
In his later work Sen further evolved this ‘capability’ approach to understanding 
famine and Table 5 below sets out the definitions of the main terms.  Having the 
capability to obtain food or vote is what matters since having the ‘right’ is only 
hypothetical if the capability does not exist alongside (Sen, 2009).  In short, rights like 
food access or equality may be legal rights but also need to be physically attainable. 
‘Functionings’ are the constituent elements of capability and can vary from, in the 
instance of voting, education and literacy down to transportation to the polls.  When 
functionings enable the capability to access rights, then personal choice is present.  In 
this way, development is about obtaining freedom (Sen, 2012).  Freedom without the 
capability to exert personal choice in the deployment of freedom is, Sen proposes, an 
empty right.  
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Term  Definition  
Entitlement  Having the legal means to secure enough food plus other commodities to 
survive.  Entitlement is based on endowment and exchange.  
Endowment  Having resources to exchange (internal).  This includes labour, cash, access to 
credit and assets. Endowment loss means depleting resources.  
Exchange  Dependent on the cost of living (external) - the opportunities in the market to 
exchange other commodities.  
Capability  This is a measure of functional capabilities and has five components in 
assessing a person’s capability.   
•   The importance of real freedoms.  
•   Differences across individuals in the capability to transform resources 
into valuable activities.  
•   The range of nature of activities giving rise to happiness.  
•   Both materialistic and non-materialistic factors used to evaluate human 
welfare.  
•   Concern about the distribution of opportunities within society.  
  
Table 5:  Sen’s Food-related Welfare Economics terms and definitions. (Compiled from Anand 
P, Santos C and Smith R, 2009 and Sen, 1981).  
  
Applying this ‘development as freedom’ approach to food insecurity further, if a 
livelihood is not enough, in food security terms, to have on-going access to quality, 
nutritionally appropriate food, then securing the right to food access, although an 
important statement of equality, remains an empty concept if the functionings and 
capability exist for all to obtain food on an on-going basis without resorting to coping 
strategies such as selling land or debt loading, which jeopardise future food security 
(Sen, 1981, Sen, 2009).  Under this approach it is inequality and lack of justice and 
freedom which inhibit food security.  Issues which, in light of the effects of 
globalisation and the crisis of advanced capitalism outlined next in this chapter, may 
be best remedied with well-developed policy solutions at the global governance level, 
perhaps implemented at a national level.  Although Sen states that famines do not 
occur in functioning democracies due to public opinion and representative 
governance, extreme food insecurity and food crises, (stages two and three of the five-
level famine intensity scale) now do (see Table 2 for the famine scales).  The current 
exigencies of the sovereign debt crisis in European countries like Greece or Spain or 
the over one million users of food banks in the U.K. (BBC, 2014) show that whilst the 
intensity and magnitude of  famine may not be present in advanced democracies (a 
minor famine is measured by WFP and USAID as level four on the intensity scale) 
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democratic governance is no bulwark against food insecurity or early stage famine. In 
advanced industrial societies the problem of food insecurity is often represented as an 
individual rather than systemic problem.  If stages two or three of the famine scale are 
consistently evident in the food deserts of the US or across UK housing schemes 
where many depend on food banks, then these are systemic problems which show 
chronic food insecurity.13  
  
If Sen’s conceptualisation of ‘democratic food capability’ is no longer entirely 
applicable in the face of the phenomenon of global food insecurity, then is it possible 
that food insecurity and famine are by-products of globalisation and advanced 
capitalism? The Human Security view of food insecurity as one of the most relevant 
approaches of threat and risk to the individual is also important to Sen’s entitlement 
and capabilities concepts. Continuing the distinction between cause-focussed and 
effects-focussed solutions for achieving food security, the next section goes onto 
analyse with more specificity the global economic and political contexts of food 
insecurity.  This builds towards the argument that effective global governance and not 
necessarily just democratic national-level government is key to addressing food 
insecurity.    
Locating Food Security in Human Security  
  
Food security is most frequently positioned as part of Human Security studies.  
Human Security itself is most times located in the International Relations discipline 
rather than Development Studies or Human Geography per se because, as soft 
security, it sits within Security Studies (Cottey, 2011:192).  The main focus in Human 
                                                
13 Of course it is morally inequivalent to discuss the threat of famine in so-called ‘first world’ nations 
whilst famines do sap developing economies across the globe.  The point made here is to use recent 
events to counter Sen’s assertion regarding democracy as an indicator of food security and instead 
highlight that food insecurity is now truly a global phenomenon and it can no longer be presumed that 
functioning democracies are immune.  This underscores the point made earlier that political freedom is 
not the default solution to food insecurity or even the solution itself (Sen, 2009).  
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Security is from the individual, rather than the state or collective perspective but 
placing it in International Relations underscores the point that International Relations 
has not always addressed the individual level perspective. A brief overview of Human 
Security follows next and a more detailed setting out of the causes of food insecurity 
follows in Chapter Two.  
As one of the main subject focus in the larger intellectual map, Human Security 
describes ‘a condition of existence’ which includes basic material needs, human 
dignity, including meaningful participation in the life of the community, and an active 
participation in democracy from the local to the global (Fierke, 2007).  
Globalisation plus the failure of liberal state building due to the Washington 
Consensus,14  the reducing threat of nuclear war between the superpowers, the end of 
the Cold War and the spread of democratisation and international human rights norms 
are all contributory factors in moving the focus from the state onto the individual.  
The proliferation and increase of new security threats at the end of the Cold War gave 
rise to a new security agenda which included the environment, migration, poverty and 
human rights (Fierke, 2007).  To adapt to these new security threats, the referent 
object expanded to include other objects rather than just nation-states e.g. 
communities, individuals and the world itself.  This avoids limiting the study of 
security to a one-way causal relationship and instead looks at the issue which poses 
the greatest threat and which should therefore be the target.   
This decreasing relevance of traditional definitions of security to the contemporary 
world was foregrounded with two developments in the mid-1990s (Fierke, 2007).  
The UN Human Development Reports of 1990 and 1994, with their development of 
security and development discourses, established the point that without justice there 
could be no peace – underdevelopment is a threat in itself in that it has a correlation 
with violent conflict (Fierke, 2007). Human Security emphasises meeting basic 
material needs as well as preserving human dignity. Out of this came the assumption 
that the Liberal Democratic model would help to establish peace.   As we have seen 
above, there is no guaranteeing peace through liberal institutions alone.   
                                                
14 The Washington Consensus, in its more commonly used broader definition of ‘stabilise, liberalise 
and privatise’ peaked in the 1990s and ended with the 2008-09 financial crisis which saw a Keynesian 
resurgence of fiscal stimuli and expansionist monetary policy.  These ‘first generation’ macroeconomic 
and trade reforms have been augmented with non-Washington consensus reforms such as programmes 
to support the poor, educational improvements and institutional reforms.  
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A new Human Security agenda arose from both the recognition of this new global 
reality of failed and collapsed states and the 1990 and 1994 UNDP reports, 
themselves precipitated by the growing human rights, sustainable development and 
human development discourses which called for an approach to addressing human 
insecurity. 15   
The UNDP 1994 report argued that human security needs both ‘Freedom from Fear’ 
and ‘Freedom from Want’ and these  two schools of thought emerged over the scope 
of the threats and the mechanisms for protection.  The Freedom from Fear approach 
seeks to prioritise protecting individuals from violent conflicts whilst recognising that 
these violent threats are strongly associated with poverty, lack of state capacity and 
other inequalities. Emergency assistance, conflict prevention and resolution and 
peace-building are the main concerns of this approach.  The Freedom from Want 
school advocates a wider approach to human security, incorporating security and 
development goals, arguing that the scope of threats should include threats to security 
like hunger, disease and natural disasters because they are so often at the root of 
human insecurity and more devastating in scale than genocide, terrorism and wars 
combined.  The concept of food insecurity partly arises from the Freedom from Want 
school (UNDP, 1994).  
Human insecurity is widely recognised as an issue which, due to the scale of those 
affected, supersedes state insecurity.  Recent developments which include the increase 
in the number of failed states, the rising number of civilians killed in conflict versus 
military, and environmental degradation (which affects more livelihoods) have meant 
the need to include a focus on the individual-as-referent is clearly understood.  Fierke 
argues that against the ‘backdrop’ of  9/11, Hurricane Katrina and the lack of 
                                                
15 Despite the declaration at the World Food Summits of 1996 and 2002, the ‘eradication of hunger’ was 
downplayed as an actual development objective although lobbying by the FAO resulted in the  
“eradication of hunger” being included in the Millennium Development Goals.  The eight Millennium 
Development Goals (MDGs) range from halving extreme poverty to halting the spread of HIV/AIDS 
and providing universal primary education, all by the target date of 2015.  The blueprint set in 2000 
in the United Nations Millennium Declaration aimed to form a Global Partnership to reduce extreme  
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protection for citizens of failed states,  “…[they have] exposed the vulnerability of the 
world’s military and economic hyperpower”  and a new meaning of security as 
‘protection from harm’ has emerged (Fierke, 2007:10).    
 
The desire for security, Fierke argues, arises from the shared experience of the 
individual’s and community’s vulnerability.  The juxtaposition of the traditional focus 
of security studies, that of individuated “states preparing for military defence against 
enemies” throws the challenge of defining security for the contemporary world into 
the spotlight (Fierke 2007:10).  Whom one chooses to protect, though, is political.  
The traditional viewpoint of the protection of those bounded by the state has been 
challenged since the state can also be  a source of threat to its inhabitants.  Two 
examples frequently put forward are the erosion of civil liberties in the Homeland Act 
in the US and the rise of covert surveillance by the UK following the so-called ‘War 
on Terror’ (Fierke, 2007).  The trade-off between liberty and security is renegotiated 
by the ongoing consensus and dissensus within the state. ‘Fear of poverty and achieve 
a set of time-bound goals.                                                                                                                          
 
 The 2010 Review Summit adopted a Global Action Plan to achieve the eight anti-
poverty goals by their 2015 target date with major new commitments on women's and 
children's health, and major new initiatives in the worldwide battle against poverty, 
hunger and disease (UN MDG website, accessed 12 September 2013).  
 
Food Loss’ is often used as a political gambit and is a recurrent driver in conflict.  The 
political manipulation of fear commonly use entitlement to food as a political reward 
and fear of its loss can garner popular support and shape the boundaries of a group, 
defined by those who are and are not entitled to food access. 16  Even humanitarian 
intervention such as food aid could be seen as ongoing exploitation by foreign powers 
(Fierke, 2007), a form of ‘recycled imperialism’ (Chomsky 1999). This legacy of 
imperialism is perpetuated by globalisation, which is discussed in detail in the review 
of the literature on advanced capitalism.  
  
                                                
16 One recent example of this is Greece’s extreme right-wing group Golden Dawn, who provide food to 
those who prove they are Greek but not to immigrants (Alderman, L., 2012 Right-Wing extremists 
popularity rising rapidly in Greece, New York Times, 30/9/2012).  
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The Critical approach to security proposes that, since the present is ‘hardwired’ to the 
past then the present situation cannot be assessed without reference to the historical 
context and legacies which shape the current structures.  This also explains why 
international responses to violence or suffering, such as food insecurity, arise from an 
intention and assumed responsibility to ‘fix’ a problem.  This explains criticisms of  
‘sticking plaster’ solutions that respond to moments of crisis rather than addressing 
the underlying structural reasons for the perpetuation of crises.  Which is not to 
condemn any humanitarian response to a crisis, which should be as quick and as 
comprehensive as the situation demands.  Instead it is make a point against only 
transient  remedies. Any imperative of the moral agency of the international actors is 
met when they respond to the crisis of powerless victims.  Yet there is surely also an 
unmet moral imperative to overhaul or reform the international structures, to address 
any unjust post-colonial overhang which might perpetuate the situation of these 
powerless victims and crises.  Indeed contemporary practices can “reproduce 
hierarchies of power” and  “contribute to the reproduction of war and insecurity” 
(Fierke 2007:9). This reproduction of war and insecurity is accompanied by the 
reproduction of these transient remedies.  This creates a cycle of issue-response (or 
sometimes non-response) which, it can be argued, address the symptoms but not the 
pathology. When it comes to food security, is it the case that international actors, such 
as the FAO and WFP by reproducing the structures of power and knowledge, cause 
the problems that they are also trying to solve?  If so, this would mean that food 
insecurity can be placed into the category of a super-wicked problem 17 which adds 
focus onto the agencies tasked with remedying the situation.  This also raises a further 
question about intentionality of international actors, which is also discussed further in 
Chapter Two and in the qualitative research in Chapter Four.  
 
                                                
17 Under the Levin (2012) definition of super-wicked problems the other criteria are 1. Time is running 
out. 2. No central authority. 3. Those seeking to solve the problem are also causing it. 4. Policies 
discount the future irrationally. While the items that define a wicked problem relate to the problem 
itself, the items that define a super wicked problem relate to the agent trying to solve it.  Global 
warming is also a super wicked problem.  Conklin (2005) expanded Churchman’s (1967) term.  
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Critique of Human Security  
 
Critics of the concept of Human Security point to the problem of making the 
individual the key referent of security - it removes agency from the state which is the 
conventional agent through which human security can be obtained.  The state is “a 
necessary condition for individual security because without the state it is not clear 
what other agency is to act on behalf of individuals” (Buzan 2000:6).  It should be 
recognised, however, that human insecurity proliferates in all societies. NGOs and 
IOs point to the erosion of Human Security despite structural adjustment programmes 
and other liberal model actions and instead call for the transformation of global 
structures and economy (Fierke, 2007).  For issues like food security, Human Security 
creates the necessary paradigm for a human-centred approach, around which actions 
and policies can be actioned. It establishes the forces of globalisation as being 
multiple threats to the individual, manifested in the socio-economic inequalities of the 
globalised world.  Food Security sits in this thematic locus of Human Security.    
If not the individual nor always the state, this then passes the agency for Human 
Security onto other structures and agents.  Thomas points to the global level:    
“the shift to human security…highlights the importance of scrutinising global 
processes that may impact on, even jeopardise security and the global 
governance structures which drive these processes” (Thomas, 2009:9).    
  
Food Insecurity, manifest in each nation-state, also requires the scrutiny of global 
governance structures. The traditional viewpoint of development assumes the 
transition from a subsistence to a modern industrial economy to be a process 
understood as reliant on modern science, technology and driven by elites.                                                                                                                                
It assumes that non-Western states are, due to unlimited economic growth, in 
transition to achieving living standards akin to Europeans or North Americans.  Yet 
food insecurity is endemic in Europe and North America too.  As evidenced by the 
rise and proliferation of food banks since the financial crash of 2008, new specific 
food insecure phenomena such as ‘hidden hunger’ or ‘food deserts’ are developing.  
Are Nation-States now developed only in pockets with other parts of the state 
underdeveloped or in stasis?  Do these zones and communities suffer from chronic 
rather than transient food insecurity?   
  
  
  
  
  	  	   60	   
In contrast to the Liberal Development model, Worlds Systems Theory proposes a 
core periphery structure of development with the industrial core overdeveloped and 
the periphery underdeveloped (Barnett and Sikkink, 2008; Wallerstein, 1974).  This 
resonates with the wider Marxist analysis of the capitalist world economy consisting 
of those who control the means of production developing the North or exploiting the 
underdeveloped South.  Whichever weltshaaung, or world view, is drawn upon, the 
existence of food insecurity in the core/North/West/former colonial powers as well as 
the periphery/South/Third World/former colonies points to the need for a less 
Manichean, more nuanced understanding of food insecurity, if the future challenges 
are to be addressed.  Food insecurity is a human security threat no longer zonable, like 
environmental degradation, it faces the whole of humanity.  
 
For some, though, the question of responsibility for food insecurity also remains 
unattributable.  Some argue that since global governance is not an agent, then agency 
cannot be attributed to it (Sinclair, 2012).  Governance is not government, but it can 
guide, shape, collaborate and lead.  It has already been proposed that the agency of 
food security could lie with global food governance since there are supra-national 
issues to be addressed. Indeed, the question is asked if ineffective global food 
governance, in failing to remedy the food insecurity, could even be a contributing 
factor?  For example if the practices of TNCs, the institutional silos of the IOs or the 
dearth of international regulation of the financial/commodities markets have created 
the conditions in which food insecurity proliferates?  This further indicates that food 
insecurity is a super-wicked problem.  This research investigates if global governance 
is part of the problem and is the level at which the solutions need to be formulated.  
To detail the global food governance space, a Field Analysis is set out in Chapter 
Three.  
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Food Insecurity: Crisis of Advanced Capitalism?  
  
For many, recent food crises and food insecurity can be mostly contextualised into a 
wider context of Western dominance associated with globalisation, postmodernism 
and neoliberalism with agency attributed to the West.  The neoliberalist paradox of 
extreme unaddressed inequality resonates with Bourdieu’s ‘double meaning’ of 
globalization, as in: “…both the unification of the global economic field but also the 
expansion of that field to the entire world” (Bourdieu 2005:224) and also an,   
“economic policy aimed at unifying the economic field by a whole set of 
juridical political measures, designed to remove all the limits to that 
unification, all the obstacles to that extension, most of which are linked to the 
nation-state ” (Bourdieu 2005:224).   
  
This, Bourdieu points out, defines neoliberal policy and also explicates the distinction 
between neoliberalism and globalisation, where the latter is about the market 
regulation and the administration of markets.  It renders the global market a political 
creation (Bourdieu, 2005:225).  Formal equality, in a situation of real inequality 
favours the dominant.  Bourdieu points to the fate of local producers in Brazil, 
Indonesia, South Korea and Thailand where the deletion of all barriers to foreign 
investment leads to the collapse of local enterprises which are then bought up for very 
low prices by the TNCs (Bourdieu, 2005:225).  This is what  
Harvey described as ‘accumulation by dispossession’ of the ‘new imperialism’ 
(Harvey, 2004). ‘Accumulation by dispossession’ involves privatisation (of public 
assets), financialisation (the financial system becomes the centre of redistribution of 
assets), state redistributions (the neoliberal state redistributes the assets away towards 
the bourgeoisie) and the management and manipulation of crises themselves 
(Harvey,2004, 2005, 2006, 2010).    Globalisation and the neoliberal turn are also 
evident in local as well as global examples. 18    
Neoliberalism  
  
Neoliberalism is conceptualised by neo-Marxists as the latest stage of capitalist global 
structural and hegemonic domination, an  ‘epoch-marking order’ that relies on the 
quasi-legal restructuring of relationships between nation-states and transnational 
                                                
18 As does Bourdieu, Tsing also demonstrates this with local producers in Indonesia, “…even 
seemingly isolated cultures, such as rainforest dwellers in Indonesia, are shaped in national and 
transnational dialogues” (Tsing, 2005:3).  
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agencies (Ong, 2007).  These relationships create instability in the name of stability 
with crises a continuous condition.  Harvey proposed that “Capitalism never solves its 
crises. It simply moves them from one place to another. From Brazil to Russia to 
Argentina to America to Britain to Greece” (Taylor, 2010).   The site of the food 
crisis may revolve or proliferate but as an extension of the logic of this argument, 
eruptions of food crises, which under the Senyan analysis are caused by a dearth of 
legal and economic endowments, will continue. 
   
Governance of food insecurity, if it is to be addressed at this structural global level 
needs full participation of the stakeholders in the international processes.  This 
proposed involvement of global governance actors contradicts the predominant 
ideology of late capitalism, neoliberalism, best defined here as “a political philosophy 
with a claim that the market is better than the state at distributing public resources” 
with a return to “ a primitive form of individualism: an individualism which is 
‘competitive’, possessive and construed often in terms of the doctrine of ‘consumer 
sovereignty” (Harvey, 2006:11).  Neoliberal reasoning is both economic (efficiency) 
and ethical (self-responsibility) (Harvey, 2006) but it should be noted that economic 
neoliberalism differs from political/ideological neoliberalism.  
  
Synthesizing this with Sen’s view of hunger as a lack of legal and economic 
entitlements, the default position of the structural and hegemonic domination of 
capitalism means that food crises and food insecurity will perpetuate unresolved since 
it is systemic to advanced capitalism.  Crises such as food crises and financial crises 
are endemic in capitalism because neoliberal capitalist policies centralise the power in 
the hands of few.  The centralisation of wealth, restoration and consolidation of class 
power by the neoliberalised global political economy creates a system that benefits 
few at the expense of many.   
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Crises, as a fundamental part of Historical Materialism, are part of the logic of 
capitalism and, as Harvey indicates, can be created and manipulated by developed 
countries.  Harvey gives the example of suddenly raising interest rates which often 
results in developing nations agreeing deals such as structural adjustment programs 
which go against the needs of their populations (Harvey, 2010).   Furthermore, 
national and international institutions, specifically the U.S. Treasury, the World Bank 
and the International Monetary Fund (IMF) are often actors in the manipulation of 
these crises and are, Harvey argues, unregulated or unchecked in these actions 
(Taylor, 2010). 19  
 “Internationally the situation is even worse since there is no accountability let alone 
democratic control over institutions such as the IMF, the WTO and the World Bank, 
while NGOs can also operate without democratic input or oversight no matter how 
well-intentioned their actions” (Harvey, 2006:68).  
   
Neoliberalisation has evolved from neoliberalism and creates a power imbalance 
within these supra-national financial institutions. Some commentators point to the 
enforcement of neoliberal trade rules by the United Nations ‘twin intergovernmental 
pillars’, the World Trade Organisation (WTO) as well as the IMF, who Harvey argues 
act in the interests of US investment banks (Harvey, 2005).  Their formal remits are 
development (WB) whilst the IMF is constituted to oversee the world economy. An 
example which demonstrates this global imbalance of power is the IMF instigating 
macro-economic reforms which often subject markets in developing countries to 
conditional investment.  Likewise the World Bank makes loans conditional, which are 
often contingent on the proper implementation of neoliberal reform (Harvey, 2005).   
Yet some believe that the remits of the WB and IMF need revised to adjust to a ‘good 
global citizen’ remit due to the globalised nature of national economies (Bossone and 
Marra, 2013).  
  
There is also not complete consensus on the idea of a manipulative global 
North/West. Aihwa Ong contests the view of “a neoliberal North and a South under 
                                                
19 A recent example here is the government-debt crisis in Greece when, in May 2010 the European 
Central Bank and International Monetary Fund, to avert sovereign default,  launched a 110 billion Euro 
bailout loan in return for privatisation of state assets, austerity measures and structural reforms.  The EU 
sovereign debt crisis was triggered by the ‘Great Recession’ caused by the global sale of US mortgage-
backed securities, offering higher yields than U.S. government bonds.  Mostly packages of subprime 
mortgages they collapsed when the U.S. housing bubble burst and US homeowners defaulted on their 
mortgage payments in large numbers from 2006.   
  
  
  
  
  	  	   64	   
siege”, arguing against the framing of the neoliberal state as a singular ideal-type of 
predatory capitalism which adversely effects the South. China, for example, 
challenges the typologies on geographical North-South and neoliberalism as a ‘tidal 
wave’ sweeping from dominant countries to smaller ones (Ong, 2006:12).  Instead, 
Ong proposes that neoliberalism can be viewed as a governing technology which 
includes particular  individuals and populations and exclude others (Ong 2006, Ong 
2007); “Techniques of economic globalisation are invested with an oral calculus 
about more or less worthy subjects, practices, lifestyles, and visions of the good” 
(Ong, 2006:21). With the neoliberalisation of the International System, the state is 
also part of the governing technology and so the state facilitates globalisation.  Ong’s 
perspective provides a critical understanding of the world economy, arguing that 
neoliberalism is unexceptional and despite the perspective of predatory institutions, 
trans nationality is not necessarily detrimental to the nation-state, neither is it the end 
of the nation-state (Ong, 1999).  If it is a post-national world, it does not necessarily 
mean the end of the nation-state (Ong, 1999).  Applying this to food insecurity 
introduces the idea that neoliberalisation, as the governing technology, dictates who is 
included/who is not and therefore how food capability is set. In short, who has access 
to food and who does not.  
  
Amongst the discourse of the death of the nation-state there is some consensus on the 
role of states in the new globalised world ‘disorder’ and that the nation-state is 
withering away from the forces of the transnational.  Zygmunt Bauman describes 
Trans National actors as having an almost spectral-like presence:  
“Since nation-states remain the sole frame for book-balancing and the sole 
sources of effective political initiative, the ‘trans nationality’ of eroding forces 
puts them outside the realm of deliberate, purposeful and potentially rational 
action.  As everything that elides such sanction, such forces, their shapes and 
actions are blurred in the mist of mystery; they are objects of guesses rather 
than reliable analysis” (Bauman, 1998:5657).  
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This view of ‘transnational forces’ which escape reliable analysis bears out when 
considering where the power lies in the International System.  This theme is 
repeatedly communicated in the interviews in Chapter Four where interviewees across 
the sectors discussed the executive power in the system. The interviewee from a TNC 
commented that nation states hold the power as voting members  of the UN forum on 
food security, the Committee of World Food Security (CFS).  This chimes with 
Bauman’s point on nation-states being the ‘book balancing’ frame, as the corporeal 
rather than spectral eroding forces in the International System. The International 
Organisation interviewee, however, pointed out that there is little executive power in 
the International System and that was part of the problem in establishing a stable and 
effective food security regime.  A third respondent, this time from an NGO believed 
TNCs to be extremely powerful despite their avoidance of sanctions, perhaps these 
are the eroding transnational forces in the globalised world ‘disorder’ that Bauman 
describes?  
 
The Context of Globalisation  
  
Despite this dynamic of transnationalising forces outwith the realm of the nation-state, 
the international process is still being shaped by institutions and frameworks 
developed for nations (Sassen, 2006).  Globalisation also leads to transformations 
within the state, which reshape power and legitimacy within states, with the power 
shifting away from the legislature and the judiciary to the executive.  This decrease in 
the democratic process across the organs of the state means less potential for  strong 
nation-level governance to address not only food insecurity but to counter the forces 
of globalisation.  For Western Liberal democracies particularly, this diminution of the 
(public) nation-state results in the augmentation of the (private) globalising forces 
within the state.  With the result that these private forces increasingly determine food 
access, food use and food distribution and the public forces are increasingly hampered 
in any attempts to mitigate the effects of these by good governance and policymaking, 
where there is the political will to do so.20  This results in ineffective food governance 
                                                
20 With the International System nation-states are keen to exert influence over the UN Executive which 
decides agenda-setting. TNCs seek to influence the UN through nation-states. Power is also brought to 
bear at the Committee level where non-members, such as TNCs, under the auspices of technical neutral  
‘stakeholders’ in the process, influence agenda-setting, decisions and policy-making which feed into 
legislation.  By these two routes, TNCs such as Monsanto and Cargill have power in GFG.  
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at the national-level, partly due to a failure in the ability to address the forces of 
globalisation within the Nation-state as well as across the International System.21    
  
The authority shifts within states to the executive from the judiciary or the legislative 
is due to globalising forces and so globalisation is “partly endogenous to the national 
rather than external” (Sassen, 2006:23).  The state, although transformed by 
globalisation, remains potentially powerful but due to “the increased complexity and 
technicality of the economy” oversight is needed by “specialised government agencies 
and the private sector” rather than by more general legislatures (Sassen, 2006:171).  
This technical expertise is one justification why commercial organisations have been 
admitted as members to the global governance field and awarded a concomitant 
political role.  
  
Comparing and synthesizing both Sassen’s and Harvey’s descriptions of globalisation 
gives a sense that Sassen describes the provenance, scale, velocity and reach of 
monetisation in particular, whereas Harvey describes the motive and intent of 
neoliberalism.  Global food crises and food insecurity are products both of 
monetisation and neoliberalism, manifestations of the human cost of these forces and 
practices.  They are also products of the paradox at the heart of capitalism and 
neoliberalism, inequality, which driven by the dynamics of globalisation propagating 
the ideology of neoliberalism, creates great perpetual schisms of food security and 
poverty across the earth and iniquitous food access.  Applying the motives and intents 
of neoliberal states (as Harvey and Bourdieu both identified) renders Sassen’s call for 
oversight of the state by the private sector unwise.  
  
                                                
21 Yet effective food governance at the nation-state level is still possible. Two examples of effective 
national-level food governance are the Food Stamp system in the USA and the recent pricing policy of 
staple foods in India.  
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One of the major neoliberal factors in food crises is the process of monetisation  
(Harvey’s term is financialisation) where derivatives in the global market and the 
consequent commoditisation of food have a significant impact on the volatility of 
food prices.  Producer markets are increasingly articulated with capital markets 
directly or indirectly (via the financialising of their operations, for example the use of  
complex derivatives packages to hedge a firm’s risk) (Sassen, 2006). This also 
happens with rice, wheat and other staples.  The hedging itself becomes an important 
source of profit and slow capitalism (mining/agriculture etc.) is subordinated by fast 
capitalism (finance) (Sassen 2006; Agger, 1989).  With the price not related to the 
value of the crop but instead to derivatives and trading, by the time the crop is 
harvested, the price is a logarithm of transactions in the world’s stock markets.  There 
is a total disconnect from all aspects of the crop.  
  
There can be local resistance to globalisation and financialisation, explained by a 
metaphor of ‘friction’ which illustrates the ‘conflicting social interactions’ which 
make up the world (Tsing, 2005).  For example, since the 1980s capital interests have 
reshaped the landscape of the Indonesian rainforests through chains of legal and 
illegal entrepreneurs, who dispossessed the previous claimants from their land.  The 
aim was to create resources for global markets.  In a response to this, local, national 
and global environmental movements mobilised to defend the rainforests. This  
‘friction’ demonstrates the cultural processes between so-called ‘predatory’ business 
practices and local empowerment struggles.  North American investment practices, 
the stock market, UN environmental funding, adventure sports and the overthrow of  
the Suharto regime all contributes to Tsing’s ethnography of “global context” (Tsing, 
2005:ix). Friction itself is global,  it is not only local vs. global capital but local/global 
environment versus local/global capital.  The forest landscape, Tsing asserts, is social 
(Tsing, 2005:xi): “Indonesian forests were not destroyed for local needs; their 
products were taken for the world.” (Tsing, 2005:2)  In this example of ‘friction’, a 
new economy was based on what Indonesians call KKN; corruption, collusion and 
nepotism.  Extraction licenses were bought by corrupt practices, “faked or fixed 
locally” (Tsing, 2005:17) with the links between illegal and legal enterprise so close, 
local residents were overwhelmed and generally unable to defend their “lands and 
resources against this combination of legal and illegal, big and small” (Tsing,  
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2005:17).  There are “new projects of connection and hegemony…emerging here” 
(Tsing, 2005:12).   
  
Similar examples of friction and KKN from local food production abound.  Action  
Aid’s report ‘Power Hungry’ gives the example of the Adivasi tribal community near 
the Davershola tea plantation in Tamil Nadu, southern India. Five Adivasi tribes are  
fighting for their land’s ancestral rights which conflicts with Unilever’s desire to 
control tea production.  Adivasi villagers reported harassment and intimidation and 
with their houses being pulled down and their tea plants uprooted in a lengthy dispute 
with the plantation’s managers, which is owned by HLL (Unilever’s Indian 
subsidiary, Hindustan Lever). Their livelihoods were threatened although many grew 
only a quarter of an acre of tea.  One villager commented that: “The new [HLL] 
manager came with forest department officials when I was working in the fields and 
destroyed my coffee and tapioca plants. They slashed and uprooted our silver oak, 
pepper, tapioca, banana and coffee bushes. I begged them not to destroy our plants, 
but they ignored me” (Action Aid, 2011: 253-255).  The ‘powerless’ like the Adivasi 
people are often subject to the force of law but may not be capable of using the law 
for redress of their grievances.  The ‘powerful’ break or ignore the law as it suits 
them, especially in weak states where the rule of law in not robust.  Even where a 
TNC like Unilever has Corporate Social Responsibility policies (Action Aid, 2011).  
Despite local or even global resistance, the devastating effect of ‘fast capitalism’, 
powerful TNCs and other private non-accountable interests on communities and 
individuals can be seen in the food system. Domination and hegemony, where the 
international and nation-state reproduce and maintain consent for class hierarchies of 
capitalist society, is a useful framework through which to examine food insecurity.   
“The central logic of domination in Western civilisation hierarchises the productive 
and valuable over the re- or un-productive and valueless” (Agger, 1992:8).  This ‘fast 
capitalism’ reproduces domination not only over class and race but gender, 
reproduction and nature (Agger, 1992).  Yet what  is productive and unproductive is 
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not always self-evident.  They can be rendered so socially, as in the example of the 
Adivasi tea planters.  Indigenous productive tea production is threatening precisely 
because it is productive and therefore must be rendered valueless by claiming it is 
uncommercial or illegal.  Critical social theory, which goes beyond ‘what is there’ to 
‘what ought to be there’, is, Agger proposes, the best theoretical lens through which to 
examine ‘fast capitalism’.   This is useful here as part of the response on how GFG 
should respond to food crises/insecurity.  The importance of a Critical theoretical 
approach to food insecurity is outlined further in the section on research design but 
first prevailing ideologies of the global system are examined to understand how they 
shape GFG.  
The Effect of the Washington Consensus  
  
The role of ideology as a determinant of a strong or weak food security regime is key 
to understanding the perpetuation of food insecurity.  This section considers further 
the prevailing ideologies of the global system and examine the ideology of the 
hegemonic global actors and countries.  To this end the Washington Consensus is 
identified and discourses on ideology as an obstacle to global development are also 
outlined.  
  
The Washington Consensus (WC) in its original definition had ten specific economic 
policy prescriptions which the IMF, WB and US Treasury promoted to developing 
countries.  These economic policy prescriptions included policies such as 
macroeconomic stabilisation, expansion of market forces within the domestic 
economy and opening up of trade and external investment which all countries should 
adopt to increase economic growth.  Since the late 1970’s many developing countries 
implemented reform packages since they were conditions for receiving loans.   
  
A new orthodoxy, the Post-Washington Consensus (PWC) approach was taken 
forward with the Obama administration’s Foreign Policy objectives, which are 
changing the PWC significantly;     
“It is possible to discern a noticeable shift in the policy focus of the key 
Bretton Woods institutions in recent years away from a hard-core 
neoliberalism to a new kind of synthesis which could be described as the 
emerging Post-Washington Consensus. Arguably, the process started in the 
World Bank at an earlier stage than in the IMF: [where] there has been a 
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renewed interest in poverty and governance issues at the Bank, which began in 
the early 1990s” (Onis and Sense, 2005: 273).   
  
The new role of the World Bank has included the launch of a global food security 
program in 2010. The World Bank has also launched a global Food Crisis Response  
Program and awarded grants to more than 40 nations for agricultural improvements 
(World Bank, 2014).  
   
This ‘new’ understanding by these key institutions is essentially that, in light of the 
failure of the WC in the Asian crisis and the global credit crisis, support by state and 
social arrangements are essential for markets to function and so institutional reform is 
key.  Yet despite the PWC, central questions such as the institutional change needed 
to effect good governance are still unanswered:  
“The question remains as to whether the PWC - together with the flourishing 
alternative globalization movement and against the background of increasing 
distributional imbalances at all levels - will bring about such a change, and 
how quickly (Onis and Sense, 2005: 287).  
  
Other economic models such as the Beijing consensus and Vienna Consensus have 
been putatively tendered as alternatives.  Since 2004 the Chinese model has been put 
forward as such an alternative to the Washington Consensus. The Beijing Consensus 
allows infrastructure development abroad to support its own economic wellbeing 
without imposing political or economic structural conditions on AID recipient 
countries, particularly in Africa.   
“The Beijing Consensus is as much about social change as economic change. 
It is about using economics and governance to improve society, an original 
goal of development economics that somehow got lost in the Washington-
consensus driven 1990s.” (Ramo, 2004:4).  
Following the financial crisis of 2008, many Western and Chinese analysts 
pronounced the death of free markets and the rise of the Beijing Consensus. Yet ten 
years after the birth of the Beijing Consensus, critics are increasingly pointing out that 
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according to the living standards of the average Chinese, liberalising, modest political 
reform, and migrating away from statist policies saw the best economic performance 
(Huang, 2011).  Latin America, which politically swung to the left following years of 
neoliberalism, also offers an alternative political economic model (Tausch, 2007).  
In contrast to the WC or PWC, a larger role for state intervention is enabled in the  
Seoul Development Consensus for Shared Growth, coming out of the 2010 Seoul 
Summit of the G20 nations which proposes tailored reforms and policies for each 
developing nation. This is very much in contrast to the one-size fits all Washington 
Consensus.  The Seoul Consensus’ principles and guidelines sought to achieve the  
UN’s Millennium Development Goals (MDG) (G20, 2014). Despite this the MDGs 
missed their 2015 targets.   
  
It should be noted, however, that although there are also new orthodoxies evolving 
out of the WC and PWC from the ‘Bretton Woods Institutions’, the prevailing 
ideology remains neoliberal which means that market-orientated solutions are largely 
still pursued for food insecurity.  Solutions which include situations such as the 
ongoing membership of TNCs in GFG, the perpetuation of revolving elites in IOs and 
TNCs and the ongoing rack-renting of the developing world’s resources by many 
financial institutions.   The ideological and political context which gave rise to both 
global food insecurity and ineffective global food governance flourishes yet across the 
world.  
The Global Economic Field  
  
With this understanding of the political context in hand, the Global Economic Field is 
now analysed for its impact on GFG.  It is important to identify the main players in 
the field, including private bodies such as Trans National Corporations (TNCs) and 
Financial Organisations (FO).  TNCs take position as stakeholders in global 
governance but it is clear yet surprising that corporate and business actors also 
demand a political role “in the ‘establishment and implementation of  norms, rules 
and institutions governing international political and economic interactions” (Clapp 
and Fuchs, 2009: 2).  This reveals a picture where TNCs lobby governments and 
quasi-private bodies such as NGOs frame international laws and shape the agrifood 
business to such an extent that their involvement is no longer questioned.  The 
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increasing level of corporate involvement is actually governing the global food 
system (Clapp and Fuchs, 2009).  The span and global integration of their operations 
being such that national food systems are no longer players. Instead there is a higher 
concentration of ownership by a few companies of each part of the food governance 
chain in the countries of the OECD (FAO, 2003).   This rise in power of private 
companies can be understood from the preceding sections on globalisation, 
neoliberalism and the dominance of the Washington Consensus but the extent and 
consequences of unchecked power also raises questions about corporate 
accountability and responsibility, which is detailed in Chapter Three.  
  
In addition to Trans National Corporations, huge influence on the GFG is also exerted 
by the practices of Financial Organisations. One example of this is the Goldman 
Sachs Commodity Index, created in 1991 by Goldman Sachs Bank. This derivative 
tracked 24 raw materials such as coffee, corn, pork bellies, soy and wheat.  The 
weighted investment value of each commodity was synthesized by a logarithm into  a 
single value.  In 1999, when the Commodities Trading Commission in the US  
deregulated the futures market, banks could take an unlimited position in 
commodities such as cereals  rather than the traditional bona fide hedgers of the 
futures market such as those with a  physical stake in wheat; farmers, millers and 
warehousemen on one side with supermarkets, Kraft, Nestle etc. on the other.   
Speculators who make money by arbitrage had also traditionally been welcome since 
their capital from the arbitrage kept the market liquid (Kaufman, 2011).    
  
The grain market system with its forward contracts had kept the real price of wheat 
decreased for most of the 20th century and the American agribusiness flourished as a 
result of the decreased prices (Kaufman, 2011).  Since the end of World War Two, the 
USA had produced a grain surplus, the selling of which, some propose, contributed 
significantly to the end of the Cold War (Clapp, 2012).  The new investment vehicle 
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of the Goldman Sachs Commodity Index deviated from the old buy-sell/sell-buy 
patterns  by constructing a long-only single derivative product which turned the 
commodities and investment into a stock.  Like any company share, this commodity 
became an asset class to which investors looked to invest and rest their money long-
term.  This brought in investors and investment for the banks and traders but without 
a ‘short’ or sell in the GSCI, the prices of the commodities continued to rise.  When 
the due-date arrived, the buy orders were rolled forward into the next futures contract, 
itself due a few months later, by the bankers.  Without the deflationary effect of 
selling and only the predictable market fluctuation of the ‘rolls’, commodity traders 
profited from the ever-increasing prices (Kaufman, 2011).  This was compounded by 
the increasing price of another part of the GSCI, energy, which rose steeply from 
2003 as the expanding economies of India and China bought oil to, literally, fuel their 
internal growth.    
These issues are, of course, wider than just the Goldman Sachs indices but this 
example illustrates the mechanism by which corporations exert financial effects on 
the global food system.  With ‘fast’ capitalism is more profitable than the ‘slow’ 
capitalism of crop growing, the slow capitalism becomes secondary and is 
manipulated for financial objectives.  The effect of derivatives like these was 
devastatingly inflationary.  Food prices are driven up by the trading price rather than 
due to scarcity, and, without the deflationary ‘sell’ price, the pattern of increasing 
prices causes not only those behaviours that Sen witnessed in the Bengal famine: 
hoarding, panic buying and contingency measures but, on a more obvious level, the 
penury and starvation of millions.     
If their entitlement is indeed “the set of alternative commodity bundles that a person 
can command in a society using the totality of rights and opportunities that he or she 
faces” (Sen, 1984: 497), then the abrogation and neglect of effective governance of 
the International System, where unchecked private organisations (such as banks and 
self-interested food conglomerates) jointly drives the price of commodities in that 
bundle out of the affordability of the majority of the world’s population, (causing 
their starvation)  is apparent.  The frequency of repeated food crises and worsening 
food security is attributable at least in part to these practices.  The governance failure 
to regulate these practices  plays a large role too: “The law stands between food 
availability and food entitlement. Starvation deaths can reflect legality with a 
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vengeance” (Sen, 1981:166).   It is sobering at this point to recall the figure of one in 
three of the global population likely going chronically hungry by 2050.  And to 
acknowledge that one of the main drivers of this ratio could be an unregulated and 
obdurate autonomous commercial/financial sector of the global governance field.  
 
The Autonomous Financial Field  
  
As  ‘subfields’ of the global economic field, global corporations such as banks and 
food companies are almost always oligopolistic.  Competitiveness within the field 
means each of these sub-fields are structurally subordinated to the completely 
unregulated and autonomous financial field (Bourdieu, 2005: 229). Controlled by 
bankers, this has created the “international speculation economy which is freed from 
the control of national institutions” (Bourdieu, 2005:230).  
  
This integration into the global economic field weakens all national or regional 
powers and leaves citizens powerless in the face of great transnational economic and 
financial forces.  All other models of development, including national models, are 
condemned at the outset (Bourdieu, 2005:230).  Bourdieu proposes social 
protectionism, such as the welfare state, as the only body capable of opposing the 
power of TNCs and the international financial institutions of the “so-called free-
market” (Bourdieu, 2005:230), which has deployed a series of “convergent measures 
of deregulation and privatisation, such as abolishing all protection for the domestic 
market and relaxing controls on foreign investment” (Bourdieu, 2005:230). This 
domination by the forces of neoliberal capitalism and eroding forces of globalisation 
have reduced the poorest nations to economies based on the “exploitation of natural 
resources … also manifested in the asymmetrical treatment meted out to the various 
nations by the global institutions, depending on the position they occupy within the 
structure of the distribution of capital” (Bourdieu 2005:230).  One example which 
Bourdieu cites is the IMF’s requests in the 2000’s to the USA to reduce its deficit 
	  	   75	   
(which went unheeded) whereas the IMF forced many African economies to reduce 
their deficits, which has increased poverty and unemployment (Bourdieu, 2005:231).   
  
The state is able to exert a determining influence on the way the national and 
international economic field functions.  Which means that the economic field is also 
inhabited by the state, which “contributes at every moment to its existence and 
persistence, and also to the structure of the relations of force that characterises it” 
(Bourdieu, 2005: 9).  States also admit the international public and private actors to its 
domestic economic field:  
“This unification of the economic field tends, particularly through monetary 
unification and the extension of monetary exchanges that ensues, to pitch all 
social agents into an economic game for which they are not equally prepared 
and equipped, culturally and economically; by the same token it tends to 
subject them to the norm objectively imposed by competition from more 
efficient productive forces and modes of production as can clearly be seen 
with small rural producers, who are increasingly wrenched from a state of 
autarky.  In short, unification benefits the dominant, with the difference 
between the two being turned into capital by mere fact of their being brought 
into relation” (Bourdieu 2005: 223-224).    
  
This means that all social agents at all levels in the food system, including subsistence 
farmers, food distributors and consumers, compete with commercial/financial 
Goliaths.  Due to the prior acquisition of capital by nation-states, the global economic 
field is not a level playing-field.  Without regulation, autonomous companies are free 
to deploy any practices which self-benefit.  The national economic field then becomes 
dominated by international private actors. Therefore, the state contributes to the 
formation of a global economic field (Bourdieu, 2005). As with the national economic 
field, the global economic field reproduces these relations of dominance, and with it 
the economic, cultural and legal iniquities at the heart of food insecurity.    
  
As well as its utility as a thinking tool, Bourdieusian Field Theory is also useful for 
determining the scope, scale, architecture of the GFG field, since mapping it out, 
auditing the position of existing international institutions and evaluating the 
effectiveness of this governance field overall is essential in determining the reality of 
the governance behind any rhetoric or beyond any pledges of action.  Field Analysis 
as a key method for this research investigation and its methodological application is 
defined later in the methodology section.  It is interesting to note, however, that in 
both the grey and white literatures there is no current mapping of the GFG field.   
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There is, however, consensus across the Human Security literature that although the 
remit of global institutions such as the UN Security Council have widened to include 
non-traditional issues such as poverty, HIV, health and the environment, a wider 
inclusion of actors is still needed.   This goes beyond the involvement of nation-states 
but to include civil society groups and other stakeholders.   Since global actors set, 
apply and monitor the global rules then there is need for regional, and sub-state actors 
to be included.  There is also broad agreement in the Human Security field that there 
is enough food produced across the globe but the issue is access and affordability.  By 
dint of severe and inter-generational poverty, a lack of a share in the capital gains of 
globalisation, structural food insecurity is perpetuated.  Since the neoliberal model of 
development pursued by many global governance institutions depends on equality 
coming from the market, from trading rather than redistributive mechanisms, it 
presumes that the rewards and benefits of globalisation will reach the poor.   
The food crises prove that this is not the case.    
  
It can now be seen that the neoliberal model negatively effects the world’s supply of 
food.  With the ‘fast capital’ of trading food replacing the ‘slow capital’ of growing it, 
international agricultural trade has expanded more rapidly than world agricultural 
output (FAO, 2005:12).  Over the past decade there has been a trend where 
dependence on the international food system is also increasing.  Many emerging 
nations are no longer agriculturally self-sufficient but dependent on imports.  In the 
early 2000s growth in food imports was most marked in developing countries (115% 
increase) compared to developed countries rise of 45% (FAO, 2004:14).   
 
The Individual and Food Insecurity  
  
An individual-level analysis of food insecurity is perhaps the most complex to set out.  
At its core is not only the key question, ‘who are the hungry?’ but since food 
insecurity also affects households in the North as well as those in the South, ‘where 
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are the hungry’ and ‘how are people hungry’ leading to the overarching question of 
‘how can global food governance mitigate against food insecurity in a way that is 
most effective for the individual’?  With these questions in mind it is easier to 
examine how food security impacts on individuals and consider the required policy 
responses.  The scale and recent trends of food insecurity have already been set out in 
Chapter One but discussing the nuances of this is useful in determining how effective 
global food governance should be constructed.   
  
Poor rural food producers make up the majority of the world’s hungry (IFAD, 2010).  
Those ill-equipped for the economy are often those without citizenship, so although 
entitled to farm by custom or common law they may not be formalised as such.  They 
occupy a different habitus than those with citizenship.  Zones of ‘bare life’ are typical 
for those without citizenship protection (Agamben, 2005).  Many female subsistence 
farmers have neither formal land rights nor citizenship.  Increasingly they are often 
dispossessed of access to the land they use by land purchases by TNCs and other 
nation-states/ organisations such as the EU (Oxfam, 2012).  Those without 
territorialised citizenship might make claims, whether through local communities or 
NGOs (Ong, 1999:24).  These claims include political claims such as land rights or 
food security. Human Security for those in zones of bare life is not just about material 
sufficiency but “ a condition of existence in which basic material needs are met and in 
which human dignity, including meaningful participation in the life of the community, 
can be met” (Thomas, 2000, xi)  
  
One of the questions raised about food insecurity is that of instrumentalism or 
intentionality.   ‘Land grabs’ are an example of intentionality and are one of the 
contributing factors for food insecurity..22  The controversial rise in land deals creates 
a form of "neo-colonialism" where the dispossessed subsistence farmers then work for 
the new land owners rather than for themselves to feed their own hungry people 
(Borger, 2008). This ‘bitter harvest’ means that by 2025 only one quarter of the 
African population will be fed by Africa with the other 75% dependent on some sort 
                                                
22 Large-scale land acquisitions in developing countries with the purchase or leasing, typically by TNCs 
or foreign governments to secure their own long-term food supplies.  Millions of hectares have already 
been purchased (Oxfam, 2012).  
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of aid, according to Karl Harmsen Director of UN's Ghana-based Institute for Natural 
Resources in Africa (Harmsen, 2006).    
Individual food producers are mostly absent from food governance measures.  There 
has been some small signs of change: civil society groups representing smallholders 
and social movements who advocate on behalf of other individuals in the food 
production chain have started to take a limited role in some recent international 
negotiations but without multilingual communication, regional outreach, or 
sensitisation or other inclusion resourcing, their contribution is extremely constrained 
(McKeon, 2011).  Electronic consultations are increasingly useful but again these are 
subject to constraints (manifest in the digital divide) of a truly equitable incorporative 
approach that could fully include smallholder agendas.  Without addressing this, 
without including the individual food producer in global food governance, uneven 
agricultural trade rules and blind profit-seeking will be able to continue unabated.  A 
ground-up rather than top-down model of membership of GFG is required, 
specifically including the individual-level.  Furthermore it should be noted that, even 
the small amount of progress made in representation does not specifically include 
positive gender discrimination initiatives, needed to address the more severe effect of 
food insecurity on females.    
Community-Level Food Security  
  
Civic Agriculture also known as Community-Supported Agriculture (CSA) is an local 
alternative civic model of agriculture where a network of consumers support local 
growers by buying shares of the future harvest thereby sharing the risk and reward 
(Lyson, 2004). The producers can be farms or local growers.  CSAs can exist in rural 
or urban environments such as New York City’s ‘Coalition Against Hunger’ (Organic 
Farming Research Foundation, 2013). The size of the CSA networks vary, some have  
13,000 families involved. In Central and Eastern Europe the CSO Urgenci has created 
many small scale CSAs some of which evolve into social enterprises that practice 
‘ecologically responsible’ farming (Urgenci, 2013).  In developing countries, there are 
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growing numbers of hybrid social enterprise/CSA ventures, often using micro-
farming of subsistence plots and community gardens in the scheme so that rather than 
growers trying to sell any excess produce from subsistence plots, the CSA means that 
these plots are worked on behalf of the CSA with community members working as 
shareholders and the food plus any profits redistributed (ibid, 2013).  This can offset 
land and legal rights problems for women. Gender equality, as well as food security 
and employment are achieved through schemes such as the Harvest of Hope scheme 
in Cape-Town (Spinks, 2012).  A more typical picture of gender equality across the 
globe however, is that women face both micro and macroeconomic barriers to 
personal and household food security.  Steps can be taken to increase agricultural 
productivity and policy solutions at the global governance and national levels are also 
possible (Urgenci, 2013) .    
  
Well-framed global governance policy solutions could also establish gender-equal 
food security, perhaps implementing national governments’ programmes, such as cash 
transfers and land titling, specifically targeting women (Delang, 2006).  Some of the 
possible policies need an international level of regulation as well as national or 
regional to be effective.  Regulation of TNCs or commodities regulations are two 
cases in point.  With Community Supported Agriculture, many women-centred, 
agricultural cooperatives are emerging which use collective bargaining for land rights 
and market access.   For example, in the Self-Employed Women’s Association 
(SWEA) in India more than half of the 1.2 million members are now agricultural co-
operative workers.  Similarly the Argan oil women’s co-operative in Rajasthan, India 
and similar co-operatives in Morocco also bring vulnerable untitled women into the 
workforce (Larocca, 2007).  The last 20 years have increasingly seen international 
movements such as La Via Campesina lobby and promote rural women’s issues.  
To improve the status of women in agriculture, improve nutrition, and decrease 
poverty, USAID created the "Women's Empowerment in Agriculture Index", to study 
gender inclusion levels in agriculture (World Rural Forum, 2011). The five factors in 
the Index promotes women’s empowerment in the agricultural sector and includes 
decision-making over agricultural production, (over income and over time use), 
leadership in the community and power over productive resources such as land and 
livestock (IFPRI, 2010) (see Appendix 2).    
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Such gender aware policy-making can invigorate women’s individual or co-
operatives, reform land laws, improve access to domestic and international markets.  
Gender-blind policy-making by political elites (at the international, national  or local 
level) will not only prevent the empowerment of women in agriculture but also reduce 
the possibility of an effective and stable food security regime which could directly 
improve nutrition and reduce mortality.  The next section directly considers GFG as 
the predominant field through which to reform the current conditions that create food 
insecurity.  
Governing the Global Food Economy  
  
In a 2008 UN World Food Day speech, former US President Bill Clinton commented 
that the food and financial crises shows "we all blew it, including me…food is not a 
commodity like others…it is crazy for us to think we can develop a lot of these 
countries where I work without increasing their capacity to feed themselves and 
treating food like it was a color television set” (Clinton, W, 2008). Clinton criticised 
US Government’s policy-making which had encouraged the Bretton Woods 
institutions, for example, to levy conditions on developing countries for receiving 
food aid, which as a result, saw the decline of Africa's food self-sufficiency and the 
rise of food imports (Clinton, 2008).  This influential formal and informal leadership  
role in GFG by the world’s hegemonic superpower, ascendant since the end of the 
Cold War, evidences the political will at the heart of the Washington and Post 
Washington Consensus.   From a food security perspective it could be summarised as 
enabling and facilitating the commercialisation and financialisation of food and 
although food aid, it was often supplied conditionally.  Rather than viewing food 
security from a developmental viewpoint, it viewed it from a commercial trade 
perspective aligned with US Foreign Policy objectives.    
  
Since the waning of the Washington Consensus and particularly since the 2008  
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Financial Crisis, a growing understanding of the interdependence of developmental 
dimensions of food security can be seen.  For example, the Obama administration 
committed to a policy of investment in sustainable local agriculture.  The roles of the 
then G8, G20 and G78 in GFG as well as the roles of TNCs, NGOs and other IOs are 
crucial to resolving food security and the leadership role of the US, as the world’s 
hyper power is key in creating the changes necessary   Many argue that policymaking 
leadership by the US government extends not only to IOs but also to TNCs (Clapp 
and Fuchs, 2009).  
  
For the food security field, leaders in governance or ‘global governors’ who 
“constitute governing authority in a changing world” include IOs , TNCS, 
professional associations and set the terms of the governance field.  They are,   
“ the active authorities who exercise power across borders for purposes of 
affecting policy.  Governors thus create issues, set agenda, establish and 
implement rules or programmes, and evaluate and/or adjudicate outcomes.” 
(Avant et al, 2010:2).    
  
In addition to introducing agency back into global governance, Avant et al set out a 
theoretical framework for investigation of the global governors in world politics.  
Governors are the ‘active agents’ who want “new structures and rules (or different 
rules) to solve problems, change outcomes, and transform international life” (Avant et 
al, 2010:1).  With many International Relations theories tending to focus on the role 
of state and functionalist theories “downplaying the contentious politics of global 
governance” (Avant et al. 2010:2), a governance-centred approach can use 
‘conceptual equipment’ to analyse the dynamics and change of these global governors 
(Avant et al, 2010).  In global politics Avant et al note,  nearly all governing in global 
politics seem to be the product of governor interactions, the social and political 
relationships in the governing authority and it is the “character of these relationships” 
amongst the governors as well as between the governors and the governed, rather than 
only the types of non-state actors, that is key to understanding global politics (Avant 
et al, 2010;18). Exogenous shocks can change governors and governance but Avant et 
al’s conceptual framework examines endogenous mechanisms for change to 
governors and ‘governing’ including multiple authority sources within a single 
governor, relations between governors and also performance (Avant et al, 2010:18).  
Such tensions can create reluctant governors who accept governing responsibilities 
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because they are necessary to fulfil their primary mission (ibid). This tension can 
mean that governors become paralysed performing only symbolic or hollow actions, 
or preferring to serve one mission over another contradictory one for the sake of 
coherence even if it incurs loss of authority of constituents not served (ibid).   
  
Governors draw five bases of authority; delegated, expert, institutional, principled and 
capacity based authority (Barnett and Finnemore, 2004) and these can be seen to at 
play both within each governor and also across the food security governance sectors, 
for example with the FAO assuming institutional authority, the WFP assuming 
delegated authority, TNCs position themselves as neutral experts, Aid Organisations 
are capacity based authority and CSOs are principled authority.  
  
In addition to the traditional intergovernmental organisations (such as the UN and its 
agencies; IMF, WB & WTO), four further distinctive institutional mechanisms exist: 
trans governmental (for example the EU, International Court of Justice etc.), inter-
regional, trans local and private and public-private hybrids (Scholte, 2011:11). Private 
voluntary organisations include global social movements such as Oxfam but since 
“global social movements are self-appointed, substantial questions about their 
democratic legitimacy inevitably arise” (Scholte, 2011 cited in Sinclair, 2012:23).  
This means that Aid Organisations and social movements such as La Via Campesina 
or Urgenci may be considered less legitimate in the GFG field because  they have 
neither an institutional mechanism nor a base of authority to be ‘global governors’ in 
World Politics, according to Barnett and Finnemore and Scholte’s definitions.   This 
is despite their democratic legitimacy to be fully involved in governance.     
  
There has also been a resurgence in interest in the study of IOs because states 
establish IOs and,    
“delegate critical tasks to international institutions because they can provide 
essential functions such as providing public goods, collecting information, 
establishing credible commitments, monitoring agreements, and generally 
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helping states overcome problems associated with collective action and 
enhancing collective welfare” (Barnett and Sikkink, 2008:70-71).    
  
Traditionally IOs or Intergovernmental Organisations, have been perceived as passive 
structures with states acting as the agents who exercise executive power (Barnett and 
Sikkink, 2008). Yet newer studies argue that IOs have authority, autonomy and 
agency with political roles similar to that of states:  “IOs also construct the social 
world in which cooperation and choice take place” (Barnett and Sikkink, 2008: 71).  
They govern by defining the issues which need to be addressed and proposing the 
solutions (Barnett and Finnemore, 2004), with more power and autonomy than ever 
before.  This research will examine if this is the case with the IOs in the global 
governance of food.  
  
 This ‘new institutionalism’ approach also points to non-state actors taking a role in 
global food governance which, in relation to TNCs taking a political role in GFG, is 
one potential areas of malgovernance.  Again this raises the issue of their regulation.  
This de facto “governance through networks that link the public and private realms” 
(Chimni, 2004; Ruggie 2004) results in a multi-layered structure of global governance 
(Conca, 2005; Khagram, 2005) where ‘rule-making’ is increasingly instigated by 
“private authorities such as global corporations and bond-rating agencies, 
transnational actors such as citizens’ movements and indigenous groups, IOs such as 
the United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees, and non-governmental 
organisations such as Doctors without Borders” (Barnett and Sikkink, 2008 :79).    
 From a food security perspective this ‘multi-layered’ structure of shared decision-
making in global governance means that leadership is difficult, governance is opaque 
and fragmented and there is no regulation of the TNCs who,   
“…in the absence of global regulations and accountable national governance, 
private sector corporations have almost untrammelled capacity to attain their 
objectives at country level to the detriment of citizens’ rights and interests, as 
the current land grab phenomenon illustrates” (Gustafson and Markie, 2009: 
179).    
  
The power of these private authorities is significant: “the annual turnover of the 
largest food companies exceeds the GDP of many developing countries, giving them 
considerable influence in international regulatory processes” (Macmillan, 2005:11).    
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The profits are rising to such an extent that if these TNCs were countries and their 
annual profits (not turnover) were GDP, then according to IMF estimates of nominal 
GDP for 2008 in 2008 Potash would be the 145th richest country in the world (above 
Rwanda with a  2008 GDP of USD 4799 million p.a.), Cargill would be the 150th 
richest country, above Malawi which with a 2008 GDP of USD 4277 million p.a. and 
Monsanto would be just below Fiji but above Togo as the 154th richest country (IMF, 
2014). In 2008, the profits of these agrifood TNCs are some 3 or 4 times the GDP of 
countries like the Central African Republic, the Sudan or Eritrea (ibid).  
  
Under the neoliberal ideological framing of international regimes, the presumption 
that businesses and markets assume a neutral technocratic position is prevalent.  For 
example,  global governance is defined by the commission on global governance as 
the role of private, non-state institutions in creating and enforcing governance.  The 
commission suggests that governance could rely on markets and market institutions 
with some institutional oversight. The view was that private agents are not political 
but technical (Sinclair, 2012:20) and this would help to dissipate political division 
(Hewson, 2008:1).   This flies in the face of the experiences of agribusinesses and 
Food Governance generally which, as outlined, have resulted in unprecedented 
inequality and food insecurity.  In fact the level, penetration and power of private 
sector interests with unaccountable and inadequate and counterproductive policies is a 
specific area of misgovernance (McKeon, 2011). The question of reforming the  
International System requires the ‘reimagining’ of the architecture of institutions and 
careful consideration of the role and legitimacy accorded to TNCs.   
The next step is to introduce the theory and methodology literature from which the 
research design is drawn, namely Field theory and Field Analysis. There are a number 
of methods which can partly achieve this analysis.  Regime Analysis does offer the 
opportunity to analyse the food security field in the international order and it is 
relevant to this study in tackling the “puzzles of international co-operation and of 
	  	   85	   
international institution-building in a world of sovereign states, a world which is 
anarchical in the sense that there is no central government capable of making and 
enforcing international rules of conduct” (Rittberger, 1993: xii). Regime Analysis, 
however, has been criticised though for being static, state-centred, and ‘woolly’ 
(Strange, 1982). Whilst it can be used to study problems of regime change and to 
consider how and why order fails to be achieved in some problem areas, it does begin 
with a bias towards ordered arrangements, although it is important to also take note 
that it is relevant to multilevel governance, for example in the distinction between 
institutions and organisations (Vogler, 2003; see also Tompkins, E. L., 2008).  
Bourdieu’s Field Theory  
  
Field Analysis, representing the ‘sociological turn’ in International Relations is 
adopted as the first method here to examine the food governance field.  The Field 
Analysis method arises from Bourdieu’s Field Theory which itself builds on 
Durkheim and Weber’s perspectives on “portraying modernity as a process of 
differentiation into semiautonomous and increasingly specialised spheres of action” 
(Benson and Neveu, 2005:3).  Fields of economics, finance, media, politics and 
religion exist that structure human action: “…in analytic terms, a field may be defined 
as a network, or a configuration, of objective relations between positions” (Bourdieu 
and Wacquant, 1992: 96-7).   Di Maggio and Powell define fields as ‘realms of 
organisations’ which aggregated, ‘constitute institutional life’ (DiMaggio and Powell, 
1983).  Analytically and empirically Field Theory conceptually bears some similarity 
to Habermas’ model of the public sphere although Field Theory can offer detailed 
specification of structures.  It is also similar to Gramsci’s hegemony theory which 
pointed to the role of intellectuals [elites] in shaping a society’s “common sense” by a 
world-view.  Field Theory also offers the opportunity to consider who and how the 
organisational routines and practices reproduce that power and by whom: essentially 
how is hegemony perpetuated (or not).  Building on the Marxist concept of dominant 
ideas being the ideas of the dominant class, Bourdieu, through Field Theory, 
examines the social worlds in which such ideas are produced and reproduced, 
examining closely the specific capital, institutions, practices and relations, as well as 
considering how counter-elite ideas and emerging counter-hegemonic organisations 
contribute to patterns of dominance.   
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Bourdieu proposed properties as part of a “rigid family of conditions, that apply to 
social fields” (Rawolle, 2007:707).  Fields are, Bourdieu argued,  “structured spaces of 
positions” that have general laws and logics around which actors act according to their 
position and stakes (ibid.; see Bourdieu, 1993b).  Fields are spaces for the ‘social 
struggles’ for power as represented by capital.  The stakes include control over which 
capital is valued most and the ‘conversion rates’ of different forms of capital.  Fields 
are structured by power relations with ‘distinctive patterns of strategies’ produced by 
actors representative of their own position, trajectory and function (Rawolle, 2005: 
708).  Although Bourdieu also applied these conditions mostly to cultural fields 
amongst others, as a method for examining global governance, Field Analysis offers 
much.  Mindful that global governance is not government and has a less tangible 
network within the space it occupies, Field Analysis can still enable the conflicting 
competing goals and resources of the actors to be identified. Understanding the 
structure as itself structuring for the actors and field - so the governance map is a 
dynamic one - is also useful in understanding how the architecture of global 
governance is dynamic and renews itself.   Since global governance contributes to the 
international order then the legitimacy of IOs, TNCs, and Civil Society Organisations 
(CSOs) are key to the stability of the international system (Hurd, 2007).    
 
Any governance field can influence the international field of power. Yet is the 
conferred legitimacy of these private commercial and financial organisations 
warranted?  Are perceptions of legitimacy enough to achieve de facto legitimacy?  
Field Analysis enables data to be used to construct the positions of the actors relative 
to each other and also within the field.  Political roles awarded to private actors could 
play out across not only the field of GFG but also across the realm of the International 
System.  Crisis or catastrophe in one field due to, for example, politically powerful 
but non-legitimate actors could, according to Bourdieu’s Field Theory, structure and 
impact on the international system as a whole.  Inequity or misfeasance in the global 
governance of food could then, in theory, change the International System.    
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Field Analysis has been applied to areas other than governance, for example, colonial 
literature, educational management, equity, fashion, policies and research practice and 
even the academic field within universities (Grenfell, 2008:80).   Multiple social 
fields such as the arts field, bureaucratic field, economic field, education field, 
political field etc. add up to the overall ‘field of power’.  All the fields may bear 
homologies, or likenesses of practices. For example, position in the field of education 
may also bear a relationship upon an individual’s position in the economic field but 
the overall field of power does not determine what happens in each of the sub-fields.  
Instead, Bourdieu proposes, there is reciprocity of structuring between the field of 
power and the sub-fields. Figure 6 shows this dynamic structure applied to GFG.  
As far as can be ascertained, this is the first Field Analysis of the GFG field.  Other 
research using Field Analysis specifically for International Relations includes 
applying Bourdieu’s concept of fields to IR theory (see Williams, 2006), European 
defence policy (see Merand, 2008), the field of the EU internal security agencies 
(Bigo, 2007) and the European foreign policy field as transgovernmental arena, 
(Merand, 2010). A recent study on the transnational field of international population 
policy also used Field Theory to examine:   
“…global governance networks as social spaces rather than merely horizontal 
networks – as meso-level orders that constrain and enable different actors in 
different ways according to the positions they occupy and the resources they 
have access to. Thus understood, expert groups can be analyzed in relation to 
other groups both in the formation, institutionalization and transformation of 
such fields” (Sending, 2009:3).   
There is also some discussion of the methodology which underpin Bourdieu’s 
sociology and its application to International Relations (see Pouliot, 2007) and to 
globalised policy-making (Dubois, 2012). 23  
  
The extent of the qualitative and depth of the multivariate analysis which Bourdieu 
conducted might no longer be viable by singular researchers but the investigative 
value of juxtaposing economic capital with its nearest transposed alternative in that 
                                                
23 Although Grenfell notes that none of these studies such as these “are as exacting and comprehensive 
in their methods as Bourdieu’s own studies…It may be that contemporary social scientists are no 
longer blessed with the skholé – the time and funding for this kind of exacting research activity” 
(Grenfell, 2009:81).   
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field is still possible.  Without using statistical components in this Field Analysis, it 
cannot be claimed (and is not claimed) that this study uses ‘pure’ Field Analysis as a 
method, since it is uses only part of the method.  It is an application of Field Theory 
and Field Analysis to the same chiastic structures and concept of capital, but without 
Prosopography, Correspondence Analysis and Multiple Correspondence Analysis, the 
method is very altered.  But this pared-down version of the method is still very useful 
in ‘discovering’ and showing the field. There is precedence for this type and degree of 
modifications. Other studies using Field Analysis sometimes go much further and use 
no quantitative data at all (e.g. Merand, 2008) or limited quantitative data (see 
Rawolle & Lingard, 2013).   
 
This reduced application may not be so incompatible with Bourdieu’s own tenets as 
first appears.  When commenting on his work generally, Bourdieu expressed the wish 
that his theories were to be considered ‘thinking tools’ to be deployed on concrete 
real-world issues, aiding empirical investigation into these issues (Bourdieu, 1976).  
Grenfell also observes that he intended these thinking tools to be developed and 
evolved ‘in the field’ itself (Grenfell, 2009).  Field Analysis then is perhaps best 
understood as an approach which draws on Field Theory, as well as being a 
methodology.   
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2. Global  
Governance Field  
3. Global  
Food  
Governance  
Field  
1. International Field of Power  
Figure 1.  Fields within a Field. Applying Field Theory to the GFG Field.    
1 = The International Field of Power, 2 = The Global Governance Field, 3 = The Global Food 
Governance Field.  The size of the fields are not indicated here and also not shown here are other fields 
within the International Field of Power and Global Governance fields.  
In Bourdieu’s execution of Field Analysis, he combined the historical trajectory by 
which agents arrived at a position within the field (habitus) with the structural 
position of individuals taken within the field.   Then he considered that field’s 
position in relation to other fields, to analyse attitudes, behaviour, discourse and 
practice.   
Global Governance fields can be understood as social spaces where horizontal or 
vertical power relationships actualise and are realised.   Field Theory and Field 
Analysis, then, are useful to global governance and International Relations as both a 
concept and a method which can identify convertibility between political and 
legitimacy species of capital as well as economic capital.   This develops 
understanding of the levying of soft and hard power by the actors in the social space 
of a specific governance field.  
This Field Analysis approach to viewing individuals and organisations within a field  
assumes that the field it examines is part of this larger field of power and as such, 
there are fields within fields.  Food governance lies within the global governance field 
which itself sits within the international political field.   Each field has varying 
degrees of autonomy and heteronomy.  This field-within-a-field is represented in 
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Figure 1. These nested fields or realms are matryoshka-like but this approach shows 
the microcosm within a macrocosm with each field obeying  “its own laws, its own 
nomos” (Bourdieu, 1993:33).  These are ‘structuring structures’ which actors 
internalise and reproduce as habitus.  Despite the dynamism and competition from 
within fields, most of the activity Bourdieu suggests, will tend to reproduce the 
structure of the field, until it is subject to pressures from neighbouring fields.  So the 
status quo is maintained as if by default.  Exogenous shocks from other fields include 
new political orders brought about by democratic processes, changes in the overall 
legal and economic policy environment, economic crises or social and cultural 
movements (Bourdieu, 1993:43). New entrants (agents) to the field may be forces of 
transformation but equally they could also be forces of conservation.  Such 
transformations of the field matter because they depict changes in power, with power 
represented by symbolic and economic capital (Bourdieu, 1993).  
It is known that Bourdieu interrogated and established the habitus of each participant 
by qualitative research such as life biography interviews, participant observation  etc.  
This prosopographic data was then quantitatively analysed using Correspondence  
Analysis and subsequently Multiple Correspondence Analysis (Robson and Sanders,  
2010). Bourdieu’s notion of capital is built on “accumulated labour’  since capital is 
relational to labour time. The differing volumes of capital held by actors indicates 
power relations but Bourdieu, however, did not differentiate between material and 
non-material labour and this is one criticism of Bourdieu’s capitalisation literature 
(Swartz, 1997).  
Bourdieu put his thinking into mathematical terms to produce ‘geometric modelling of 
data’ (Lebaron, 2009).  This approach was,   
“the logical consequence of a critical experience and reflection about the 
shortcomings of dominant quantitative approaches in social sciences, which 
led [Bourdieu] to a conscious and systematic move toward a geometric frame 
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model more adapted to his conception of the social world” (Lebaron, 
2009:11).   
This central aspect to Bourdieu’s work has been subsequently overlooked by some 
writing on Bourdieu (Lebaron, 2009) and also by some who use Field Analysis as a 
method.  
Critique of Bourdieu’s Field Analysis Method  
Whilst it is important to acknowledge the application of Bourdieu’s “anthropological 
perspective to the sociological interpretation of survey data” (Lebaron, 2009), 
applying this approach to the global scale and the parameters of this research, whilst it 
could be useful, is not viable here for a number of reasons.  Whilst the social class of 
personnel in organisations is important and GFG has certainly been criticised for its  
‘revolving door’ of personnel moving between IOs, NGOs and TNCs and state-level 
governmental organisations (GOs) such as the FDA (Clapp and Fuchs, 2009), such a 
micro level of analysis would allow for conclusions about the personnel of actors in 
global governance and not allow for analysis of the politics and practices of the 
actors, as well as the architecture of the global governance field itself.    
  
To examine global governance from an International Relations perspective means that 
modifying Field Analysis in this way allows for a better fit between method and 
discipline.  Additionally, the trajectory of the major institutions involved in GFG 
(including a brief explanation of the rise of Corporate and Financial Organisations) 
has been covered in the literature review (page 64) so the habitus of some 
organisations is already established. The case studies in Chapter Four examines one 
organisation from each of the four sectors in GFG in more depth.  Also, the dramatic 
vertical integration of all TNCs in 2012 and 2013 means that individual organisations’ 
habitus are now opaque, hidden behind a ‘corporate veil’ of monopolistic 
conglomerate mergers but these are not so relevant to the scope of this study.  On this 
point, it is interesting to note the increasing use of the ‘corporate veil’ 24 in 
corporatism in global governance (also in the trend identified as ‘corporatocracy’).  
                                                
24 Features of the corporate veil include foreign liability (so difficult to use domestic rule of law), no 
international standards to regulate competition from one continent to another. Market practices. The 
‘hidden hand’ are also obscured from view.  
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Furthermore, one of the reasons that Bourdieu included habitus was to establish 
actors’ class but this may not be as relevant to an analysis at organisational or system 
level.  Class is, of course, an important variable in Bourdieu’s sociological analysis, 
since it is the vehicle of perpetuation for domination and elite hegemony.  The aim of 
this study though is not a sociological inquiry into class nor how Bourdieu converted 
class into other symbolic capitals, such as literary renown.  Instead the aim is a 
descriptive analysis of a global governance field, weighted by economic, political and 
legitimacy capitals.  So there is no need to measure and make manifest the habitus of 
the organisations per se.  Another reason Bourdieu included habitus was to inform the 
practice of the actors.  It is acknowledged that without habitus as a variable then the 
practices of organisations cannot be determined solely by Field Analysis (since 
habitus + doxa = practice) but instead the practices of the actors are available in the 
reviews of the white and grey literatures plus the case studies in Chapter Four 
illustrates examples of said practices.   
  
Lastly, there are also practical considerations for not including prosopography, 
quantification and formalisation in the Field Analysis.  A full quantitative analysis 
along the lines of Bourdieu’s was considered for this research but Bourdieu used a 
statistical team (often from the Institut National de la Statistique et des Études 
Economiques) alongside his research team to conduct his research so the 
multidimensionality and scale of this method is outwith the financial and practical 
scope of this research project.  Instead, elements of Bourdieu’s Field Analysis and the 
overall conceptualisation of Field Theory inspire the ‘Field Analysis-esque’ approach 
here.  Even with these alterations the method is still consistent with Bourdieu’s aim to 
establish a ‘synthetic vision of social space as a global structure’, here the GFG field 
(Lebaron, 2009:14; Bourdieu & de Saint-Martin, 1976).  For example, in his study of 
culture, ‘Anatomie du Goût’ (1976) Bourdieu examined in more detail two sectors 
within a social space; the spaces occupied by the dominant class and the middle class 
respectively.   The choice of variables allowed for subjectivity.  The results gave  
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‘volume of capital’, the ‘composition of capital’ and the seniority in the class’  
(Bourdieu & de Saint-Martin, 1976). Bourdieu also studied economic elites such as  
CEOs and heads of enterprises in his 1989 work La Noblesse d’état (republished as 
State Nobility).  In this he analysed positions occupied in the field as indicated by 
economic capital positions and also  indicators of social capital such as memberships 
of councils and committees plus indicators of symbolic power such as positions in 
boards etc. (Lebaron, 2009; Bourdieu, 1989).  Although Bourdieu also included 
biographical details, the main aim of La noblesse d’état is consistent with this study – 
the dynamic relational aspect between fractions in a field  as an indicator of power 
and domination.      
  
It is interesting to note that Bourdieu himself critiqued parts of the quantitative 
elements of his methods, commenting that regression analysis was too limited 
(Lebaron, 2009).  Towards the end of his career Bourdieu developed the 
understanding that:  
 “…if quantification is to take place in sociological research, it has to be 
multidimensional and aim as a first step at operationalizing each of the basic 
dimensions of social space, namely the various types of capitals (e.g.  
economic, cultural, social and symbolic).” (Lebaron, 2009:13).    
  
This approach continues to be deployed in Bourdieu’s ‘school’ within sociology but is 
also extremely useful for International Relations because where there is opaqueness, 
such as with the ‘corporate veil’, it offers a way to map out the governance space and 
place relationally the governance actors within that field.   If the same approach is 
deployed in repeated field analyses then it allows for not only a better interrogation of 
the field but comparison across governance fields too.  Bourdieu also set out various  
‘research strategies’ along these lines, so not only discovering and representing the 
field but showing structural similarities across fields, for example, position by in-
depth studies of individuals, types of modalities and also, similarities in dynamics of 
fields (Lebaron, 2009:26).   From an International Relations perspective these 
dynamics could be hegemonic, conflictual etc.   
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Bourdieu and International Relations  
  
Possibly due at least in part to the flaws and challenges already outlined, the approach 
and ideas propounded by Bourdieu  “have made relatively little impact on 
international relations as a whole” (Edkins and Vaughan Williams, 2009:112).  One 
explanation could be that IR is structured around debates incorporating varying 
metatheoretical positions with less emphasis placed on empirical investigation.  
Although Guzzini argues that Bourdieu’s framework of power analysis offers an 
opportunity for “more coherent social theoretical setting for many power phenomena 
and concepts” and to “embed a performative analysis of power in International 
Relations”, discussing “power concepts” inherent in International Relations (Guzzini, 
2006:21):   
“Yet, at the same time, the transfer of this approach to an international power 
elite, is marred with a series of difficulties, not the least of which the question 
whether such an elite can ever be circumscribed in the first place” (Guzzini, 
2006:21).   
  
Formal modelling and other quantitative methods were considered for this research 
question but assessed to be not as appropriate for setting out a ‘performative analysis’ 
of the GFG Field.  As mentioned, Regime Analysis was considered too but critics 
point to its weakness with Non-Governmental Organisations and Transnational 
corporations (see Buzan and Little, 2000) and organisational types, which are central 
to the study of global governance.   
Notwithstanding, of all the approaches of International Relations, Social  
Constructivism is possible the most compatible with Bourdieu’s Field Analysis but  
Social Constructivism has, until recently, not interrogated the issues of power that  
Bourdieu’s work focussed on (Williams, 2007; Barnett and Duvall, 2005).  Yet 
Bourdieu’s social theory has a strong political bearing and the relational consideration 
	  	   95	   
of economic capital and political capital offers a useful ‘thinking tool’ for the study of 
global governance and the subsidiary questions such as the power of private TNCs in 
the International System.  These constants are already deployed in analyses of the  
domestic and international ‘fields’ (Bigo, 1996 and 2006; Guzzini, 2000; Leander, 
2005 and 2007; Williams, 2007; Pouliot, 2007).  The international field with its 
competition, co-operation, hegemony, struggle and ‘transversal relations’ all display 
doxa, that is a ‘common-sense of the field’ which Bourdieusian Field Analysis can 
also offer.    
Research Design  
Method 1:  Field Analysis  
  
A large part of Field Analysis’ applicability stems from its ability to demonstrate the 
economic power and other ‘symbolic’ powers of the field by drawing on Field 
Theory, thereby setting out a dynamic map of the structure of the governance field. 25  
By mapping out the field in this way it aids understanding of food security, going 
further than simply providing a list or organogram.  This approach, whilst not 
intended to be definitive or exhaustive, provides one measure, an estimate, of the 
economic and political positions of the top organisations in each of the four sectors 
which might be useful not only to this study but hopefully to other studies of food 
security governance or global governance. As mentioned, substantial modifications 
have been made to the method to the extent that it is perhaps more accurate to call the 
approach a quasi-Bourdieusian Field Analysis or even an inquiry device inspired by  
Bourdieusian Field Analysis. A ‘thinking tool’ which enables some audit of the 
constitution of the governance field, rather than thinking of the GFG field as a 
monolith.  To limit the amount of mis-specification (which arises from the conceptual 
ambiguity) and contribute to future comparative research with other governance 
fields, measures for each capital species’ criteria have been developed and these are 
contained in the notes for Tables 6 and 7 in Appendix 4.  
                                                
25 The need for dynamic map of the structure of the GFG became apparent when approaches were 
made to development and agency elites to request a map of the GFG Field.  In addition the Civil 
Society Mechanism (CSM) of the Committee for Food Security (CFS) have identified the need for one 
(Duncan, 2013)  
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Fields are perhaps best understood as a match or game (Le Jeu).  Competitive 
contested arenas with two forms of power, or capital species, which Bourdieu  
identified in his Field Theory of cultural production as cultural (i.e. symbolic) capital 
and economic capital (Bourdieu, 1993). Cultural capital includes educational 
credentials, technical expertise and can manifest itself in many ways: embodied (such 
as the manners of an aristocratic art dealer), objectified (owning art) or 
institutionalised (cultural capital as certified by an authority: e.g. the Pulitzer or Nobel 
prize) (Bourdieu, 1979).  Economic capital here includes money or assets and it is, on 
the whole, the more powerful of the two (ibid).  This juxtaposition can be represented 
as intersection between two axes shown in The Social Field (see Figure 2, below).  
Cultural capital relates to symbolic capital.  Other forms of symbolic capital are used 
for other fields such as political capital and ‘political legitimacy’ capital.   
Figure 2: Bourdieu’s Social Field.  
  
 
 Figure 2: Bourdieu’s Social Field.  The X-axis is -/+ Cultural Capital and the Y-axis is -/+ 
Economic Capital. The diamonds are organisations/actors. Source: Bourdieu, 1993.  
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Method 2: Interview.  
  
The second method used here are the interviews with personnel from within the field.   
In-depth interviews can “let us see that which is not ordinarily on view and examine 
that which is often looked at but seldom seen” (Rubin & Rubin, 1995: 15)   
Interviewing can be seen as “a series of steps in a procedure” of identifying  
interviewees, determining which type of interview is both practical  and effective in 
obtaining data, design and use an interview protocol including deciding on the 
questions, use adequate recording procedures, refine the questions through pilot 
testing and transcribe the answers soon after the interview (Cresswell, 2007: 132- 
134).   As with other qualitative methods field issues’ can arise such as access to the 
organisation but mostly focus on conducting the interview.  The relationship between 
interviewer and interviewee is key yet complex, sometimes  reflecting the 
interviewer’s (witting or unwitting) dominance through hierarchy, hidden agendas, 
asymmetrical power balance and  the interviewer’s monopoly over interpretation 
(Kvale, 2006), perhaps projecting the interviewer’s own culture, gender, race and 
status (Nunkoosing, 2005).   To counterbalance these projections, it is also important 
to be responsive as an interviewer, to listen and hear the data, so as to not treat the 
participant as a research object  (Rubin and Rubin, 1995:15).    
  
Method 3: Case Study  
  
The third method used here is case study and this is to supplement the description of 
the field obtained by the field analysis by focusing in on four organisations and they 
supplement the interviews since the organisations selected for case study declined to 
be interviewed.  As a qualitative method, case study research involves drawing on  
“multiple sources of information” such as documents and reports, offering a case 
description and case-based themes (Cresswell, 2007:73).  The four small case studies 
selected here make up a collective (multiple) case study rather than a single 
instrumental case study  (where one bounded case study is selected to illustrate an 
issue) (Cresswell, 2007).    As multiple case studies of organisations within the global 
food governance field they are bounded together within the field yet are distinguished 
by each being a different type of actor/organisation (International Organisation, Trans 
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National Corporation, charitable organisation and civil society organisation).  For 
multiple case studies the format should be consistent - using  the “logic of replication” 
where the procedure is replicated for each case (Yin, 2003) and to enable 
generalisation, representative cases need to be selected, with ‘purposeful sampling’ to 
select cases that show different perspectives (Cresswell, 2007:75).  The ‘cross-case 
analysis’ is possible when this  multiple case studies’  format  is a detailed description 
of each case and themes from the within-case analysis followed by a thematic analysis 
across the cases, the cross-case analysis.  This enables the interpretation phase  
(Bennett & Elman, 2006).   
  
Using case studies within IR means that here are many possible combinations of case 
study;  experimental, formal, statistical, survey, and the characteristic strengths, 
weaknesses, and challenges of alternative combinations and sequences of 
multimethod work deserve more examination.  (Bennett, Elman, 2006: 187).   
Approaches for combining case studies with other methods within IR need more 
consideration too. Lieberman (2005) pointed out that the compatibility of statistical 
and qualitative analysis such as case studies offer a lot of promise to  IR and Social 
Science and he proposed the idea of ‘nested analysis’.   The combination of each 
mode of analysis can be successfully used to achieve similar social scientific ends, 
while using somewhat different tools (see King, Keohane, and Verba's (1994); Brady 
and Collier, 2004).  
Conclusion  
  
As well as introducing the three methods used and reviewing some of the literature for 
each method, this chapter continued the literature review introduced in Chapter One, 
to further define the research puzzle.  A number of the challenges to establishing a 
global food governance field have now started to emerge from the literature review.   
Such issues urgently need addressing, for example, the role of financial speculation in 
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price volatility. There are a number of possible ‘building blocks’ of GFG proposed in 
the grey literature and a few of these are listed below.  This research project’s 
objective is to delineate, investigate and interrogate these challenges, issues and 
possible remedies.   The research also aims to discover and identify any such possible 
foundations for better food governance.  
  
Neoliberalism, the Washington Consensus, the Vienna and Beijing Consensi, the G20 
Seoul Summit and other factors identified in this chapter are political contexts 
surrounding global and National/Regional political situations where global hunger 
and food insecurity continue to rise.  Despite strategies to reduce food insecurity, the 
rate of global hunger accelerates.   These ‘ideological’ factors have begotten and 
continue to beget economic factors such as the financialisation, commoditisation and 
commercialisation of food.  All of which unremittingly drive up food prices without 
reference to the cost of food production and distribution.  This created entitlement 
failures, making food unaffordable for an increasing number across the world.  If 
hunger and famine, the physical effects of food insecurity, are caused by political 
factors then so too is food insecurity.    
  
 Changing the political conditions and structures of food governance through 
institutional reform is essential to establishing a new food security regime yet with the 
track record of overall ineffectiveness by the current international order, then perhaps 
a new global governance regime is also needed to circumvent this political situation 
and establish a stable and effective food security situation?  All the more so since the 
private agribusiness companies who reap benefit and profit have a political bearing 
and role in the global governance of food.  The questions now are, what shape should 
the architecture of the global food governance take?  What should the membership be 
and what form of governance should it take?  In the next chapter, Chapter Three, a 
Bourdieusian Field Analysis of the global food governance field maps out the existing 
organisations and policies to establish whom and what is currently present and it also 
discuss these results and findings from the Field Analysis.  Chapter Four sets out the 
interviews with those involved in food security at international and national levels and 
case studies.  Chapter Five concludes with the remedies and recommendations arising 
from the literature review and research.    
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 Chapter Three: Setting out the Global Food Governance Field  
  
 “The eradication of hunger and malnutrition is an achievable goal.  Reaching it 
requires, however, that we move away from business as usual and improve 
coordination across sectors, across time and across levels of governance…Local-level 
and national-level policies should benefit from an enabling international environment, 
in which policies that affect the ability of countries to guarantee the right to food.”   
(Olivier de Schutter, Report of the Special Rapporteur on the Right to Food, 2014)   
 The Politics of Food Security Governance  
The political dimension to food insecurity and hunger is now established with the 
understanding of food insecurity as a dispossession of both food and the Right to 
Food.  The next step is to investigate the political dimensions of food security 
governance.  This chapter sets out and analyses the current global food governance 
(GFG) field.  It identifies the current membership, mapping out four sectors of the 
GFG field and estimating the degrees of economic capital, political capital and 
political legitimacy of 16 key actors.  This exogenous view of the field provides a 
descriptive context from which to identify then analyse the balance of power in the 
GFG field.  This global governance ‘power map’ is a springboard to the subsequent 
chapters.  This chapter contains the Field Analysis results and Chapter Four the 
endogenous views of the field established from interviews with workers from the GFG 
field.  Chapter Four also examines by brief case study one organisation from each 
sector, looking at their profile and practices.  These chapters build up an arc of 
description and analysis that identifies changes that could be made to the GFG field to 
mitigate food insecurity.  The thesis concludes with recommendations for changes in 
GFG to alleviate food insecurity, presented in Chapter Five.  
A Field Analysis of the Global Food Governance Field.  
 
Specifically, the aim of this chapter is to identify, classify and delineate the GFG field 
by Field Analysis and to set out some main features.  ‘Mapping out’ the top players in 
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each sector of the field builds an informed picture of the power in the field. 26  This 
chapter’s research method is a modified Bourdieusian Field Analysis of the GFG field 
that maps out the top organisations to establish who is dominant within the field and 
how effective this format is for addressing food insecurity.      
So the GFG space is here treated as a ‘field’ and in this space are the members of the 
field, the IOs, NGOs, TNCs and CSOs.  These can be positioned on sets of axes with 
economic capital and political capital poles and, secondly, for this research, economic 
capital and political legitimacy capital poles.  Here capital of ‘political (democratic) 
legitimacy’ and ‘political capital’ have been transposed onto Bourdieu’s concept of 
‘symbolic capital’.  So political capital and ‘democratic’ legitimacy capital are new 
additions to the repertoire of Bourdieu’s symbolic capital.  This is on the basis that the 
field of global governance is being examined and this drives the form that the  
symbolic capital takes.  For example, Bourdieu’s investigation into the field of 
cultural production used cultural capital and the field of literary production 
used literary renown.     
The symbolic capital forms of political capital and political legitimacy are constituted 
by criteria such as the GFG  actors’ mode of self-governance (e.g. public/private), 
degrees of transparency, their representativeness and other ‘values’ drawn from the 
global governance literature which more clearly delineate the  actors’ democratic 
legitimacy in the GFG field.  The criteria and measures for economic capital are also 
shown in Appendix 5. In the following results section, each of these two variables 
tables are juxtaposed in turn against economic capital in a set of axes.  The first set 
shows economic capital versus political capital and the second shows economic 
capital versus legitimacy.  This is to demonstrate, firstly, the juxtaposition of the 
economic and political capital of the top organisations in each sector of the GFG field 
and, secondly, the economic capital and political legitimacy of the same top 
organisations.  A diagram showing the criteria and measures of all three capital, is 
provided in Appendix 8.   
Bourdieu advised three steps in undertaking Field Analysis, the first being to identify 
the position of the field in relation to the field of power.   This is identified from the 
earlier literature review. The second is to map out the positions of the 
                                                
26 Power is here defined as ‘intentionality and effectiveness’ (Wrong, 1995:2).  
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agents/institutions who, “compete for the legitimate forms of specific authority of 
which this field is a site” (Wacquant, 1992:104-7).  Third is the analysis of the habitus 
of social agents, the different ‘dispositions’ held and shaped by a “determinate type of 
social and economic condition” (Bourdieu and Wacquant, 1992: 104).  As discussed, 
since this is not an investigation of social class per se, the habitus (step three) is not 
examined in this Field Analysis. In its place is a step counterpointing economic 
capital with firstly, political capital at organisational level and secondly, with 
legitimacy capital. This approach still allows the researcher to reveal the position 
taken by the actors (see Grenfell 1996 and 2007).  Identifying actual objective 
positions of organisations and sectors in the field (as opposed to only position-taking) 
in polar categories of economic capital versus political capital and also versus 
legitimacy ‘capital’ are mapping-out exercises to clearly identify the main authorities 
(and therefore the power) in the GFG field.    Measuring the objective structure of the 
field overall is also important and Fuchs specifically identifies this as important in 
relation to the power of  not only global governance but more specifically the power 
of agrifood corporations within the field of global governance (Fuchs, 2007).  So to 
operationalise the research, the steps are to firstly, delineate the ‘field of power’ then, 
secondly, map out relations by establishing and evaluating the symbolic capital/s of 
GFG and lastly, analyse the results.    
Setting Out The Field of Power  
  
The field of power, the GFG field, was identified as a sub-field of global governance, 
set in the neoliberal context of the current international system, which corresponds to  
Bourdieu’s ‘international field of power’ (Figure 1).  Following an initial scoping of 
the players in the field (Appendix 3), the four largest similar institutions in each of 
four sectors were included to allow for equitable comparison across the sectors. This 
also gives an indication of the biggest power players not only in each sector but also 
in the field.  The initial scoping garnered results for the largest 12 TNCs, eight NGOs 
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with  only one Civil Society Organisation, La Via  Campesina, available and so the 
need for parity and symmetry across sectors was evident.  ‘Cutting’ the economic data 
to show the top four of each sector by economic capital enables a better descriptive 
and comparative tool of the GFG field sectors.  One of the challenges of this approach 
was to find three other Civil Society Organisations, such is their low salience in the 
field.  This was sourced from the attendees list for the Committee for Food Security 
and the interview participants were also asked for this data (Appendix 9).  
The next question to be fixed is identifying the symbolic capital in the food 
governance field. It can be argued that the consecrating principle in government is 
direct or instrumental power to drive forward one’s own agenda, to influence, to 
achieve objectives (Bäckstrand, & Lövbrand, 2007; also Falkner (2008) uses the term  
‘relational power’). In democratic government, one consecrating principle is 
democratic legitimacy and the capability to hold power.  To establish the consecrating 
principle in governance it is useful to turn to the GFG literature to define the 
constituent elements of powerfulness.  Fuchs points to transparency, accountability, 
autonomy, low regulation etc. (Clapp and Fuchs, 2009). Margulis uses dimensions 
like, power, norms, ideology from a critical International Political Economy 
perspective (Margulis, 2012).  
 For the governance field, with its close proximity to government, security and power, 
there are a number of symbolic capital alternatives, or manifestations, of powerfulness 
and political capital. These could include variations of power such as discursive 
power, or desirable principles such as transparency, representation or even political 
roles.   For the GFG field alternatives are considered such as political capital or 
effectiveness in establishing food security (Clapp and Fuchs, 2009). Other qualitative 
measures of good governance  such as transparency and accountability could be used 
but, in keeping with Bourdieu’s definition, as the hierarchies’ consecrated principle, 
power to influence - capital in action over time - is taken as the symbolic capital.  
This is the actualisation of power. To establish this, the raison d'être of the 
organisation is established, by cross-checking with the symbolic capital Bourdieu 
delineated for the fields he researched, and the consecrated principle becomes clear.   
The raison d'être also represents the mission of the governor/actor.  In deciding the 
symbolic capital there is an element of value judgment and it can be said that even the 
choice and construction of symbolic capital is a value-based judgement by the 
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researcher, who selects what they presume to be the consecrated principle of the field.  
Yet the endogenous view of the consecrating principle may differ from that of the 
researcher’s.  Bourdieu himself could also stand charge for this (which he countered 
by pointing to the importance of the self-reflexivity of the researcher).   
To address this, dual field analyses have been done with the ‘consecrating principles’ 
of political capital and ‘political legitimacy’ (which draw on the variables of 
transparency and accountability mentioned above).  The components of the symbolic 
capital (variables) are attributed to actors in degrees decided by a range of criteria for 
which data has been gathered from disclosure by participants, organisations or 
obtained from desk research.  The criteria and data are standardised by ‘measures’ 
(see Appendix 4 for the measures and criteria).  
As can be seen from Bourdieu’s Field Analysis (Figure 2), the top of the Y-axis 
shows a scalar value of high economic capital.  The X-axis represents increasing 
cultural capital left-to-right.  Therefore the organisations in the bottom left quadrant 
have both less economic power and less cultural power.  Moving clockwise, those in 
the top left quadrant however have a bigger ration of economic power to cultural 
power with some having cultural power only.   The top right quadrant has both high 
cultural power and high economic power and those in the bottom right quadrant have 
a higher ratio of cultural power to economic power.  Bourdieu also identified 
organisations in the chart as tending towards the autonomous or heteronomous 
depending on their positions dominating cultural and/or economic capital.  The 
heteronomous pole represents external forces - primarily economic.  The symbolic 
capital specific to the field (e.g. technical skills) are represented by the autonomous 
pole.   A comparison to Bourdieu’s Field Analysis on the Literary Field illustrates this 
binarism well.   
The axes are the main opposition or distinction in Bourdieu’s Field Analysis. Other 
fields have economic capital versus other forms of capital or sub-sets of symbolic 
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capital such as scientific capital, educational capital and these sub-sets of symbolic 
capital establish the “hierarchies of discrimination which exist in the sub-fields” 
(Grenfell, 2008:100) For example, the literary field attributes the symbolic capital of 
temporal capital (form) to the X-axis, with less form (i.e. more creative editorial 
content) to the right of the X-axis and global capital of renown +/- to the Y-axis).   
Symbolic capital, the “transubstantiated types of economic capital” (Grenfell, 
2008:104) are relevant and appropriate to their field.  In fact, the symbolic capital is  
the ‘consecrated principle’ of the field.  For example, in the cultural production field, 
cultural capital is the principle which is held in highest esteem by the actors in the 
field.  However, the social worlds Bourdieu investigated, such as art, literary, higher 
education and property reflect his sociological inquiry into social worlds.  So the 
species of capital he defined - the ‘symbolic capital’ - are designed for investigations 
into those worlds.  Just as the cultural reproduction of  dominance is core for 
sociology so the political reproduction of dominance is central to global governance.  
For International Relations, however, it is more appropriate to deploy ‘political 
capital’ and ‘political legitimacy’ as transubstantiated forms of economic capital as 
these are two main distinctions in the field of power.  For example, for the TNC 
sector of the GFG field, economic capital admits the actor to the field and then 
political capital is used as leverage to influence the agenda, maintain or increase 
position-taking and increase economic capital etc. Political capital is a ‘consecrated 
principle’ of GFG Field since it is held in the highest esteem by the actors. Similarly, 
although a recent development, the CSO are admitted through perceived high political 
legitimacy. This approach of comparing economic capital to a transubstantiated type 
of economic capital, political capital or legitimacy, is applicable to global governance 
research.  It allows for analysis of which organisations have the most/least economic 
capital and which have the most/least political capital most/least legitimacy.  This is 
still true to the aim of a Bourdieusian Field Analysis i.e. to show how economic 
capital and the symbolic capital are relational in the field for reproducing capital.  
This approach also allows for a distinction between those who have the most power 
and who have the most economic capital.  It should demonstrate the difference 
between position and position-taking by the organisations involved.  For the GFG 
field, possible elements or sub-types of the symbolic capital of political capital could 
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be derived by cross-referencing with specific aspects of power including discursive, 
structural, instrumental etc. (Clapp and Fuchs, 2009:159 also see Arendt, Weber etc.).    
Bourdieu identified these as variables but it is important to assert here the benefits of 
modifying Field Analysis to global governance.  Firstly, it can report the position of 
different types of actors in the field, not just IOs.  Secondly, by attributing values to 
political and economic capital, it can offer a view of the actors within the field  of 
organisations and also their competitors.  Thirdly, it shows one view of the struggle in 
the field - the dynamics underpinning a static ‘snapshot’ of the field.  This is useful as 
a baseline for mapping out future events within the field such as competing logics, 
tipping points or political change. Lastly, it can show new entrants to the field, 
mergers between the actors and, most crucially, provide an estimate of the true 
economic and political weighting of each of the major actors.  Each of these benefits 
are useful to establish and advance a more informed understanding of the architecture, 
membership and dynamics of a global governance field and also the economic and  
political measures of the main actors and sectors within the field.  As with Bourdieu’s 
fields, it offers a visualisation of who dominates.  With the rhetoric and disavowals 
consistent with a field of power, this is a useful thinking tool, a method of description 
from which to draw observations about the nature of global governance.  
As arenas of struggle and competition where organisations struggle to compete to 
maximise the value of the forms of capital which they possess, these fields show that 
those who dominate are the ones who have most successfully converted one form of 
capital into another, acquiring both economic capital and symbolic capital through 
which their dominance is achieved and perhaps legitimated.    
Drawing on the understanding obtained so far from Bourdieu’s other fields, and 
applying them here to the field analyses of the GFG field which follow in Figures 11 
and 13 (where the Y-axis is the value of economic capital in increments of USD 
(millions), and the X-axis is a scalar value of either, political capital (Figure 11) or 
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political legitimacy (Figure 13), we would expect to see the following.27  From 
bottom to top and left to right of the axes the overall amount of both of capital 
increases with the top half of the axis as the ‘field of power’ where all actors possess 
increasing amounts of economic capital.   Any actors with high levels of economic 
capital only are on the top-left of the axis. High levels of either political capital only 
or political legitimacy only are on the right of the X-axis and actors with relatively 
high amounts of either a) political and economic capital or b) legitimacy and 
economic capital sit at the uppermost top-right area of the axes.  Therefore those 
actors in the ‘top top-right’ of the right quadrant dominate the GFG field  either 
politically and economically or legitimately and economically.   Those sitting on the 
X-axis on the right have either more political capital but less economic capital or, 
alternatively, more political legitimacy but less economic capital. The results of which 
actors do dominate the GFG field in this way follow but firstly there are some further 
caveats on the application of the method are required.  
In researching GFG it is essential to understand that political capital may be deployed 
by different sectors to different objectives.  The raison d’être  of each sector 
determines its level of self-interest and the application of its political capital.  So 
TNCs seek to maximise economic capital, or profit-seek.  NGOs seek to fulfill their 
political and mission objectives, Aid organisations seek to achieve their humanitarian 
objectives having stated their political objectives and the CSOs seek to achieve their 
discursive/representation objectives plus political objectives in some cases.  To fulfill 
these objectives, each actor must seek the optimum return on their economic capital 
and political capital.  The less material resources an actor has, such as economic 
capital, then the more non-material resources the actor needs to use, to be more 
effective  according to their raison d’être, such as non-material assets and attributes 
such as democratic legitimacy, discursive power, reputation etc. which can be used as 
resources for other forms of capital, for example symbolic capital.     
                                                
27 On the Field Analyses axes (Figures 17 and 19), poles of more/less political capital and more/less 
democratic legitimacy poles offer an opportunity to depict and analyse the architecture and 
membership of the field, contextualising it in the political and economic power of its top 
members/sectors.  Then any relationship between political and economic capital can be identified, and 
allow for analysis of any increased power-sharing position-taking in the GFG field by, for example,  
networks of community agricultural groups or smallholders.    
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Problems and Limitation of using Field Analysis  
 
There are a number of other flaws with Field Analysis as a method, which tempers the 
results and necessitates the use of other methods to triangulate any conclusions drawn 
from Field Analysis (interviews and case studies are used for this research).  Firstly, 
there is the false opposition of the chiastic structure (Benson and Neveu, 2005).  This 
can be seen between economic capital and cultural capital in the Social Field Analysis 
and also between renown and symbolic/temporal capital in the Literary Field 
Analysis. Supplementing this Field Analysis with other methods such as interviews 
and case studies can offset any distortion from this false juxtaposition of species of 
capital. Another mitigation is to limit the Field Analysis to a descriptive or illustrative 
function in the research.  It is useful to map out the field of global governance to 
achieve a clearer understanding of the most significant players in the field with 
measures of their economic and political power relative to each other but since Field 
Analysis sets the parameters of analysis along the lines of species of capital, then it 
limits other factors from being introduced into the analysis.    
Secondly there are the problems associated with the double weighting of economic 
capital, where it is both counted as a form of capital and is also a constituent criteria 
of the other capital too.  In this study this could potentially could bias the 
measurements in favour of TNCs, although it actually had little impact on this study, 
making only very little difference to the relative power of each sector and 
organisation.   This double-counting of economic capital favours those actors with the 
largest economic capital and the potential to bias of this flaw in field analysis should 
be noted for other studies.  An adaptation to the Field Analysis method, where double 
counting of economic capital is avoided by removing it as a criteria in both political 
capital and political legitimacy would be possible and this forms a recommendation in 
the final chapter of this thesis.     
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The observation in the case studies is that they are very useful supplementary methods 
to Field Analysis since they lend real-world examples of practices but again they can 
be subject to researcher bias and as much a construction as the Field Analysis.  These 
mini-versions of case studies suffer for their brevity yet are useful nonetheless in that 
had they been omitted, the research results would not have had the same real-world 
focus at organisational level.    
Secondly, field Analysis suffers from a rigidity of form which, if it were to be the 
only method deployed, could lead to deterministic ‘skewed’ findings.  Of course such 
a non-experimental non-positivist research design is less rigid but remains 
nonetheless a useful descriptive device for setting out a field of governance.  
Secondly, there is the question of how subjectively the values for these variables are 
attributed and this remains a challenge for this research project.  Therefore the results 
should be accepted on a critical basis only with self-reflexivity about the subjectivity  
of the attribution of the variables’ criteria. Thirdly, it is a critique of Bourdieu’s 
approach and style that there was not always clarity about separating sociological and 
statistical interpretations.  Similarly, both Field Theory and the “sociological 
interpretation of statistical analyses” were not entirely formalised (Lebaron, 2009:27).   
There is not “the clear understanding of what he did from a statistical point of view” 
which limits the inferential potential and reproducibility of his method (Lebaron, 
2009: 27).  Despite these challenges an analysis using Field Theory offers the 
opportunity to identify and investigate a field, the position-taking by the actors within 
it and the relational effect of capital/s on the field.  It enables comparison of the field 
temporally across time spans, cuts through the ‘fog’ of warring propagandas and 
offers a measure of the power in global governance fields. The applicability to 
International Relations is interesting and useful, which, with the modifications 
outlined below, may also improve the method’s cross-disciplinary application.  
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Step One: Conducting The Field Analysis  
The first step, identifying the GFG field, can now be undertaken.  From the interview 
results to question three, it is clear that the GFG field can be structured into four main 
sectors: private commercial sector which consists of TNCs, IOs, 28 the charitable and 
aid organisation sector (Aid), and, lastly the civil society organisations sector (CSOs) 
(Figure 3 below).  There are actors who hold influence in this field not represented 
here, for example, National Governments and Financial Organisations as well as the 
Institutions from the International Field of Power such as the IMF, WTO and World 
Bank.  Their membership (or exclusion from membership) of the Field Analysis 
sectors is decided on the basis that their primary function does not iterate fully with 
GFG, rather that their involvement in GFG is adjunct to their main functions, albeit 
that their role may be important and significant for the global governance of food.  
One way of understanding this is that, referring back to Figure 1 on the Field within 
the Field, these organisations may inhabit the second level, the global governance 
field or the first level, the International Field of Power rather than level 3, the GFG 
field.  That is, National Governments and Financial Organisations sit in the field of 
power.  So for example the World Food Programme is included whilst the World 
Bank and WTO are not, despite their large impact on food security governance. 
Another factor to remember is the merging of many global actors, for example the 
recent vertical integration of TNCs towards a more monopolistic architecture means 
that some Financial Organisations are part of the same corporation.  One example of 
this is Monsanto.  This consolidation of corporate power has led to accusations of  
‘corporatocracy’.   Again the private FOs, whilst they may be part of the same 
corporate ‘family’ have not been included since their primary function is not food 
governance-related.  This approach enables a more precise probe into the field 
                                                
28 Specification on nomenclature of ‘organisation’ and ‘institution’ is in Chapter One.  
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although a Field Analysis into the wider field of power in GFG is also an opportunity 
for future research.    
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Identifying the Sectors in the Global Food Governance Field.  
  
 
Figure 3 represents the four sectors of Global Food Governance.  In this graph each sector is 
represented unweighted by economic or political capital.   In Figures 11 and 12 the sectors are shown 
by financial weighting.  The number of actors in each sector vary widely but for the Field Analysis the 
top 4 actors only in each sector are included.  
The quarto-sectorial structure of this analysis of the GFG field represented in Figure 3 
was corroborated by answers given to Question Four of the interviews. There were a 
few individual propositions towards a different structure such as five sectors with 
advocacy as a fifth etc. but there was no consensus on these alternative propositions 
and in general these reflected an asymmetrical focus on the type of organisation/sub 
sector in which the interview participant was based.  Two of the respondents also 
stated that national governments should be included, since they provide the national 
context for food insecurity. Again, these actors are sited in the Field of Power. There 
was, however, majority agreement amongst interview participants on the GFG  field 
consisting of these four sectors.  This enables some differentiation of the field which 
is helpful in gaining a sense of the structure and capital dynamic of the field. With the 
four sectors of the GFG field identified, it is useful to look at the features of these 
 
Global Food Governance Sectors   
IOs 
TNC 
AID 
Civil society 
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sectors in turn.  One example from each of the four sectors are examined in the case 
studies in Chapter Four.  
Trans National Corporation Sector  
The TNC sector is key to understanding the GFG field as corporations have been 
major players in the development of the world food system for the last 150 years. 
Themes of power, authority and legitimacy arise from the literatures on the central 
role of TNCs in the agrifood system (see Glover and Newell, 2004; McMichael, 2005; 
and Saad, 2013).  As well as market power, there is recognition that TNCs exercise 
political power over the global food system, a system which has seen a dramatic 
increase in the value of agri-trade with over two thirds of that trade now processed 
food (FAO 2004: 26) and more developing counties have become net agricultural 
importers since the 1970s (FAO 2004:14).  This intense corporate concentration 
highlights concerns about accountability, regulation and responsibility (see Murphy, 
2006; Action Aid International, 2005; MacMillan, 2005) and raises the question if this   
‘private authority over food globalisation’ - the increasing corporate control by TNCs 
over so many levels of the globalized food system -  results in effectively a  
‘privatisation’ of food security?  
  
Most of the TNCs have expanded horizontally and vertically to cover more activities 
of the food and agricultural process such as commodity trading, distribution, food 
processing, international trade, production, retailing plus seed and agricultural 
chemical production (FAO, 2003).  Their political activities mean that many of these 
TNCs are involved in setting the rules of their own regulation which includes 
“influence over state-based and intergovernmental mechanisms of governance, as well 
as private forms of governance” (Clapp and Fuchs, 2009:1).   This raises questions  
about the exact role the TNCs play in setting norms, rules and influence supplicated 
over the institutions of global governance and in the GFG field generally (see Fuchs, 
2007; Cutler, Haufler and Porter, 1999; Cutler, 2009 and Skalir, 2002).  That is, the 
various ‘facets of power’ that these TNCs exercise in setting the rules of their own 
regulation and also over the field (see Clapp and Fuchs, 2009).  In addition to 
instrumental and discursive power, the structural power of this private realm of global 
governance has increased dramatically in recent years:   
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“As globalisation has continued, material structures have increasingly put 
corporate actors in a position to make governance decisions themselves, either 
supplementing or in some cases replacing traditional actors such as states and 
global institutions.  Economic and institutional structures, processes and 
interdependencies have created a setting where corporate actors have control 
of pivotal networks and resources.  This control has given them the capacity to 
adopt, implement and enforce privately set rules that may take on an 
obligatory quality and that also have distributional consequences for others” 
(Fuchs, 2005, 2007:9).    
 
Which raises the question to what extent do the TNCs write ‘the rules of the game’ in 
the GFG field?    
  
Privately developed regimes, Clapp and Fuchs point out,  are “adopted by states as a 
form of regulation, [and] given legitimacy” by IOs, enabling corporate actors to  
“determine the  focus and content of rules” (Clapp and Fuchs, 2009:9).  Some see this 
corporate concentration and exercising of power over rule-making as leading to these 
rules reinforcing a corporate-led agrifood system 29 (McMichael, 2005) which fosters 
further inequality and a more vulnerable food security regime (Norberg-Hodge, 
Merrifield and Gorelick, 2002).  An example of this corporate  power is the Codex 
Alimentarius, where voices of smallholders, peasants and consumers are increasingly 
marginalised in the governance system (Smythe, 2009).  In response to this lack of 
inclusivity there are calls for increased transparency, accountability and participation 
in GFG, particularly in the TNC sector.  In addition to shaping the main sources of 
TNC power and influence (the public regulations, norms and institutions under which 
they operate) other main sources of TNC power and influence over the agrifood field, 
                                                
29 Since the 1994 Agreement on Agriculture in the GATT Uruguay Round, which liberalised the 
agriculture of WTO members, corporate concentration of TNCs accelerated with global food mergers 
and acquisitions dramatically increasing until it was worth USD 200 billion by 2007 (ETC group, 
2008:8).  For this Field Analysis the top four TNCs are selected because they are the largest 
organisation of each agro industrial sub-sector. This selection was ascertained from data collected from 
a total of 107 organisations involved in food security (Figure 10)).   
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are their size, buying power, setting private standards for suppliers, price-setting as 
well as shaping the public debate.  This led a former Rapporteur of the Right to Food 
de Schutter to comment that:  
 “Large agribusiness corporations have come to dominate increasingly 
globalised markets thanks to their ability to achieve economies of scale and 
because of various network effects…the dominant position of larger 
agribusiness corporation is such that these actors have acquired, in effect, a 
veto power in the political system,” (Tran, 2014).  
  
Despite the size achieved in vertical mergers, large TNCs can collapse, as was seen in 
the 2008 financial crisis with the collapse of Lehman Brothers as well as the near 
collapse of many financial and agricultural titans.  Some have commented on the 
vulnerability of the cartel of the industrial food chain:   
“The argument in favour of “too big to fail” agro-industrial giants rests on a 
single powerful myth: Unless we intensify food production with the North’s 
genetically-engineered seeds, agrochemicals, synthetic fertilizers and 
corporate breeding stock, the world’s burgeoning population, living in the 
midst of climate change, will not have food to eat. In reality, the industrial 
food chain offers a very incomplete (and distorted) picture of global food and 
agricultural production” (ETC, 2013).    
  
Instead they point to the peasant food web as being more likely to feed the globe:   
“The reality of most of the world’s food production: the world’s three billion 
of indigenous and peasant producers – rural and urban, fishers and pastoralists  
– not only feed a majority of the world’s people and most of the world’s 
malnourished, but they also create and conserve most of the world’s 
biodiversity and are perhaps humanity’s best defence against climate change” 
(ETC, 2013)  
  
For the TNC however, economic capital is also an end in itself because profit-making 
is the rationale of the TNCs. Therefore political capital is subjugated to economic 
capital.  There is an implicit expectation to reconvert or re-exchange political capital 
into economic capital.  As with all the sectors, economic capital is part of political 
capital but for the TNCs political capital must also be exchangeable into economic 
capital.  The issue for TNCs is that political capital enables their individual and 
collective political agenda to be established and promoted to achieve economic 
objectives.  Although a mirror image of the IOs and other organisations in each sector 
in the field, this aim drives TNCs’ agendas, differing from the other sectors in that 
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increasing economic capital rather than reducing food insecurity is the motivating 
principle.  As the sector with the second largest economic capital it is expected that 
political capital would also be the largest. A list of  the economic capital for the TNCs 
(and the other major actors in the GFG field) is shown in Figure 11 below. This 
usefulness of political capital is borne out by TNCs’ tactics to garner political capital, 
such as lobbying, when corporations can control not only laws but also policies and 
standards surrounding their industries.   The weakened regulatory context impacts on 
food prices.   
  
 
Figure 4:   The sectors of Global Food Governance weighted by total sectorial annual 
income (in USD billions).30    
                                                
30 Figure 4: the sectors of Global Food Governance weighted by total sectorial annual income (in USD 
billions).  The Civil Society sector is present but not visible.  This is calculated as total annual income 
per year, combined for the top three organisations in that sector but it should be noted for all the graphs 
here that annual income is a guide to economic capital but omits assets. This is one graphical 
representation of the economic capital on the Field Analysis. Notes: A sample of the biggest three for 
each sector was taken and their annual income sourced from audited accounts (if public) or stock 
exchange data (if private).  The numerical data is contained in Table A.  For the Trans National 
Corporations the top company from each sub-sector was taken (Monsanto plus Syngenta (Biotech) - 
 
Intern'l  
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As well as vertical integration there is also horizontal and vertical co-ordination. 
Coordination which enables TNCs to control supply chains without the need for 
mergers. And as well as  horizontal coordination there is inter-corporate elite co-
ordination (Khan, 2012).  For example, when clusters of TNCs control markets by 
monopolising patented technologies. (Action Aid, 2005: 13).  Recalling the ‘revolving 
door’ between IOs, TNCs and National Governments, then this is surely part of the 
mechanism which enables the elision of elites intra sectors.  Political and corporate 
interests can and do elide, but this intra sector elite co-ordination dynamic can only 
magnify the concentration of power in the field, to the exclusion of other sectors not 
included in the inter-sector elite co-ordination.  
 
As some commentators state, a ‘hidden hand’ of TNC practices exists (Action Aid, 
2005), where TNCs use/abuse market power, pay low prices, marginalise poor 
farmers and rural workers all subject to no accountability, in a regulatory void.  
Corporate Social Responsibility some believe, is rhetorical, with no mechanism for 
redress. When TNCs engage in practices that violate both human rights and the 
environment, the communities affected often first look for redress through laws and 
regulations through their own government, the ‘host’ country. They may also seek 
justice in the TNC’s ‘home’ country, through international frameworks such as the 
Africa Union or the European Union. Authorities in host and home countries are often 
either unwilling or unable to ensure that companies are prosecuted. Currently there 
are little international mechanisms for redress that are legally binding on companies.  
Also TNCs based in the US have the same legal protection as individuals (i.e. a right 
to privacy etc.), with the result that TNCs often fall between this gap in national and 
international legal frameworks.  Those communities or individuals with a legitimate 
grievance have limited opportunities to hold companies accountable for personal or 
environmental damage.  Without penalty, regulation or ultimate accountability there  
                                                                                                                                                      
                                                                                                                                       
$1.76 billion; Cargill (Food Merchant) - $1.28b; and Potash (Fertiliser) -$2.4b.  For the international 
organisations UN Food Agencies were used (WFP ($3.7b), FAO ($2.4b) and CGIAR 0.927b and IFAD.   
Again, the four biggest of the charitable organisations majorly working in food were selected:  
(Gates Foundation, Oxfam International $10.6 Million, Action Against Hunger $180million (rated up 
from 2012 figure of $162million) and World Vision $1.019 billion = combined total of $1.2096 billion .   
From Civil Society the top four food organisations were selected: La Via Campesina ($3.6 million), 
FIAN ($2million) and Urgenci ($1.8 million) and GRAIN.   
  
  
  
  
  	  	   118	   
is no censure, no reason for TNCs to cease bad practices, despite any obvious 
dissonance between their stated Corporate Social Responsibility policies and their 
practices.  
  
An interesting explanation of the legal rights and protection of Corporations is set out 
by Clements who describes why in the US, American Corporations have the same 
legal rights as individuals, i.e. privacy, non-disclosure, non-regulation etc., (Clements,  
2011).  These ‘artificial entities’ have the same rights of ‘free speech’ as humans.   
Clements describes a historic series of battles between ‘Citizens United’ and public 
bodies such as the Federal Election Commission and comments that the latest battle 
is:  
“…class war waged for thirty years from the top down by the corporate and 
political right [in the U.S.].  Instead of create a fair and level playing field for 
all, government would become the agent of the powerful and privileged” 
(Clements, 2011: xii).  
  
Currently corporations, with the same rights as individual, can attack legislation in  
courts under their ‘constitutional rights’ because in US, courts can strike down laws 
where they conflict Constitutional Rights e.g. Brown vs. Board of Education.  For 
example laws to curb pollution require disclosure which corporations, like individuals 
can decline to disclose. (Clements, 2011: 27-28).  This arose in a case Monsanto v  
BST and BGH where Monsanto claimed the right to remain silent as an individual 
(Clements, 2011:39).  This “fabrication of corporate rights hollows out American 
citizenship” claims Clements, and ‘corporatizes’ American character (Clements, 
2011:39).   
  
This is pertinent to understanding the TNC sector of the GFG field because many of 
the  agrifood TNCs are not only based in the US but are incorporated under laws of 
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the State of Delaware.  300 of the mega-corporations listed in Fortune 500 are 
registered in Delaware as are half of all publicly traded companies in the US.   
Delaware allows low corporate standards but as with all States’ laws, none of the 
features of the Delaware Corporation Law are ‘required’.  Rather, they are policy 
choices made by elected legislatures, e.g. shareholder limited liability.  One example 
of this is the BP Deep-water Horizon Oil Well explosion in 2012 when the 
shareholders were not held to account due to BP’s limited liability (Clements, 
2011:62).  Yet ‘corporate personhood’ only exists in US State and Federal law, not in 
the US constitution.  These attributes of a modern corporation such as limited 
liability, perpetual life, and legal identification as a unitary actor persist in the US 
(Clements. 2011:61-62) but have a much wider significance for the International 
System and global governance fields.  Their practices shielded by patterns of 
‘euphemism and distortion’ (Clements, 2011:39).    
  
The agro-industrial TNC sector stands charge for hiding behind such a ‘corporate 
veil’ (Action Aid, 2009), specifically on accountability issues especially blocking 
redress in the host and home states,  such as no foreign direct liability (no command 
and control accountability); no international standards for competition regulation from 
one continent to another; competition policy which should  promote social objectives; 
competition regulations should address buyer power, market practices, abuse of 
power, price-fixing and to not marginalise peasants (Action Aid, 2005).  Further 
criticisms are that TNCs are not accountable and CSR is optional and insufficient. 
Ethical investment and scrutiny which includes examination of both self-governance 
and practices, however, could be a growing trend if there is political consumer action 
to demand it.   More detail will be supplied in the TNC case study on Monsanto 
provided in Chapter Four which further discusses ‘corporate plutocracy’ (Clements,  
2011).  The next sector of the GFG field to be examined is the International 
Organisation sector.  
  
The International Organisation Sector  
  
The World’s largest hunger relief agency, the World Food Program (WFP) emerged 
out of the FAO, by dint of being the UN agency with responsibility for food aid.  The 
WFP distributes USD2.9 billion (2012) of direct aid mostly from U.S. contributors, 
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and USAID coordinating some of its work through the WFP. Through its offices in 80 
countries it provides food relief to over 100 million people per year.   How well this 
diffuse network is monitored plus questions about transparency have been raised 
(American Enterprise Institute, 2010). Accusations of corruption have also been 
levelled at the WFP. This ties in with questions raised about the complicity of 
International Organisations – either through the malfeasance of intention or 
misfeasance (Clapp and Fuchs, 2009).  
 
A number of commentators have criticised the UN reform ‘One UN’ as also being 
process orientated rather than results orientated.  This diffuse institutional 
architecture, however, does offer opportunity for dramatic improvement.  One 
proposed improvement is to integrate existing agencies especially the three Rome 
based UN agencies, (FAO, IFAD and WFP)  into one ‘New Roman Forum’ or,  at 
least, develop a common strategy (see McKeon, 2011 and Clapp and Fuchs, 2009, 
ETC group, 2014).      
   
Shaping an enabling international environment is one of the key recommendations in 
the 2014 outgoing report by the UN Human Rights Council  Special Rapporteur on 
the right to food, Olivier De Schutter, who also confirms that most stakeholders agree 
on the urgent need for reform since “the food systems we have inherited from the 
twentieth century have failed” (de Schutter, 2014: 4).  De Schutter makes five 
recommendations for ‘shaping an enabling international environment’ (ibid).  These 
include:  remedying food price volatility, a new framework for trade and investment 
in agriculture, regulating agribusiness, moving away from agro fuels back to food 
production and, finally, food aid development co-operation (De Schutter, 2014).   The 
recommendations of particular relevance to the global governance of food are the 
coordination of food aid, managing grain stocks at a global level to limit speculation 
and also to explore ways to “combat unhealthy speculation on the futures markets of 
agricultural commodities through commodity index funds” (de Schutter, 2014:27).   
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Establishing an emergency food reserve for the WFP plus designing trade rules 
towards more sustainable agricultural practices are also key remedies for the global 
governance of food security.  
  
There is a strong focus in de Schutter’s recommendations on regulating agribusiness, 
managing the risks associated with international trade, and protection from price 
volatility for the “least developed and net food-importing developing countries 
(NFIDCs)” (de Schutter, 2014:27).  De Schutter also charges states with responsibility 
for the establishment of a “multilateral framework regulating the activities of 
commodity buyers, processors, and retailers in the global food supply chain, including 
the setting of standards by these actors and their buying policies” (de Schutter, 
A/HRC/13/33).  A call for commercial actors in the agribusiness sector to refrain 
from “practices that constitute an undue exercise of buyer power” was also proposed  
(de Schutter, 2014:27).  Including smallholders in deciding the norms, guidelines and 
terms the framework  is part of this recommendation.  There is a paradox of global 
governance:  that the need for international institutions like the IMF, the World Bank, 
and the WTO has never been so high, but trust in them has never been so low 
(Stiglitz, 2006).  
  
Aid and Charitable Organisation Sector 
  
This sector of the GFG field consists mostly of charitable organisations.  Three 
selected for the this Field Analysis are Oxfam International, Action against Hunger 
and World Vision.  A fourth, the Bill and Melinda Gates Foundation (B&MGF), is a 
private foundation but combined with charities in this sector is called ‘the 
Charitable/Aid sector’, or ‘Aid-sector’ (a term which reflects the nomenclature used 
by workers within the GFG field).  There is little in the literature on the role of NGOs 
in GFG, possibly because much of the grey literature is written by NGOs themselves.  
There is comment, however, on the relationship of NGOs to Food Aid, commenting 
that some NGOs prefer aid-in-kind rather than cash-aid because partly because their 
income is related to it.   
As the new entrant, the B&MGF, has “unprecedented financial power to influence 
agricultural development agenda” (McKeon, 2011).  Whereas the FAO’s budget for 
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2010-2011 was USD 1 billion, the 2012 budget for the Gates Foundation was USD 
3.12 billion (Gates Foundation, 2014). Questions have been raised about the lack of 
democratic oversight of a private foundation (McKeon, 2011) but others indicate  
‘private global regulation’ is already a feature of GFG, given the growing power of  
TNCs and the “emergence of new food movements presenting alternative visions of 
the food system” (MacMillan, 2005:2-5).  
 
 The Aid Organisations sector also show high levels of economic capital and political 
capital.  Recent agreements have seen donors committing to implementing measures 
to increase the effectiveness of aid and improve accountability to those intended to 
benefit from aid (OECD, 2014).  These recent developments in improved self-
governance and governance of the NGO sector enables transparency and 
accountability and contrasts with the lack of transparency and accountability of the 
TNC sector.  Public governance of each of the four sectors is one of the 
recommendations made in the conclusion of this chapter.  Further details of the NGO 
and aid organisations will be investigated in the case study on the Gates Foundation in 
Chapter Four (but it should be noted here that agencies and aid organisations do not 
have the same function nor raison d’être ).  
The Civil Society Sector 
In the Civil Society sector, one significant issue for CSOs is access to the field 
especially if  economic, political and legitimacy capital are all necessary for full  
‘voting-rights’ access to the field.  The civil society sector in GFG has also been seen 
as being a buffer to neoliberalism (Duncan and Barling, 2012). The main CSO is the  
international network of peasant organisations, La Via Campesina (LVC) who 
declared in 2008 that:   
 “we are men and women of the earth, we are those who produce food for the 
world. We have the right to continue being peasants and family farmers, and 
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to shoulder the responsibility of continuing to feed our peoples. We care for 
seeds, which are life, and for us the act of producing food is an act of love. 
Humanity depends on us, and we refuse to disappear” (LVC, 2014).   
  
LVC also aim to defend local markets as a building block of food sovereignty which 
is based on horizontal dialogue between “peasant, indigenous and “scientific 
knowledges” (ibid).  Commitment to gender inclusion means that women are enabled 
to a key role which in turn “helps build new relations inside the family against 
patriarchy” (ibid).  The set of values rejected by LVC’s policy on agroecology 
include:  
 “technocentrism, academicism, reductionism and top-down verticalism, 
agrotoxics, transgenics and monoculture.  Input substitution and neoliberal 
organic farming that leave monoculture intact.  The external “certification” of 
seeds and the fruits of our labor Agribusiness and commercialism. The 
privatization of knowledge intellectual property over life; capitalism and 
neoliberalism. Payments for environmental services and the commodification 
of seeds, water, forests, biodiversity, carbon, and nature; land grabbing and 
large private estates (latifundio)…” (LVC, 2014).  
 
LVC also assert that peasant agriculture is not just an “economic model of 
production”, but is a way of life with many complexities including organisation of 
production and consumption as characterised by the rural indigenous way of life.  The  
‘Declaration of the Rights of the Peasants (women and men)’ was adopted in 2008 by  
Via Campesina which protects the indigenous way of life (Desmarais, 2007) Another 
significant civil society grass roots social movement, GRAIN, promotes public 
governance for public policies which ‘Support Sustainable Peasant and Family  
Farm Agriculture’ (GRAIN, 2014).  These public policies include demands for   
“respect for farmer knowledge and the importance of farmer organisations and 
the broad implementation of Food Sovereignty policies such as protection of 
national markets from dumping, hoarding and speculation by corporations, 
and systems to guarantee fair prices for peasant food production.   Support of  
peasant seed systems and repeal of anti-peasant seed laws” (GRAIN, 2014).  
  
Public sector food procurement, farm-to-city initiatives such as  farmers’ markets, 
rural and urban cooperatives are also promoted by GRAIN as measures to improve 
food security and food sovereignty.  Importantly, GRAIN also calls for the 
prohibition of national and global corporate agrifood monopolies and which  “capture 
and distort policies to their own profit-taking ends, at the expense of farmers and 
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consumers alike” (ibid).  A large part of GRAIN’s claims are targeted at TNC 
domination of an unjust global food system: “…today almost one billion people live 
in hunger due to an industrial food system that places corporate interest and global 
markets ahead of feeding people” (GRAIN, 2012).  So the CSO actors can be seen as 
not only a bulwark against the neoliberalism inherent in the food system but also as 
being in opposition to the dominance of the TNCs.  As the fourth sector, it has 
dramatically less economic and political capital than each of the other three sectors.  
This concludes step one of Bourdieu’s Field Analysis, the identification of the global 
food governance field.   Step two, establishing the capital and step three,  analysing 
the GFG field can now be undertaken.   
Step Two of The Field Analysis: Establishing The Capital 
 
 Bourdieu defined economic capital as money, assets and property as well as 
command over economic resources such as cash and assets (Bourdieu, 1986).  The 
economic capital of the GFG actors can be established through a combination of 
document research such as accessing public sources including the New York Stock 
Exchange, tax returns and also requesting the data individually (see Appendix 5).  
Consistency must be kept across accounting procedures, national financial reporting 
conventions and categories, and also awareness of distinctions such as the difference 
between profit and turnover or market capitalisation and yield.  Since this Field  
Analysis examines organisations rather than the individuals of Bourdieu’s Literary 
Field, then establishing the economic capital is comparatively straightforward.  It 
should be remembered that economic power alone is often used as shorthand for 
political power but empirically this is not a secure enough measure. This was a strong 
rationale for deploying Field Analysis – so that a relational structure of political 
capital/ political legitimacy and economic power could provide a more detailed 
picture.    
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Establishing Political Capital and Political Legitimacy  
  
Despite its centrality to understanding power, political capital is a more fuzzy 
concept: “Political capital is ill-defined, little understood yet an important concept for 
understanding political exchange and relationships in the political arena” (Casey,  
2008: 3).  Casey establishes a definition based on Bourdieu’s intercontravertability 
theory derived from the understanding  that capital types (here Bourdieu meant social, 
economic and symbolic forms etc.) are not ‘pure’ since they contain elements of other 
capital.  “Political capital is the sum of combining other types of capital  for purposive 
political action  or the return of an investment of which is returned into the system  
(reinvestment) ” (Casey, 2008:6). They are interconvertible with each other.  Political 
capital closely relates to the concept of political resources and a large range of 
political resource theories point to the empowering role of resources in actors 
achieving outcomes.  An example of political capital as political resources are the 
emergence, dynamics and tactics of social movement organisations (Casey, 2008; 
Hicks and Misra, 1993; Leicht and Jenkins, 1998).  
Each capital species can be distilled into individual elements/resources (here called 
criteria) such as these and also converted into other capital species.  For example, 
economic capital mobilised for political purposes includes resources such as 
influence, control over an agenda or lobbying/persuading institutions - in other words 
political ‘pay-off’.  Therefore economic capital converts into political capital.  As 
discussed  Bourdieu (1986) set out a range of capital species including economic 
capital (money, assets and property),  cultural capital (cultural goods and services), 
social capital (for example, acquaintances and networks) or legitimation (symbolic 
capital).  In this thesis, the volume of food governance actor’s  criteria has been 
determined by document research of financial reporting, minutes from meetings as 
well as direct communication with the organisations themselves by phone and email 
(Appendix 5).   
 Political capital is also defined as “the resources used by an actor to influence policy 
formation processes and realize outcomes that serve the actor’s perceived interests”  
(Dolsak, Nives and Ostrom, 2003: 298). In Casey’s working example of the 2004 US 
presidential candidacy, an index of Political Capital is created (which demonstrates its 
conceptual viability).   For the 2004 election, four criteria of Political Capital were 
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created; democratic norms, voting, campaign activism and contact with public 
officials (Booth and Richard, 1998:782).   These are also relevant to group activism or 
social mobilisation in civil society (as in Putnam’s’ original conceptualisation of 
political capital (Putnam, 1993)).   
Bourdieu also refers to political capital in his work, describing it as a variation of 
social capital: “the source for observable differences  in patterns of consumptions and 
lifestyles” and  also that it “guarantees its holder  a private appropriation of goods and 
services, residences, cars, hospitals, schools and so on” (Bourdieu, 2002: 16).  
Political Capital can be understood as the most ‘authoritative form of capital’ because 
of its proximity to power and is highly predictive of political action (Casey, 2008 see 
also Bourdieu, 2002).  Capital and capital criteria such as economic capital, social 
capital, political participation etc. marshalled for political purpose become political 
capital.  Therefore, economic capital or political capital is exchanged at ‘political 
market’ for political outcomes, which, in a governmental market, can be electoral, 
policy or institutional.  Global governance political outcomes could include 
international support, committee access etc. and since political outcomes are set along 
self-interested lines (Bourdieu, 2002) then in an ideal-type political market the more 
political capital an organisation has, the more political gains towards self-interested 
objectives can be obtained.31 Political capital exercised to these ends are a case of 
converting political capital to social capital or, perhaps economic capital, where there 
is, say, a return in shareholder investment for TNCs or grant-funding for NGOs.  This 
is the cyclical nature of capital.   
To ascertain the political capital of the actors, component values or ‘criteria’ of 
political capital were extrapolated from the literature on political capital.  These 
                                                
31 The exception may be where the gain is not self-interested, such as is the case of altruism, as is the 
case of some charities or advocacy groups.  Corporate Social Responsibility is not altruistic in that 
sense since the improved reputation or esteem of CSR and other ethical objectives are a form of social 
capital.    
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include material (objective) and non-material criteria (subjective) and compared to the 
criteria of Casey’s political capital and Bourdieu’s capital.  In the field of US electoral 
candidacy (the best defined of the political marketplace) Casey establishes that the 
candidate with the highest amount of financing, or economic capital does not always 
achieve electoral success, or most number of votes and does not have the most 
political capital.  The successful candidate may be the one with the best return on their 
political capital or at least who exchanged it most effectively. Although a caveat for 
any market-based metaphor is that the assumptions are of rational actor, perfect 
information etc.  Other factors impacting on action such as poor or opaque 
information, disenfranchisement etc. should also be considered.  
As identified in this Field Analysis, the exchange of economic capital compared to 
political capital in the governance marketplace of the GFG Field should illuminate 
aspects of the relationship between economic capital and political capital or 
legitimacy capital. In the electoral field Casey attributes seven capital species to 
political capital; institutional capital,32 human capital,33 social capital, economic  
capital,  cultural capital,  symbolic capital and moral capital. 34 These correspond with 
the aspects of power such as discursive power, symbolic power and instrumental 
power.  All constitute political capital but for this thesis the decision was made to 
measure mostly only the manifestations or material criteria of political capital, to 
minimise subjectivity. From the main definitions of a) political capital and b) 
democratic legitimacy variables of measurement can be derived. These form the 
criteria for the variables table for political capital with each of the top four 
organisation from each of the four sectors measured against the criteria to give a 
scalar value.  For details on their construction see Appendix 4.   
 
                                                
32 Institutional capital is here defined as “capital associated with the identification and association  of 
prevailing ideology and power” (Lin, 2001:105)  - the resources that  governmental organisations 
wield.  
33 Human Capital is defined  as consisting of ability, behaviour and effort and time and is “the currency 
people bring to invest in their jobs” (Robinson & Baron, 2007: 257)  As a political resource it is 
defined as  political ability, skill and experience (Davenport, 1999:7).  
34 Action, cause, example and rhetoric/symbolism are necessary for the building, maintenance and 
mobilisation of Moral Capital.  Moral Capital influences public opinion which can form part of 
political capital (Kane, 2001).  Here it is defined as “moral prestige- whether of an individual, an 
organisation or a cause –in useful service” (Kane, 2001:7).   
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Political Legitimacy   
  
With the Field Analysis’ initial steps in hand; step one identifies the field, and step 
two establishing the economic and symbolic capitals then step three, the Field 
Analysis and results can be undertaken.    
Step Three: A Field Analysis of Global Food Governance  
With the global food governance space divided into four sectors and the economic  
capital, political capital and political or ‘democratic’ ‘legitimacy’ capital of the field 
were identified as the key capitals to measure governance power in the field.  Criteria 
(with measures for these criteria) for each of these capitals were defined (Appendix 
4).  These criteria were then used to give an estimation of the amount of economic 
capital (see Figures 4 (on p. 104) and 5, 6, 7 & 8 below) and scores for political 
capital and legitimacy capital for each of the top four actors in each of the four sectors  
(see Figures 9 and 10). Analysis of these results was Bourdieu’s third step in his 
research design and so this chapter sets out the results of the Field Analysis, analysing 
what the results mean for the global governance of food insecurity.   
Economic Capital 
  
First of all, the economic capital is analysed.  The economic capital of the global 
governance field is considerable, even when based on 16 actors, as it is here.  The 
asymmetrical nature of annual income of the 16 organisations of the global 
governance field is shown in Figure 8. The economic capital of TNCs is slightly more 
than that of the IOs but the field is dominated by the ‘Aid organisations’ (due to the 
high income of the B&MGF).  Figure 7 shows this data with the Gates Foundation 
removed (and correspondingly one organisation from each sector also removed).  This 
comparison shows that, without the Gates Foundation, the top three Aid organisations 
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have economic capital equivalent to about one-third of IOs and less than one third of 
TNCs.  
  
Breaking down the data further reveals interesting insights into the size of each sector 
by economic capital.  The four sectors by each sector’s combined annual income (top 
four actors only) are shown in Figure 6.  Figure 5 shows these values expressed as 
percentages of the field.  
  
 
Figure 5:  GFG Sectors by percentage of combined annual income of top 4 actors per sector   
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Figure 6:   With average per capita annual income per actor in each sector calculated on 
top four actors only.  
  
By comparison to Figure 7 below, which shows the total income per sector minus the 
Gates Foundation, (i.e. just the top three actors in each sector) it shows the effect of 
the Gates Foundation in that Aid agencies, which dominated the field when the Gates 
Foundation was included, no longer dominate when it is excluded.   TNCs dominate 
with IOs second whereas Aid organisations are only 14% of the GFG field on this 
calculation.  Figure 5 (also below) expresses this in percentages for easier 
comparison.   So the initial view of the economic capital of the Aid organisations 
being 72% of the field is misleading since, as seen in Figure 7, once the Gates 
Foundation is removed as an outlier then Aid organisations are only 14 % of the field.  
Significantly, the Gates Foundation represents 80% of the aid sector (as can be seen in 
Figure 6).   With an average per organisation income of USD 9.58 billion the Aid 
sector appears to dominate the GFG field but minus the B&MGF, the next top three 
actors have combined economic capital of USD 777.66 million.  This not only shows 
the size of the Gates Foundation but also the economic capital differential between 
organisations in the different sectors. The CSO sector is almost not visible.  
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Figure 7:   Shows the combined annual income of top three actors per sector with the 
Gates Foundation removed (as an outlier).   
  
 
Figure 8:   Shows the sectors of Global Food Governance weighted by total sectoral 
annual income (in US $ millions).35   
                                                
35 Figure 8 shows the sectors of Global Food Governance weighted by total sectorial annual income (in US $ millions).  The Civil 
Society sector is present but not visible (between the green and blue segments).  This is calculated as total annual income per 
year, combined for the top three organisations in that sector.  This is one graphical representation of the economic capital on the 
Field Analysis.  Notes: A sample of the biggest three for each sector was taken and their annual income sourced from audited 
accounts (if public) or stock exchange data.  
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Political Capital Weighting per sector  
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Figure 9:   Political capital weighting per sector. 
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Figure 10:   Political legitimacy weighting per sector  
  
This is also significant because once the B&MGF is removed, it reveals that TNCs 
dominate as the economically largest sector.  IOs are the second largest economic 
group. The Aid sector (minus Gates Foundation) is now less than a third as large as 
TNCs and a third of IOs.36  The economic capital of the Civil Society sector is 
considerably smaller than the other three sectors. In Figure 15 it is seen that, as a 
percentage, the TNCs and International Organisations hold economic capital 
domination of the field with a much smaller Aid organisation sector and a civil 
society sector of negligible size.  
In regards to the other two symbolic capitals, political capital weighting per sector 
(for 3 actors) indicised to 1 is shown in Figure 9 and Figure 10 shows a measure of 
political legitimacy weighting calculated from the total score per sector (3 actors per 
sector, Gates Foundation removed), also indicised to 1.  From the legitimacy capital 
score, International Organisations are the most legitimate with Aid organisations 
second, and Civil Society Organisations third.  Yet CSOs are the most representative 
by dint of their rationale but the result is skewed by both the non-disclosure policy of 
La Via Campesina and also by economic capital being included as a criteria in both 
                                                
36 The CSOs are a fraction of the TNCs to a ratio of less than 1:1666.  The ratio of the economic capital 
of the CSOs to IOs is 1:1500.  From this figure it can be seen that if the CSOs and Aid organisations 
were to combine, it would make little difference in term of the configuration of the economic capital of 
the field.  
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political capital and legitimacy capital.  (The reasons given by LVC for their policy is 
the cost of financial reporting, to protect identify of donors and for political reasons).   
Despite CSO’s lower legitimacy scoring, its position in the field is significantly much 
smaller and more marginalised that its validity due to its legitimacy.  The TNCs have 
the least legitimacy capital, being as illegitimate as the CSO sector is legitimate.  Yet 
its position in the field is as second most dominant. International Organisations also 
dominate yet improved and increased funding and power-sharing with CSOs would 
improve the relegation of the civil society sector to virtual invisibility.  
     
	  	   135	   
The Field Analyses  
  
Field Analysis 1  
Figure 18:  Global Food Governance Field Analysis 1 (Political Capital) 
 
 
With this data put into the Field Analysis axes, the first Field Analysis is shown in 
Figures 11 (above) and 12 (below).  For the first axis political capital is represented 
by the X-axis and economic capital (Y-axis). This is compiled from the variables 
table (Appendix 6) with the political capital criteria and measures outlined in 
Appendix 4, Table A). The distance between the Gates Foundation and the other 
players in the field is evident.  According to its economic capital and political capital, 
the Gates Foundation could potentially dominate the field.  Even if the Roman 
Agencies merged (WFP, IFAD and FAO), their total would still be less than the 
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income value of the Gates Foundation.  The political capital of the Gates Foundation, 
according to this scalar value, is equivalent to the others but since economic capital is 
also convertible to political capital, the Gates Foundation could, in future, become the 
hegemon in the field for political capital.  The political capital, political legitimacy 
and economic capital of the Gates Foundation is examined further in a case study in 
Chapter Four and the effect of the Gates Foundation on the field is also analysed at 
the end of this chapter. Also visible are the fragmented IOs but since the field is 
struggle and competition, if all the IOs merged then symmetry of the field would 
improve.  The Civil Society sector achieved low scalar values for political capital and 
is again at the margins of the field.  
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Figure 12:   Global Food Governance Field Analysis 1 (Political Capital, Gates removed) 38 
Notes: x axis= Political Legitimacy Score (taken from variables table 3.5.  See table 3.2 for criteria and 
attribution notes)  
 
With the Gates Foundation removed, Figure 12 above shows that those in the top right 
have the highest level of political capital and economic capital namely WFP, 
Monsanto, FAO, Potash and Syngenta, who all inhabit this space.  This demonstrates 
the weighting that IOs and TNCs have in the field. With lower economic capital but 
similar political capital is Oxfam International, the largest of the Aid Organisations.  
There is some symmetry between the IOs and the TNCs but not the Aid Organisations 
since  Action Against Hunger is close to zero political capital and World Vision scores 
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five.  Those sitting on the X-axis have low economic capital, for example IFAD, 
(which also has high political capital) and Action against Hunger (which has  
‘middle-sized’ political capital).  The CSOs have low economic capital, low political 
capital and are once again on the outer limits of the field.    
Field Analysis 2. 
 
 (Figure 13:  Global Food Governance Field Analysis 2 (Legitimacy capital)   
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Figures 13 (above) and 14 (below) show the second Field Analysis, that is the 
political legitimacy capital of the GFG field with legitimacy on the X-axis this time 
and economic capital on the Y-axis, as before.  The political legitimacy scores are 
taken from the Variables Table (Appendix 7) with Appendix 4 Table B showing the 
criteria and attribution of measures for legitimacy capital.  As the most dominant 
player in the field, it is interesting to note that the Gates Foundation scored lower on 
accountability and regulation, although its scoring sits between the CSO sector and 
Action Against Hunger.  The top right of Figure 14 below shows those scoring 
highest in the legitimacy scoring, namely WFP, FAO, Oxfam, World Vision and 
CGIAR (in descending order of economic capital).  It should be noted that whilst IOs 
claim inclusivity (they scored a 1 for that), it is not always demonstrated in widening 
the membership out of the GFG field to others.  Which poses the question if any 
inclusivity performance gaps are perceived by governors in the GFG field.  Inclusivity 
can be rhetorical and the GFG field is not representative (Clapp and Fuchs, 2009). 
The CSO sector score highly on political legitimacy but not as highly as IOs due to 
lower economic capital being a criteria.  LVC’s score, despite the organisation’s 
representativeness, is lower due to a lack of transparency and accountability.  This 
infers that legitimacy is not equal nor based on representativeness, only that 
representativeness is an element which may only be rhetorical.   Effective global 
governance would include meaningful representation, since regimes and issues can 
only be democratic and effective in their governance with good information and 
inclusion.    
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Figure 14:   Global Food Governance Field Analysis 2 Legitimacy Capital, Gates  
Foundation outlier removed  
What is learned about the GFG field from these Field Analyses? This section analyses 
the main results and themes arising out of the Field Analysis results including 
architecture, dynamics, effectiveness, membership and power. Each of these aspects 
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governance best mitigate food insecurity and address the obstacles to establish a 
stable and effective food security regime? 37   
Of primary importance is that this Field Analysis demonstrates that GFG is indeed a 
field according to Bourdieu’s ‘family of conditions’ (Bourdieu 1993b ).   
Additionally, the GFG field is traversed by both some very powerful and some very 
marginalised actors.   Also important is the observation that the most powerful in the 
field are the least legitimate.  The Gates Foundation has substantially more economic 
capital than previously thought and there is less variance between the legitimacy of 
the TNCs and, surprisingly, the CSOs than might be expected, although this is 
perhaps due to La Via Campesina’s non-disclosure policy, which decreases its 
legitimacy.  The asymmetrical appearance of these 16 actors across four sectors 
reaffirms the point of the GFG architecture being fragmented and incoherent with 
many of the international actors who claim a role having overlapping mandates and 
competing rationales and organisational structures (Clapp and Fuchs, 2009).  From 
the Field there is general (but not unanimous) agreement that the food governance 
framework has “failed to provide a sustainable food supply that is accessible to all” 
(Gustafson and Markie, in Clapp and Cohen, 2009:179).  The key challenge for any 
reform agenda, however, is to reach consensus on an appropriate framework which 
would also be effective in eliminating hunger.    
  
One approach could be a ‘gradualist’ approach, perhaps consisting of evaluation, 
similar to the evaluation that the FAO experienced.  This could perhaps be based on a 
comprehensive evidence-based analysis evaluating individual institutions, which 
could perhaps then recommend a stronger international institutional architecture.  
Further fragmentation of the institutional architecture through creating more 
institutions could be counterproductive so instead it has been proposed that  
‘mandates, capacities and mechanisms’ could be extended within the existing 
institutional architecture (Gustafson and Markie, 2009).  The benefit of this approach 
                                                
37 It is useful to here reiterate once more the caveat that these are results arising from a Field Analysis 
device.  Combined with the literature on the GFG Field, they offer a set of observations about features 
of global governance field which, in all, provide a foundation for the subsequent interviews and case 
studies and ultimately, the recommendations for effective food security governance at the end of this 
thesis.    
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is that it continues the multilateral system but a critique of this approach is that many 
of the key players have already had evaluations and reformed but despite this the 
global governance of food is still not effective in mitigating food security since the 
number of food insecure grows (Gustafson and Markie, 2009).   Perhaps the most 
effective reform would be to establish one new body that could take leadership of the 
field and transform the fragmented and asymmetrical nature of the field to be a more 
effective governance space.  
Identifying the Global Governance Field  
The Field Analysis also describes and shows the global food governance field for the 
first time.  If the Gates Foundation is removed as an outlier then in descending order 
of dominance, the actors dominate as follows:  TNCs, IOs, Aid and CSO with CSOs a 
very small fraction of the economic capital.  Aid Organisations have economic capital 
at less than one third that of TNCs’ economic capital and one third of IOs’ and CSOs, 
and are extremely peripheral to the field. Again, if the Gates Foundation is removed 
then the selected Aid Organisations consist of about 14% of the field.  The big 
differential is the Gates Foundation, which holds 58% of the total economic capital of 
the sixteen actors selected for the Field Analysis.  IOs, however, have the highest 
amount of political legitimacy (again if Gates Foundation is removed as an outlier).  
Aid Organisations are second, CSOs third and TNCs fourth in political legitimacy.  
With political capital however (also with the Gates Foundation removed) the equal 
first position in the field is held by both TNCs and IOs with Aid Organisations second 
and CSOs last at third.   
  
As seen in both Field Analyses, the GFG field contains such widely variegated actors 
with dramatically differing rationales and disparate economic, political and legitimacy 
capitals,  they are, literally, polar opposites.  Coherence, consistency and agenda 
alignment must be difficult to attain and maintain across such diverse sectors and 
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governors.   This explains some contradictions of the field, such as the misalignment 
between the trade agenda and food security agenda, as described by the Special 
Rapporteur for the Right to Food in his call to put food security first in the 
international trade system, (de Schutter, 2011).  In fact, from the Field Analyses it can 
be estimated that the trade agenda must be in a dominant position in the GFG field 
due to the dominance of the TNCs.  The actors who promote the food security agenda 
are less well positioned in the field and so countervailing objectives are at play across 
the members of the field.  Also in the Field Analyses, GFG is dominated by a single, 
private foundation and to a lesser degree by IOs, with the CSOs in a very 
marginalised position, despite their legitimacy.  So the structure of the GFG field is  
‘structuring’, in that it reproduces the diffuse, fragmented and asymmetrical 
architecture.    
  
Identifying the Dynamics of the Field.  
A second results analysis theme concerns the dynamics of the field, namely the effect 
that economic capital, political capital and political legitimacy have on the GFG field.  
The asymmetric distribution of power across governors affects the key components of 
global governance of rules, roles, responsibility, accountability and processes 
(Rosenau, 1992) because in the field the positions are determined by economic and 
political capital rather than legitimacy.  Accountability varies across sectors and 
actors and so is not standardised.  The rules seem to largely protect the status quo, 
marginalise the CSOs, thereby diminishing representation and plurality. Using  
Rosenau’s definition, needs and wants may be fulfilled but the question is whose 
needs and wants (ibid)?  The Field Analyses indicate the absence of overarching 
democratic authority in the GFG field although dominance of the IOs and TNCs is in 
evidence, perhaps resembling Pareto’s lions of conservatism and foxes of speculators 
(Pareto, 1963).    
  
The main dynamics of the field for this research, economic capital, political capital 
and political legitimacy (as well as the dynamic of the ‘structuring structure’ of the 
field itself) although all interconvertible, vary in their effectiveness.  Economic capital 
favours those who have it in abundance - here the IO and TNC sectors overall and 
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some of the Aid Organisations.  Similarly, political capital benefits those who can 
wield it in largest measures, again the TNCs, IOs and, to a lesser degree, the Aid 
Organisation sector.   In this GFG field, political legitimacy is the least effective 
dynamic since those who hold only legitimacy capital (the CSOs) are unable to 
convert it to either other forms of capital, such as political capital or to leverage 
significant outcomes from it. The marginalised excluded CSO sector holds the least 
economic and political capital out of the four sectors, therefore it follows that 
economic capital and political capital are the strongest dynamics for the actors in the 
GFG field with legitimacy capital a weak, inferior form of capital for this field.  Since 
economic capital is convertible to political capital, then economic capital may even be 
the predominant dynamic. The dominance in the field of private actors is also evident 
and discussion on the effects on the GFG of such powerful private actors is developed 
through this thesis.  Changing the logic of this field so that political legitimacy carries 
a stronger effect on the field would redress the power imbalance and constrain the 
hegemony in the field of agrifood TNCs.    
  
There is political authority in the GFG field in the deployment of political capital but 
since there is hegemonic power, there is little legitimate political authority.  As a 
result there is little impetus for co-operation or co-ordination in the field.  Legitimacy 
and authority are  often derived from the inclusion of interests and participation of 
groups in decision-making (Turner, 1998) but the GFG field, with its asymmetrical 
architecture, weak power-sharing and poor representativeness has limited legitimacy 
or authority.  The GFG field is a sub-field of other fields of power so it is perhaps a 
reproduction of the features of the International Field of Power.  This chimes with a 
constructivist interpretation of global governance as being constituted by identity and 
culture.  The GFG field could be structured by the governance cultures of the 
International Field of Power in which case, does an international power elite dominate 
each governance field and regime?    
  
	  	   145	   
Economic Capital Dynamic 
  
The importance of economic capital in the Field Analysis is substantial.  Both as an 
organising principle (in the Y-axis) and also as a constituent criteria in both the 
political legitimacy capital and political capital scoring.  This is taken from  
Bourdieu’s research design with economic capital in effect ‘double-counted’ with the 
organisations holding the highest economic capital also redeeming economic capital 
in the symbolic capital score.   Another way to understand this is that the 
organisations without economic capital are doubly-disadvantaged.  Yet as discussed 
in the earlier section on defining the symbolic capital, Bourdieu was clear that 
economic capital must also exist as a criteria in symbolic capital.  Notwithstanding, it 
can be seen that actors with the highest amount of economic capital dominate the field 
for political capital as well as economic capital.  Since political capital is 
interconvertible from economic capital, then this fits with the understanding of how 
economic capital can ‘buy’ political capital.  Where the economic capital is from 
trade, then this creates the political capital to prioritise trade concerns: “…this 
increasingly globally oriented corporate control over the food system is resulting in a 
privatization of food security, whereby we see ‘an emerging world agriculture 
subordinated to capital’” (Clapp and Fuchs, 2009:6, citing McMichael, 2005:280).  
 True to Bourdieu’s conceptual understanding of a field, there were also differences 
across the actors in each of the criteria in political capital and this demonstrates that 
each of the sectors are not monolithic.  Whilst there may have been vertical and 
horizontal integration of, for example, TNCs to form ultra-corporations, each of these 
are not identical transits.  There are variances in practices, financial commitment to 
lobbying and, in the political legitimacy criteria, differences to open-ness, 
inclusiveness etc. That these variances exist shows that alternative modus operandi 
are not only possible but can also be successful.  This forms a recommendation to 
private and commercial actors in the GFG field.  
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Another important observation from the results are the differences on how this 
economic capital is manifested in GFG. 38  For the second largest economic capital 
sector, the IOs, the purpose of the economic capital is to address the manifestations of 
food insecurity, (e.g. emergency and crisis measures) but political capital is also 
necessary to influence the political agenda at the international level.  So economic 
capital is necessary as part of political capital.  Therefore the economic capital is 
exchanged for political capital by governors. Examples of political capital include 
campaigning work and political negotiations which influence legislative outcomes at 
the national level and also influence summits and directives at the international land 
regional level.    
  
Therefore economic capital buys political capital and so enables agenda setting by the 
most powerful sectors, the TNCs and the IOs.  The income of the IOs is extremely 
significant and, considering the high level of food insecurity and the low level of 
effectiveness of the field overall on resolving food security, then how can  
effectiveness i.e. resolving and mitigating food insecurity, be better achieved from the 
economic capital of the International Organisations?   The amount spent on food and 
aid in humanitarian crises was estimated by Mark Malloch Brown, former head of the 
UNDP as USD 360 billion (2002 figure) (Kristoff, 2002).    Without the systemic 
causes of food insecurity being addressed, then this figure can only increase.  Perhaps 
the IOs need to divert more economic capital to funding the CSO sector - so grass 
roots movements can increase their reach. Grass roots organisations are effective with 
food insecurity because local agriculture feeds people systemically.  Also grass roots 
social movements increase the buffer against neoliberalism, in the idea of Tsing’s  
‘friction’ because they actively contest globalisation and neoliberalism.  
                                                
38 Measuring the total global governance field was considered but assessing the total volume plus 
number/types of actors would not have yielded the data required for the principle question in this 
thesis.  A cross-section, such as the top four organisations of each sector was judged to be more 
relevant to the issue of better global governance of food security.  
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This link between economic capital and effectiveness inevitably leads to the 
conclusion that reorientation of the IOs including the UN bodies, could be considered.   
This is not the same as the one-UN reform, which set process-orientated goals.  
Instead, results-orientated goals could be set for the reform of the IO sector so that 
food security can be best addressed which may include diverting more IOs’ capital 
towards CSOs especially grass roots movements. There is also the flip side to the 
dynamic of economic capital in that those with low economic capital - here the CSO - 
are unable to convert economic capital  to political capital, even with high political 
legitimacy.  So the dynamic of economic capital is double favour to those members 
with high income and political clout and disadvantage those with low economic 
capital with lessened political capital.     
  
Political Capital Dynamic  
It now seems the case that economic capital plus political capital is not enough for 
effectiveness, and legitimacy capital and political capital also do not achieve 
effectiveness.  Yet legitimacy capital, political capital and economic capital together 
can achieve effectiveness (where the raison d’être corresponds), so improving 
effectiveness over food insecurity can be aided by increasing the economic and 
political capital of the civil society groups - in other words, better funding, 
inclusiveness and representation. Increasing political legitimacy capital alone will not 
increase effectiveness.   
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As can be seen from  Figure 15 above the organisation with the most political capital 
is the Gates Foundation followed by the World Food Program then, in decreasing 
order; Monsanto, FAO, Syngenta, Cargill, CGIAR, IFAD and Oxfam International, 
who each have the same political capital score but varying economic capital.  Action 
Against Hunger has lower political capital partly due to a lower annual income.  So 
here the IOs, Aid Organisations and TNCs are vertically assembled with Monsanto 
and the World Food Program the most similar behind the clear leader of the Gates 
Foundation. It is interesting to note that the Civil Society sector arguably has almost 
no placing -  at the low end of political capital showing low levels of political and 
economic power.  Revising the economic capital of the Civil Society sector would 
also raise the political capital.  
 
  
Figure 15  Political Capital by Sector :  
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Since the agendas of the governors with the highest political capital dominate, this is a 
driver which structures and restructures the field. The membership is kept inaccessible 
and the governance ineffective because the status quo suits those who benefit the most 
from its preservation i.e. those with the highest political and economic capital.   
Rather than pursue effectiveness in mitigating food insecurity as a goal, maintaining 
the status quo benefits those most successful members, and become de facto goals of 
the GFG Field. Those with least political capital are, according to Bourdieu, the most 
dominated, therefore, their continued participation in the game is not guaranteed 
(Bourdieu, 1993).  Being so dominated means that the rewards, or convertibility rate, 
are so low that the CSO actors could ‘leave the game’.  For example, they may seek to 
pursue their objectives outwith this field of power and enter another where they are 
less dominated.  Or resort to only direct action methods to achieve political capital.  
Another option is that those with the most political capital, i.e. the least dominated, 
power-share with those who are most dominated.  The benefits of doing so would be 
to exchange some political capital for political legitimacy, to stabilise the field of 
power and/or to stop the CSO actors leaving Le Jeu.  
  
Political Legitimacy Dynamic  
 
Political legitimacy capital here includes the criteria of  raison d’être , inclusivity, 
transparency, public facing accountability, regulation, ethical practices and economic 
capital.  The results in Figure 16 below show that the most legitimate according to 
these criteria are, in descending order of economic capital; WFP, FAO, Oxfam 
International, World Vision,  CGIAR and IFAD followed by Action Against Hunger. 
The next most legitimate are FIAN, GRAIN, Urgenci, then LVC but this is  partly due 
to lower economic capital.  The Gates Foundation is included in this grouping 
(although with significantly higher economic capital). The least legitimate but with 
the highest economic capital are Monsanto, then with increasing legitimacy capital 
and decreasing economic capital, Syngenta and Potash.  Needless to say, the 
opportunity exists for actors with low political legitimacy to increase it by improving 
on any of the criteria such as transparency, inclusivity, public facing accountability 
and ethical practices etc.  As discussed, political legitimacy capital seems to have the 
poorest exchange rate in the GFG field of all the symbolic capitals in that it does not 
easily translate into political capital in this context.  Those sectors with only political 
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legitimacy have less of a voice and less power in the GFG than other sectors, who 
combine political legitimacy capital with economic capital or with political capital (or 
with both).  Despite the importance of representation and inclusion, the sector with 
only political legitimacy capital have less voting rights and influence over legislation 
and admittance of new members is more difficult for this group than those with high 
economic capital or high political capital. This poor dynamic of political legitimacy in 
the field can only inhibit the effectiveness of the GFG field in resolving food 
insecurity. The figure below shows the political legitimacy score by sector.  
  
 
Figure 16:   Political legitimacy capital score by sector  
Figure 17 below shows a comparison of political legitimacy and political capital by 
institution and demonstrates some concurrence of political legitimacy and political 
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capital for IOs and the Aid Organisations, but more disparate connection between 
political capital and political legitimacy for TNCs and the highest disaggregation is 
between political legitimacy and political capital for CSOs.  The value of holding 
high political legitimacy and little or no political capital in a field of power seems 
low, because political legitimacy is not valued in the Field.  Especially of note is the 
high political capital and the low political legitimacy held by TNCs.  Yet the 
combined force of political legitimacy and political capital of IOs and Aid 
Organisations does not effect many changes to the field either.  Is lip service played to 
political legitimacy or is it the case that it is not recognised at all in the structuring 
structure of the GFG field or field of power?  Political legitimacy seems to have no 
effect on the field on its own otherwise it would have converted into high political 
capital or even economic capital.  Those who have low political legitimacy are at a 
disadvantage in such a system and are dominated by other sectors.  Therefore the 
logic of this field of governance is to respect political capital and economic capital 
over political legitimacy.  Thereby the GFG field is, at present, set up to fail to 
change, or represent, include or incorporate all the agricultural voices or consider 
systemic solutions to food security since these issues cannot be represented, analysed 
or solved without a more inclusive, polyvocal form of democratic governance.    
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Figure 17:   Comparison of political legitimacy capital vs. political capital scores by 
organisation   
Perhaps the GFG field is, in effect, set up for on-going continual crisis response and 
not for establishing food security.  If so, this would agree with some of the criticisms 
in the literature review.  Therefore this GFG field, which does not value legitimacy 
capital, needs urgent and drastic reform.  Yet the status quo seems to not only prevail 
but to renew itself. It seems to ensure the continuance of neoliberal ideology, where 
market practices and commercial objectives dominate.  The GFG structure is 
hardwired to the past and so the CSOs will remain dominated.   
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Effectiveness in the Global Food Governance Field  
There is discussion by some of the interviewees in Chapter Four that the Committee 
on World Food Security (CFS) is a step in the right direction towards a more 
democratic GFG field.  The counterpoint is that this viewpoint assumes a dynamic of 
change whereas a little measure of power, albeit new, can remain just exactly that 
size.  In the context of the urgency of the situation, better and quicker effectiveness is 
imperative.  A more democratic food secure-orientated field which recognises and 
rewards political legitimacy would, if the CSOs were politically enabled, be more 
effective in mitigating food insecurity.  The economic capital of the IOs could yield a 
more effective political capital dynamic in the field.  The status quo then, is deadening 
not only this prospect for change to the GFG field but, going on the forecasts for 
global hunger, will also result in billions more being denied access to affordable and 
nutritional food.  Therefore the status quo is also one of the causes of food insecurity.  
Since, of the three dynamics selected for analysis here, political legitimacy capital is 
the weakest, the question needs to be asked why legitimacy capital is so weak in 
global food governance? The question is can legitimacy capital be valued and new 
members admitted so that the GFG field is reformed to enable public governance 
rather than laissez faire global governance to flourish?   
  
From the review of literature (pages 69-76) and in the interviews that follow, it is 
made clear that the views and knowledge of agriculturalists such as peasants and 
smallholders could be placed at the fountainhead of improving change. With reform, 
restructuring and regulation of TNCs, dynamics other than economic capital could be 
valued and a power shift could result in establishing pro-food secure positions, 
policies and practices (rather than only position-taking).  In the face of such an 
escalating and catastrophic problem, is improved power-sharing enough to guarantee 
effectiveness? 39  The CSOs have only recently been admitted to international arenas 
like the Committee of World Food Security, and only as non-vote bearing members 
(since 2009).  The membership of the GFG field could be therefore revised by 
reducing TNCs’ political role (Clapp and Fuchs, 2009) and increasing the Civil 
                                                
39 Parallel regimes on the same scale, such as climate change, offer interesting comparisons and 
opportunities for appreciating the rate of improvement required.  
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Society Mechanism in not only the CFS but also their position and role in the field.  
New actors could also be admitted and allowed voting rights for committees set up by 
the IO sector, such as the UN Committee for Food Security. The Aid sector could 
horizontally integrate and co-ordinate with refocused priorities aimed at results.  The 
barriers to entry to the GFG field could be made more porous.40  
 
This ineffective global food governance field helps to explain contradictions such as 
there being enough food to feed the world but the number of hungry is rising.  Both 
can be true under this current governance format.  It would also seem that the 
narrative that the 2008 global food crisis revealed new dynamics of hunger is not 
wholly correct.  Instead, food crises are systemic and endemic to the food system, as 
is the on-going hunger problem because of issues such as the governance system 
giving power to the ‘hidden hand’ of the TNCs.  The 2008 food crisis revealed how 
big the hunger problem had grown, fuelled by globalisation and neoliberalist 
practices, such as the commoditisation of food.   
  
Considering this vast scale of global hunger and the David versus Goliath position of 
the TNCs versus CSOs, perhaps the IOs, as the framers of the international political 
structure of committees and summits, and gatekeepers to membership of this 
international political system, could ratchet up the political capital of the Civil Society 
sector by admitting them further, sharing more economic and political resources as 
well as building the capability of the Civil Society (and the Aid Organisations) to 
engender change and crucially address food insecurity. If the current structure of 
global governance has, at the very least, perpetuated current levels of food insecurity, 
then the current structure must be urgently changed.   
  
                                                
40 Barling and Duncan ( 2015) propose that the Civil Society Mechanism of the CFS is an example of 
the improving democratisation of the GFG field.  
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Similarly, to redress the democratic deficit the political access of the TNCs could be 
ratcheted down by the IOs as gatekeepers.  The rationale for the inclusion of the 
TNCS in global governance: that of an assumed neutrality of technical expertise, can 
no longer be tenable in the light of the dominant political capital and economic capital 
in the field and the low level of effectiveness in mitigating food insecurity.  Added to 
the examples of bad practices by the TNCs arising from reports and eye-witness 
accounts, a picture arises where some TNCs are, due to their recent vertical 
integration,  powerfully asserting their own agenda through sizeable political capital.   
Unlike the other sectors in the field, since their objective/raison d’être is to increase 
economic capital, then this is inconsistent with decreasing food insecurity.  In fact, the 
aims of decreasing food insecurity and making profit may be competing 
contradictions, or at best dissonant, disconnected autonomous objectives.   
   
In addition to ratcheting down the political role of TNCs in the GFG field, the 
question of regulating TNCs at national and regional level is also important.  Through 
the practices of some TNCs it is clear that some practices do exacerbate food  
insecurity, for example, on the issue of seed sovereignty:  “At a time where mega 
corporations want to control our food, it is imperative that we stand together to protect  
our food, the planet and each other” (Shiva, 2014).  Seed sovereignty is a growing 
civil society movement which links seed sovereignty with food sovereignty, land 
sovereignty and water democracy into an earth sovereignty movement  which resists 
TNCs and the implementation on Intellectual Property and seed patents into national 
and regional legislation (Navdanya, 2014).  Promoting biodiversity and food 
sovereignty as democratic rights, the seed sovereignty movement sets up seed saving 
banks and conservation and training centres for subsistence farmers and  peasant 
across India in response to Indian farmers’ suicide and so called ‘terminator seeds’.  
Navdanya is now becoming a global movement with an aim of fighting ‘mega 
corporations’.  The national level of government and the regional level of governance, 
such as the EU, could impose legal restrictions on TNCs with the justification of 
protecting ‘earth sovereignty’.  
Some steps have been taken by International Organisations towards power-sharing 
with CSOs (McKeon, 2009).  Some CSOs have commented that the International 
Organisations do support their activities and their assertions over issues such as 
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patenting and intellectual property of seeds (Navdanya, 2014). Yet LVC mainly avers 
any involvement with IOs since their experience is that they are invited into 
partnerships which benefits the IOs but their views are often misrepresented or 
funnelled (Desmarais, 2007).  These exogenous perspectives are supplemented by 
endogenous perspectives established from the interviews detailed in Chapter Four.  
So depending on the raison d’être of the actors, some of the economic and political 
capital of International Organisations and Aid Organisations is put to use in 
mitigating food crises and emergencies, reflected in the moral capital and good 
practices factors, whereas it seems that almost all of the political capital of TNCs is 
deployed in profit generation.  This push-pull dynamic across sectors may contribute 
to the overall ineffectiveness.  
  
In summary, this Field Analysis of global food governance has mapped out the GFG 
field for the top actors in the four sectors.  The results demonstrate who holds most 
capital in the field and how the three types of capital selected, economic, political and 
democratic legitimacy capital are distributed across these actors, according to set 
criteria.  The results show the dominant position held by private power – the agrifood 
TNCs such as seed companies, agrochemical companies etc. and that through 
horizontal and vertical integration they now control all aspects of food from fertilisers 
to the plate.  It also shows the extent of that private power with the hegemony of the 
Gates Foundation, demonstrating which sector is excluded to the outer limits of the 
field and the rising predominance of the new governor, the private Gates Foundation.   
As discussed on pages 22-25, the discourses of these sectors and actors; Productionist, 
Food Sovereignty and Civil Society will also be at play across the field to varying 
degrees of salience according to their position in the field.     
  
Maintaining such a status quo will inevitably have devastating consequences. 18,000 
children and 7,000 adults die of starvation each day and over one billion people starve 
each night  (Molla, 2011).  The global governance of food, which could address this, 
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falters, beset by problems of poor representation, asymmetrical power-sharing, 
conflicting trade and food security agendas, conflicting discourses, domination of 
legitimate grass roots movements by private actors and the dominance of a private 
commercial elite who hold a significant amount of economic and political capital in 
the GFG field. This Field Analysis research asks how can food insecurity be 
effectively remedied and what role would effective power sharing take?    
  
Food security governance is ineffective at least partly due to the above factors.  Other 
factors include variables omitted from this study such as national-domestic 
governments, the role of Financial Organisations and other contexts and dynamics 
such as political will.  GFG can better address food insecurity through a range of 
measures such as  reforming along more inclusive lines, promoting pro-food secure 
agendas and practices and gender inclusion.  Hunger can be put at the centre of GFG 
by regoverning agrifood markets to identify, set and achieve pro-poor development 
goals. Regulating TNCs to end practices such as the abuse of TNC buying power in 
agrifood markets and enforcing guidelines for transparency and accountability for all 
actors in GFG will also improve effective governance.  Representation and inclusion 
will also aid effective governance.  
  
By implication, the inefficacy of current GFG  makes current initiatives such as the 
Comprehensive Framework for Action seem too incremental and ineffective. This 
need not be the case but neither should the assumption be held that there is time for 
gradual improvement, given the 25,000 deaths per day.  Some of the interviewees talk 
about a ‘tipping point’ where the global food system may need to urgently and 
drastically reform.  The announcement by the IPCC in Yokohama in April 2014 of a 
climate change- induced catastrophic food and water shortage may be the clarion call 
of such a tipping point. Heeding such a call and creating an effective food secure 
centred governance field could mean the capability to manage any tipping points or 
crises is already in place.  
  
Even barring any future food disasters, it is clear that the global governance of food 
needs reformed. The agenda-setting by actors who dominate by dint of their economic 
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and political capital, despite an apparent lack of legitimacy, means that the current 
global governance policies and practices are, on the whole, not effective enough and 
not fit for purpose.   Accepting this begs many questions about how to reform and 
what should be reformed?  For example, how can agrifood markets be regulated?  
How should global institutions respond to the future threats of food security? How 
can the ‘democratic deficit’ in the GFG field be addressed?   
  
Conclusion  
As with climate change, partial reform may not be enough. Small steps in the right 
direction, whilst reassuring, may not be justifiable nor effective enough in light of the 
scale and pace of food insecurity.  There is an assumption about small-scale 
improvements - that they show a ‘bounce’ in a downward trend or herald a new 
upswing which will bring the problem to an end.  That only one in eight people are 
hungry now rather than one in seven is not a success, it is a failure and a renewal of 
previous failures. Consequences of such harrowing magnitude require great leaps 
forward not just little steps of success.     
  
The next chapter, Chapter Four, offers interviews with organisations in the field and 
outlines short case studies of one representative organisation from each of the four 
sectors, introducing individual perspectives on scenarios of food insecurity.  Chapter 
Five contains the overall analysis and recommendations.  
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Chapter Four:  Views From The Field    
  
“Squeezing the lives of people is now being proposed as the saviour of the planet. 
Through the green economy an attempt is being made to technologise, financialise, 
privatise and commodify all of the earth’s resources and living processes.”  (Vandana 
Shiva, 2000).   
  
With the global governance field now mapped out by the Field Analysis it is useful to 
have an actor (governor), level of analysis.  Through this lens the view of the GFG 
field is from their perspective and the issues and viewpoints on GFG that affect them, 
such as co-ordination, distribution of power and effectiveness of IOs.  As outlined in 
the methodology section in Chapter Two, through qualitative research – firstly 
interviews then case studies – this chapter considers the dynamics, power and 
membership of the GFG from ten governors’ perspectives.  The first half of the 
chapter contains the results from the ten interviews and the second half has four case 
studies and comparison.  The chapter concludes with some analysis and interpretation 
of the results from these two methods and the next and final chapter continues the 
analysis and sets out recommendations.  
Part 1. The Interviews  
 
The importance of self-reflexivity in qualitative research is evident in interviews, 
since the interviewer is also a participant in the research. As such, interviews offer 
both risks and opportunities to the researcher.  The risk of researcher bias accidentally 
shaping the results versus the opportunity of data that offers insights and knowledge 
not previously known.  
 
A Semi Structured Interview Approach.  
  
Although the interview protocol (Appendix 9B)  appears on paper to be structured,  
the actual approach to the interviews was semi-structured in that points raised by the 
participants in answers were immediately followed up and the participants were also 
given opportunities to raise their own points or add their own commentary on items 
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not on the interview protocol, so that the questions were open-ended.   In this way the 
protocol was used as a prompt for the interviewer but mostly dialogue flowed 
between the interviewer and participant in a formal but responsive way.    The 
interview protocol lists the main questions and some possible follow-up questions but 
probes were also used as questions during the interview, when possible, and it was 
these probes and follow-up questions that demonstrated  the responsivity in the 
interviews, according to Rubin & Rubin’s description of responsive interviewing 
(Rubin & Rubin, 1995:16).  The operational difficulties of conducting international 
interviews over the phone should be highlighted here too, as well as the difficulties  in 
gaining access through gatekeepers, gaining the confidence of participants and 
establishing a rapport when there is no face to face validation (Creswell, 2007: 120).  
It was also extremely difficult to retain access and participation.  With it taking 
months to secure both participants and interviews in many cases and almost a year in 
the case of the TNC participant it was also a challenge to secure a date for the 
interview slot with the participant or gatekeeper, even when permission had been 
granted in principle.   With perseverance it was possible to conduct semi-structured 
interviews, to audiotape and then transcribe them, which constituted the data 
collection.  The one part of the interview process which proceeded easily, however, 
was the issuance and signage of ethics approval sheets and participant information 
sheets.   
As a lone method the interviews would not have been robust since not enough 
interviewees chose to participate, so they are not representative of each sector but are 
representative of the GFG field in a holistic sense and their perspectives on the global 
governance of food are represented.  As a supplementary method, however, the 
interviews offer useful new insights into the food governance field.  The interviews 
combined with the case studies offer an endogenous view of the GFG field that 
augments the Field Analysis. This endogenous view of the GFG field is important to 
develop issues raised in the literature review such as power-sharing between actors, 
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silo mentality and the effects of corporations, to collect recommendations for 
improvement such as inclusion and scrutiny mechanisms and also to appraise in a 
wider sense how food security is understood amongst the agency, commercial and 
charity workers who work on it.  
Research Process and Participant Selection  
  
As mentioned there was significant difficulty in securing participants to take part in 
the interviews and the challenge was two-fold in that it was also difficult to get them 
to reply to contact, or participate in the interview.  In some cases it took persistent 
emailing, verbal coaxing and assurances to obtain participation. One food security 
expert explained that this was typical and the issue was suspicion across the food 
security governance field.  Mostly Aid organisations replied, sometimes with offer of 
participation, probably because they have a public facing role and remit, with a 
mission statement to raise awareness and they also seek funding from grant-awarding 
sources.  90 potential respondents were approached with a request for an interview 
from a master list of 107 organisations (see Appendix 3).  The master list devised for 
the Field Analysis shows that the personnel are a mixture of senior management and 
field workers.  The head of the organisation was approached first and it was often then 
delegated by them to a more junior (and perhaps more relevant) person.  For more 
generic organisations, research was conducted into the most relevant role to approach.  
The most typical response from many was either non-response or declining to get 
involved.  Another common response was to agree but then to not respond to the 
interview phone call.    
A total of ten respondents were interviewed from nine organisations; seven by phone, 
two face-to-face (in the same interview) and one completed the interview protocol by 
email. An additional two replied to a later follow up email interview although this was 
a truncated version of the questions (see Appendix 9 for versions of the protocol). The 
responses to this email largely tended to point out website links.   
The interviews are anonymised and each of the four sectors are represented by at least 
one interview.  The ‘aid’ sector (AID) offered six interviews (from five organisations, 
participants B, C, D, E and G) and the other three sectors have at least one participant 
each so there is one interview each with a national Governmental Organisation  
(Participant A), an International Organisation (Participant F), a Trans National  
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Corporation (Participant H) and a Civil Society Organisation (Participant I) (see Table 
6 below). The Governmental Organisation interview has been used here although not 
part of the quadripartite sectors of the GFG field.  One of the Aid Organisations was 
the pilot interview.  The gender balance is six men and four women.  Three 
participants are based in the UK, three in Europe and four in the USA and there was a 
wide span of the working age demographic.41  It is regrettable that Asia and Africa are 
not represented here.  This perhaps reflects the geographical bias of the field, the 
constraints of unfunded doctoral research and the domain of the researcher.  
A  GO  
  
B  Aid (pilot interview)  
  
C  Aid  
  
D  
  
Aid  
E1  
E2  
  
Aid  
F  
  
IO  
G  
  
Aid  
H  TNC  
  
I   CSO  
Table 6: Interview Participants’ code by Sector   
Although, as mentioned, each sector is represented, the interviews are not fully 
representative of the total GFG field.  The findings from these two methods 
                                                
41 Although demographic detail was not formally asked for, this data was ascertainable from research 
into the participants.  
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(interviews and case studies) are illustrative and, combined with the Field Analysis, 
provide a foundation for observations, analysis and some recommendations. Due to 
the low participation rate in the interviews there are, however, a number of ‘missing 
voices’.  As well as other geographical areas, the biggest player in each sector, 
namely Monsanto, the Gates Foundation, World Food Programme and La Via 
Campesina all declined to be interviewed.  As a result these organisations are chosen 
as the case studies so that their profile could be set out.  Future research into the GFG 
field that both overcomes this Euro-American bias and specifically includes 
interviews with the larger players would offer a further important step forward in 
understanding Food Security.  Unfortunately this was outwith the reach of this 
research.   
Although the difficulties in securing participants were consistent and enduring, no 
pattern can be drawn from non-participation in the interview other than it was a 
common response, given that more than 80 other participants also declined.   In the 
most extreme example it took twelve months to obtain an interview, that of the TNC.  
It was very important to the research so polite persistence and perseverance was 
imperative.  In the same way that abstaining from voting is a form of democratic 
expression, not participating in the interview can be seen as an expression towards the 
question, the investigation and perhaps also towards academic research generally.    
Email correspondence with a number of potential participants drew positive 
comments on the importance and relevance on the research and frequently there were 
requests for a briefing paper or some form of dissemination of the results but there 
can only be speculation on the reasons for their subsequent non-involvement.  
Referral to websites or corporate publications was another typical response, which 
shows a preference for unidirectional mode of communication.  Some, such as La Via 
Campesina, have a policy of non-disclosure via online, by publication or even by 
interview, but overall these non-disclosing organisations tended to be non US-based 
organisations.   Interestingly and of note for future researchers, La Via Campesina’s 
position is to reject academicism (and so studies are rare).    
Of the nine organisations who did participate, eight gave at least 30 minutes of 
interview time and were generous in offering supplementary information.  Advice 
sought from five food security or global governance experts confirmed that these 
responses of non-participation are a typical stance and sectors only deal with or care 
  
  
  
  
  	  	   164	   
about their own sector so pan sectorial co-operation and oversight are rare.  This may 
go some way to explain why an overall specification of the membership of the field 
has been absent.  The interviews were conducted from August -September 2013 with 
the preparation starting in February 2013. The results do indicate differing points of 
view from across sectors and show contradicting and competing opinions and 
understandings of effective GFG.  
  
The Interviewer’s Approach 
  
As mentioned, although the interview protocol appears to be structured (see Appendix 
9) the approach for  the interviews was intentionally more semi-structured.  Open-
ended and open questions were asked and answers which were interesting or opened 
up new topics were followed up with further off-schedule questions as part of the 
semi-structured approach.  The interviewees were also asked if they wanted to raise 
any part of global food governance, or comment on any issues.  This enabled 
narratives to be established and the responsiveness gave the space for a wider range of 
observational and analytical data to be drawn from the participants (Appendix 10).  
Reflections on the Pilot Interview and the Questions 
  
Reframing the interview questions and nomenclature awareness became apparent 
during the conduct of the pilot so post-pilot, a second version of the interview 
protocol was devised (Appendix 9, B).  The pilot/first version had 32 questions which 
were a mix of primary and secondary questions and duplication, overlap and some 
slight leading of the participant were evident but this initial version was a necessary 
precursor to creating the final version of the protocol (see Appendix 9, A). The main 
reflections from the pilot are on the praxis of the research, (such as the recording 
equipment failing to record and so the importance of detailed note taking as a 
backup).  The semi structured approach taken in conducting the survey was again 
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demonstrated by asking the participants for comment, or any other points they wanted 
to add.  
For the next interviews, the participants’ publications were read and ‘brief sheets’ 
started on their organisation, work etc. In the pilot I slightly dominated the interview, 
not letting the voice of the participant come through well enough but I did stay 
objective, only steering the participant to remain ‘on topic’, not drifting off onto seed 
or advocacy (which the interviewee wanted to). When piloting the questions I also 
realised that there was still a slight mix of primary and secondary questions together 
under topics such as reform, field, and regulation so this ordering was sorted for the 
remaining interviews.  Plus the pilot interview took too long – overall the 
interviewees gave much more comprehensive questions than expected and also 
anticipated questions, so to get around interviewee fatigue I rearranged the order of 
some of the questions, frontloading the most arduous questions that required the 
highest cognitive load to the beginning.  I also collapsed the first two questions on 
personal role/organisational involvement since most interviewees spoke only about 
their organisational involvement with a brief sentence on their role involvement.   I 
also frequently asked if they had issues, points or questions.  Overall it went well and 
operationalising the interviews brought the topic to life and the enabled the data 
collection.  
Interview Themes  
  
Once redrafted, the final version of the interview protocol (Appendix 9, B) worked 
well.  The questions for the interview were divided into three sections of personal 
involvement, GFG and reform of GFG, each with an open question on that theme at 
the end.   The conclusion was one open question on any aspect of the topic.  There 
were thirteen questions in all which covered the participant’s role in food security; 
asked for their evaluation of the effectiveness of current GFG; the sectors in GFG; the 
architecture, oversight, reform including possible leadership of any reform; scrutiny 
of TNCs, Aid organisations and International Organisations and also opinions on 
profood security policy innovations.    
Towards the end of the interview, if time allowed, a question was asked about which 
issues the G8 should prioritise (although this question was also implicitly asking what 
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it was going to take to improve food security).  Answers given to question four (on 
the main sectors of the GFG field) were applied to the Field Analysis.  A point on 
nomenclature was raised by a few interviewees at the start, since food security and 
global governance definitions do vary but this was quickly reconciled during the 
interview.42  
  
Logistical Difficulties  
  
For all of the post-pilot interviews physical challenges predominated.  For example 
the logistics of recording over poor phone signals, time zone alignment, unkept 
appointments, note-taking at speed, interruptions and delays were all repeatedly 
overcome.  But the biggest challenge remained the lack of uptake, sometimes on the 
day.  The response rate really depended on the head of the organisation. The focus of 
the interviews was to capture opinions rather than facts (since facts are in the public 
domain) and the questions were designed to avoid duplication with publicly available  
information.  Once the interviews were all concluded an email ‘sweep’ of unfulfilled 
interviewees was conducted with a truncated version of the interview protocol of five 
questions.  In research terms I felt that by the time I had completed the interviews, my 
decision to do the Field Analysis was again validated in that there was no map of 
GFG nor overall sense of actors involved even amongst many of the governors 
themselves.   The lack of interview uptake and tentativeness of the interviewees meant 
that interviews alone would not yield a complete view of who was involved in GFG 
since the actors and sectors themselves are very siloed and Balkanized.      
                                                
42 Interestingly another observation is that the nomenclature of ‘Non Governmental Organisation’ did 
not transfer across sectors. The danger is of non-fully articulating definitions is misspecification but a 
few participants pointed to the need for aligned nomenclature as a prequel to their interviews.  
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The only face-to-face interview possible was with one aid organisation and this was a 
much better quality of data-yield than the rest.  Face-to-face interviews as standard 
would have been better since the data quality was so much improved.  So another 
observation is that it is not easy to do organisational interviews on a very low budget 
and with no prior relationship nor access.  Despite being persistent and the importance 
of the topic there was almost no response from the ‘Roman Forum’, International 
Organisations and TNCs.  The faith based organisations, however, did reply.   This 
widespread lack of reply is a reflexive conclusion in itself but also speaks to the  
opaqueness of the field.  Perhaps Bourdieu’s concept of social capital also applies to 
social researchers?  
Paradoxically, for a governance field so static, another of the challenges of the 
research generally was incorporating the numerous developments in such a vast topic 
area.  For example, between starting and completing the research, the Gates  
Foundation came out from the ‘left field’ so the Field Analysis was revised to include 
the Gates Foundation and was changed from three sectors to four sectors.  Measuring 
the effects of the Gates Foundation on the GFG field could be an entire research 
project in itself.  Discovering that LVC did not disclose data any more was another 
surprising development.  With their secretariat now based in Zimbabwe and a recent 
policy of non-transparency (with the justification of not revealing funders or funding) 
LVC’s non-disclosure reset the narrative of the research into a more complex, shaded 
picture. These developing changes justify the methodology because by consistently 
asking systematic questions across sectors and not accepting only the received 
wisdom, interesting and sometimes surprising results can be obtained.    
To sum up, despite thorough planning, carrying out the research was an exercise in 
solving a series of problems.  Obtaining ‘thick, rich data’ was difficult but since the 
purpose was to garner endogenous viewpoints from the global governance field, 
enough new ‘thick, rich’ data was obtained.  The response rate was not ideal but this 
also unburdened this researcher from one of a researcher’s more judicious decisions. 
Rather than stopping when the data was satiated, the interviews ended when all the 
respondents who were willing to get involved were interviewed.    
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The Interview Data  
  
The interview themes in the protocol are drawn from the themes arising from Chapter 
Three namely, governance architecture, dynamics, effectiveness, power and 
membership. Taking the first major theme, membership, the first question asked the 
participant about the role and involvement of their organisation in food security. The 
Aid Organisations commented that their organisations either fed into UN 
organisations e.g. the Committee on Food Security; promoted agricultural 
development (Participant C); conducted campaigns, lobbied and offered advocacy 
services (Participants D and G), or pursued economic-based approaches to food 
insecurity. This shows the wide range of activities by the Aid Organisations who 
participated in the interviews.  The Governmental Organisation provides oversight 
and scrutiny of the food security activities of the legislative arm of the US 
Government. The International Organisation commented that it achieves economic 
development through agricultural growth.  The TNC stated that it improves the supply 
chain by supporting farmers to access markets.  Lastly Participant I, the CSO, 
commented on their role in GFG:   
“[We] work with the CFS, not as a member (only states are members), but as 
an active participant in the Civil Society Mechanism (CSM) to the CFS.  
[Organisation name] has, in the context of the respective CSM working group, 
co-facilitated civil society input to two important processes in the CFS: the 
Voluntary Guidelines on Responsible Governance of Tenure of Land, Forests 
and Fisheries, adopted by the CFS in May 2012, and to the Global Strategic 
Framework for Food Security and Nutrition, adopted by the GSF in October  
2012.”  
  
These answers to the first question provide descriptive rather than analytical data but 
are useful in identifying how the actors view their involvement in food security.  But 
it is clear that for some of the respondents’ secondary activities, such as feeding into 
the CFS or lobbying and campaigning and their primary role in food security, whereas 
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for others their work in food security is primary, involving direct action via 
agricultural growth, economic development or, in the case of the TNC supporting 
farmers access market.  Each of these fit into the productionist discourse, although the 
advocacy activities of aid organisations could be said to also relate to the food 
sovereignty perspective and civil society discourses.  This intermediary role has been 
criticised by LVC who reject intermediaries and demand direct routes to power. The 
civil society organisations show the circumscribed role of civil society organisations 
in the CFS.  Although the Voluntary Guidelines and the Strategic Framework  are 
important landmark guidelines, the international organisation participant comments 
that these guidelines “don’t go anywhere”, which demonstrates the restricted although 
progressive, membership that the civil society organisations are allowed in the 
governance of food.    
Whereas the first question dealt with a description of roles in the global food 
governance field the theme of the second question is effectiveness of members within 
the current GFG field.  Answers to the second question varied dramatically across 
sectors.  The Aid Organisations commented on factors which have a huge on GFG, 
specifically the global trade policies of multilateral agencies which they saw as being 
self-fulfilling.  Participant B commented:  “They [agencies] have unintentional 
influence but the question remains - how can we get to an effective GFG regime?”  
This chimes with the point  on the effectiveness of the GFG field and comments that 
multi-lateral agencies can even inhibit food security.  
Participant C pointed to a compacted stasis across the field:  
 “…however with international governance there is need of global trade 
regulation and compliance to create a more even playing field.  There is 
impasse on Doha work on GFG.  The last 5 years have been impasse [so] 
there is more to be done, especially with clearer resolutions.”    
  
The relates to the perceived need for resolution to the stalemate over the WTO Doha 
round on global trade negotiations, as described in further detail on page 176,, which 
has impacted on developing countries and on the global governance of food.  On 
global trade regulation this participant specifically highlighted access to markets with 
the need to improve food security by increasing trade opportunities, and developing 
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greater access for developing markets, which is consistent with the food justice 
discourse.  
The failure in the GFG system, particularly in its lack of response to climate change 
threats and worsening trends, was highlighted by participant D who commented:  
“The current GFG system does not provide adequate responses to the rise of 
food prices…looming water problems… rapid concentration in multinational 
agribusiness corporations without the necessary institutional innovation to 
guide them.  [There is a] lack of progress in addressing scarcity; adverse 
impacts of climate change on agriculture; widespread nutrition problems, 
including hunger, obesity, and chronic diseases; and agriculture-related health 
risks, such as avian influenza.”    
National Governments and International Organisations in particular,   
“…have notoriously underinvested in public goods related to food, nutrition, 
and agriculture, such as rural infrastructure, agricultural research, and rural 
institutions, which have international spill over effects and global impact.” 
(Participant D).  
   
Participants E were also critical of the international institutions, commenting that the  
UN is a “super-talker” and pointing to the WFP delivering aid in Karnega in Uganda 
for 46 years, even though the need for structural investment would be obvious over 
this time period, commented participant E1.  Participant E2 confirmed this.  
“Any gains have been lost.  Co-ordination levels range from crisis to non-
crisis, country to country with a better coordinated approach needed.   There is 
a lot of evidence that it is improving but it still has a long way to go.  In major 
stakeholders voices vary and small voices are often lost so participation of 
smaller stakeholders is key.  It is caught in an emergency situation and this is 
recurring so a systemic way of dealing with hunger would be better.”  
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This points to a need for systemic coordinated approach to dealing with hunger 
specifically including smaller stakeholder voices.  It also points to global governance 
fragmentation, also contained in the literature review (page 126)  
The need for a strategic systemic approach is also underlined by participant G who 
points to the FAO as a lead body:    
“So in particular, as you will see, the rights of the CFS are run out of the FAO 
which used to be, and I’m not completely knowledgeable about its origins, but 
from what I understand, it wasn’t always a strategic body.”    
 The viewpoint of the TNC participant (participant H) is that GFG is weak and 
extremely ineffective:  
 “I mean there is no real international governance of this. It is national with 
some international guidelines around policies.”   
However,  hope of change is also perceived in the UN’s top-down approach in the 
albeit slow improvements seen in the CFS.  For GFG to be effective, comments 
Participant G:   
“There is much more of an effort to be inclusive of nationally based local 
organisations, local movements such as the various peasant movements and 
organisations around the world as well as NGOs and I think that has played 
quite an important role in terms of mapping out priorities that are more 
relevant, more  in line with different interests and priorities somehow [as with] 
the High Level Panel of Experts in  food security and nutrition…with the 
understanding that there needs to be global coordinated action to stop that 
scale of crisis from happening again.”  
  
The TNC participant also stated that it was their belief that the ultimate responsibility 
for implementing food security lay with national governments:   
“I mean there is a Committee on Food Security in the UN now, which means 
it is pretty much all encompassing of countries, which looks at food security 
and coming up with recommendations for national governments. So there is a 
forum, if you like, where global issues of this kind can be discussed, the 
implementation and recommendations going into national governments. That 
is where executive power lies, [and] so to some extent [it] is around what 
national governments do with these recommendations. I mean could you 
improve the system?  I am sure you could, do I have…? I mean a lot of it is to 
do with how well national governments implement guidelines.”    
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This position is a good example of the productionist argument as put forward by 
agrifood TNCs generally, that they are neutral technical actors with no power, and 
they also point to the executive power of Nation-States and the discursive power of 
the UN and Committee of Food Security, which shifts the focus away from scrutiny 
of TNC power, which is the considerable power of private actors.  This illustrates  
TNCs’ denial of their power in the GFG field which itself contradicts the viewpoints 
of some of the other interviewees.  
The TNC participant also commented that this ultimate national government-level of 
action should apply to food aid and social protection policies:    
  
“For food security and from the FAO and organisations like the Committee on 
World Food Security there are recommendations around these kind of things 
but, at the end the day, it is down to national governments to implement and 
for various reasons they may not do that  some of them do, some of them have 
done very well and some have not.”  
  
This demonstrates a desire for national governments to implement social protectionist 
policies to mitigate the excesses of the market for producers and consumers.  These 
policies, it is suggested, could flow from recommendations by the FAO and CFS or 
by National governments themselves. This, rather than global trade regulations, would 
improve the effectiveness of Global food Governance.  This illustrates a TNC 
viewpoint and agenda in Food Security governance.   Participant H felt went further 
and indicated that  private sector actors like  TNCs deliver food security in the global 
system by creating an ‘enabling environment’ to support farmers:   
“In my view a lot of the time it is private sector players who deliver food 
security - everyone from farmers to the companies who are involved in the 
food system. I mean, they are the people who are actively day-by-day bringing 
food to the rest of the population people who need it.  I mean what 
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governments need to do is create an enabling environment and that enabling 
environment includes private sector actors who do that better and that 
enabling environment includes  public infrastructure -  roads and electricity in 
developing countries - straight through to forces that might help farmers 
access input like fertilizer or credit that help farmers access market that help 
markets function across local regional and international markets that help 
trade because different countries have different resources some countries can 
produce a lot of food and there are others who produce very little then you 
have to enable food to flow from areas of surplus to areas of deficit.”  
  
This TNC position attributes national governments as the prime agents who should be 
resolving food insecurity by implanting CFS recommendations, providing social 
protection policies and infrastructure, and enabling the private sector who “deliver 
food security.”   Yet it is TNCs who do provide food security by helping farmers 
trade. This does not take into account the point raised in the Field Analysis that the 
raison d’être of TNCs is to maximize economic capital, not ‘provide food security’.  It 
also represents a view of food security where the failure is at national government 
level since their role is to facilitate food trade.  Also of note is the lone food producer 
here aligned with the ultra-corporation.  This viewpoint is in direct contradiction with 
points on TNC practices outlined earlier.   It omits the issues of TNC practices such as 
terminator seeds and patenting which causes so much damage to famers’ livelihoods.  
This position that the TNC promotes a productionist discourse and mercantilist world 
view is aligned with the food justice and right to food movement.   
  
The Civil Society participant focused on the UN Human Rights system rather than 
food security per se in the GFG, representing a rights-based discourse:   
“As the international human rights organization on the right to adequate food, 
we work also on food issues with the different organs of the UN Human 
Rights System, based in Geneva.”  
  
This illustrates the competing perspectives and discourses on effectiveness from a 
rights-based approach by CSOs to the viewpoint of TNCs of their role as food 
security enablers.  Each sector points to each other’s sector as the source of 
ineffectiveness or, as with the CSO, sees themselves as  pushing their approach 
  
  
  
  
  	  	   174	   
through to change the status quo.  Overall these competing perspectives, agendas and 
disparate understandings of GFG vary considerably and can only serve to impede 
rather than improve food security.  There are also disavowals of where the power lies, 
presumably to conceal the true balance of power and lack of power-sharing in the 
food governance system.  
Cross sector opinions also varied widely for the third question which asked, what 
should be done to improve GFG? The GO (Participant A) focused on inefficiencies in 
the system of delivering food aid, dealing with the corporate culture and internal 
controls of agencies. Participant A also pointed out that,   
“With food aid, a lot of it is logistics.  So issues like modernization and 
inefficiency in the emergencies.  Using local and regional procurement for 
example.… So we look at the internal controls of agencies.  For example, the 
World Food Program didn’t sufficiently track from the port of entry to the 
recipient and we expressed concern re their data on losses. …We make 
recommendations but bearing in mind the environment in which they work.”  
  
Better co-operation amongst the organisations and agencies involved in governance 
and a number of issues such as improving co-ordination amongst agencies plus the 
need for ‘more and better’ fora which include more smallholder producers, was 
highlighted by Participant B (Aid) who stated:  
“Civil society gives the credibility to the [CFS] Secretariat and offers critical 
contributions since their personnel has been involved for a long time.  
Important too for the UN agencies to talk to everyone more freely since  
Governance knows vital information.  It should be relatively easier now to  
establish a stable food regime since there are smallholder groups like La Via 
Campesina involved so there is stronger network with decades of experience.”   
This more diverse and inclusive form of Global Governance was also recommended 
by Participant D (Aid) who commented on the potential for the EU to support the  
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CFS,  
 “In order to strengthen global governance, the EU should give full support to the 
multi-stakeholder UN Committee on World Food Security (CFS) to ensure it fully 
emerges as the ‘foremost inclusive international and intergovernmental platform’ 
operating at the global level. It should: Support ongoing CFS negotiations on the 
new Principles for Responsible Investment (RAI) in the context of food security 
and nutrition. Secondly, it is important to promote and operationalize new CFS 
negotiated Voluntary Guidelines on the Responsible Governance of Tenure of  
Land, Fisheries and Forests;43 and thirdly, promote the creation of a proposed 
Global Fund for Social Protection for 48 Least Developed Countries”.44  
  
Better information about production levels of food in countries would also improve 
food governance, commented participant C, since the current system,  
“…is too slow to update the systems with information like market prices.  This 
[is a] need for better food balance sheets and better links to countries re trade 
bands and tariff setting.  This indicates price volatility.  There is also the need 
for better stores, such as the farm bill process in the States.  In India and Asia 
large TNCS work more closely with governments.”  
Both better organisation and wider participation of global actors, in particular African 
actors, was highlighted by Participant G (Aid) who commented that things were 
overall on the “right track” and that the CFS is,   
“An important first manifestation in terms of process… the private sector 
obviously has an added value to support that process but I think it does need to 
be government led and civil society led.”   
  
The TNC participant (H) put forward a perspective which focused on the role of 
TNCs in GFG as being only stakeholders involved in the governance process: “We 
don’t give input into the governance of food security but we do give input into the 
process of governance.”   
This articulates the role of TNCs as neutral technocrats which chimes with Clapp and 
Fuchs (2009).  
                                                
43 For FAO (2012) Voluntary Guidelines on the Responsible Governance of Tenure of Land, Fisheries 
and Forests in the Context of National Food Security, see FAO, 2012.  
44 The participant offered to provide arguments for this proposal.  
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This description of power does not describe the degrees of influence which 
stakeholders have over those with ‘decision-making’ power or how much the 
decisions made reflect the interests of stakeholders such as power-sharing.  From the 
Field Analysis we know that governors vary considerably in size, economic capital  
and also in political and legitimacy capital and applying this to the ‘process’ means 
that the leverage will also vary considerably.  The distinction between inputting into 
governance or inputting into the process of governance is an interesting one.  This  
interpretation is that GFG actors, such as TNCs,  do not make the decisions (so no 
executive power) but it could be argued that by their inputs into the process involves 
other forms of power such as discursive power (promoting agendas, lobbying, 
negotiating etc.) or instrumental power.  The actors can also still wield instrumental 
power, albeit through the soft power of negotiation and persuasion.  This may also 
explain the narrative given by the TNC participant to the previous question that TNCs 
provide food security and that national governments should enable them to do so.  
This represents an example of the position-taking by corporate power which 
underplays the extent of their power and by aligning (falsely conflating) themselves 
with single food producers, many of whom experience negative effects of TNC 
practices, the neoliberal logic of market-driven solutions to food insecurity, outlined 
in Chapters One and Two, is again identified here.    
Additionally the ‘input into governance process not decision-making’ is a useful 
distinction for TNCs to make since it legitimizes their involvements in GFG by 
categorizing them as ‘stakeholders’ with an accompanying presumption that only 
executive power is instrumental power.  This chimes with the assumption of the 
technical neutrality of TNCs in the food governance system but ignores the dynamics 
of not only GFG but also power itself.  Such as, the amount of ‘stake’ (political and 
economic capital) held by an actor determines their ability to ‘influence the process’.   
It avoids the bigger question of whether TNCs should be stakeholders at all  
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(legitimacy).  Or if that question does arise, ‘stakeholder’ implies a benign detached 
distance from the governance of food rather than a much more immediate, active role 
in the food system to the extent where, as we shall see in the Monsanto case study, the 
Foreign Policy actions of governments are aligned and acting on the needs of home 
corporations to impose their controversial products on resistant nation-states.  
‘Stakeholder’ status dilutes or masks a reality where the commercial activities or 
business practices of  TNCs (or of other divisions in their corporations) should,  
according to some commentators, preclude them from being ‘stakeholders’ or having 
any involvement in the governance process at all (Participant B).    
  
Furthermore,  commercial power and practices might even dilute ‘executive power’ of 
GFG power, where they weaken food security measures or Right to Food discourses, 
rather than strengthen them.  By creating this distinction between degrees of 
governance involvement in this way, elements of governance have been delineated 
but it is possibly the unofficial degree and extent of influence over decision-makers 
which matters, not the official position taken. To this end political capital, legitimacy 
capital and economic capital are useful measuring sticks of political and economic 
power and Field Analysis, which sets out actors’ symbolic capitals in the field of 
power, becomes a very useful method to set out a ‘power map’.   The relationship 
between power and political capital is discussed earlier but in brief, the more 
resources that an organisation can marshal and convert to exercising power (political 
capital), then the more influence the organisation can levy.  It stands to reason that 
any actor would take full advantage of the leverage available to it, if not limited by 
other means.  
  
On effecting change and establishing effective GFG either ideally or practically,  
Participant B (Aid) felt that only a shock would improve the system:   
“A disaster or scandal will happen – the only question is how bad and of what 
magnitude will it be?  Then reason will prevail over agribusinesses.  They 
may become decentralized and smallholder production will come to the fore.” 
Whereas Participant D (Aid) felt better co-ordination and effectiveness was 
the right approach for change: “Political will and more coordination among 
the different  
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Institutions. This is a similar answer to the question on diffuse architecture.”  
The International Organisation, Participant F, pointed to the need to reset this question 
to GFG more generally:   
“This unitary body or what comes closest is probably the CFS but that said, it 
is a global committee on food security. It can make recommendations but it 
cannot proscribe.  It can provide guidance etc. etc., but this guidance would 
need to be adopted by sovereign states but ultimately we are going back to the 
level of nations although these nations need to determine  jointly what their 
interests are for food security for now and in 10, 20, 50 years to come  and 
that is where I think,  for that you need a global body... I mean, where do we 
have the bodies that make authoritative decisions? We are firmly in the sphere 
of international law there and we know how difficult that is.  A lot of the 
decisions made for food security…are not International soft law, so they are 
not hard law and mostly are not captured at all.”  
  
Participant F’s opinion means that that an authoritative decision making organisation 
with legal power to implement its decisions is needed in the GFG space.  So either 
enhance the CFS to enable it to make these decisions and implement through 
international law or better, through hard law such as national sovereign law, although 
this is fraught with political difficulty and unlikely since it needs the harmonization of  
states’ legislations.  The current role of the CFS in making recommendations is, 
Participant F proposed, not what is needed to globally govern food security.  
Extension of the CFS would mean new governance structures with powers and the 
cooperation of national governments.  This could emerge from the governance space 
currently occupied by the CFS but the current situation would remain with their 
decisions neither captured nor implemented.  Otherwise it remains a committee which 
makes guidelines and the self-interest of member states, including their commercial 
elite and trade interests continue to dominate.  This ‘Realism’ analysis tempers the 
Cosmopolitanism which enables the design of a new global unitary food governance 
body.   
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Participant G (Aid) reiterated the need for civil society being taken into account by 
governors to identify and establish priorities from the ground up and for agencies to 
partner more with governments and CSOs.   
Participant F, (IO) called for a unitary international body to govern food security, 
overcoming the silos:   
“A forum like the CFS needs to be able to overcome the individual interests of 
its members for real dialogue to happen, for real decisions to be made.  The 
next stage is not just to agree on a set of international soft law instruments but 
to make an international unitary body so the CFS needs to monitor progress. 
That is a great challenge that the CFS will need to live up to in the next few 
years”  
The idea of an international unitary body revisits the concept of the World Food 
Council which would offer legislation to be adopted nationally.  This could also 
manage food stocks, oversee TNCs and reduce price volatility by addressing 
commoditisation and trade practices.  This could also enable public-private 
partnerships so that TNCs were better regulated yet were encouraged to participate in 
agricultural development across the board along guidelines proposed by smallholders 
and peasant farmers.  
The TNC respondent pointed to the role of TNCs in effecting change and establishing 
effective Global Food Governance:  
“That is what we do.  A lot of our work, particularly in developing countries 
for example, where you are providing a market for smallholders farmers for 
example cocoa in  Ivory Coast or Ghana, we systematically help to train the 
farmers in growing the cocoa trees on their farms better. How to harvest the 
cocoa at the right time; how to ferment it properly; which is an activity that is 
done on the farm and by doing this help to raise the income usually between 
30-50% of the cocoa farmer which much improves their ability to feed 
themselves… which builds resilience into the next generation… For example, 
we have trained over 2 million farmers over the last 10 years in china, 
basically in animal husbandry; how to get pigs healthy and grow them to 
optimum weight and grow grain.  So just basic kinds of agriculture extension 
work which the public sector are not doing  which are really to move a lot of 
farmers out of poverty and farmers are a big part of the hungry, then that is 
what needs doing.”  
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To sum up, these comments overall show that there was no solid positive evaluation 
of GFG across the interviews.  The answers range from the commentary that the CFS 
is a ‘step in the right direction’ to the TNC viewpoint that there is, de facto, no 
international governance.    
  
Question Three was on the theme of membership asked the participants if they agreed 
there are four main sectors in GFG.  The answers are utilized and discussed in the 
Field Analysis in Chapter Three but there was broad agreement of this.   Additional 
points made include suggesting the inclusion of National Governments (by 
Participants A and C).  Participant D proposed that the aid organisation sector be 
divided into development agencies and NGOs.  It is interesting to note that, despite 
the domination of the Gates Foundation in the Field Analysis, not one of the 
participants mentioned the role of private non-TNC actors.  Participant F (IO), did 
comment on the regional variance of private actors, here meaning TNCs: “in some 
perspectives MNCs might play a major role but in other geographic areas they don’t.”   
That there is geographically-segmented variance in the roles that actors play is an 
important point to be raised and offers an opportunity for future research by 
conducting geographical field analyses by region of GFG.    
  
Participant G (Aid) also suggested including other governance groups, especially 
where they function outside of the UN or regional governance-led bodies, for 
example, the CAADP which comes out of the African Union and out of the NEPAD 
process. 45   NEPAD promotes agricultural development in the African continent;  
                                                
45 NEPAD is a technical body of the African Union.  Agricultural development is key to NEPAD’s 
Comprehensive Africa Agriculture Development Programme (CAADP)  which brings together major 
players in agriculture including African leaders, policy makers, scientists, partners and farmers to 
engender agricultural growth and sustainable development.  It is seen as being the legitimate 
policymaking organisation with a mandate which states should respect.  Some commentators think that 
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“…it is a programme, which is government-led and specifically African Union 
government-led so [it is] outside of the UN or International Organisations [so] it 
should be included and it should be international…and that is another important 
stakeholder which you might want to include.”    
  
This is a significant point about the representativeness or democratic deficit of the 
existing GFG field. Participant H, the TNC actor, also questioned who is an IO or an 
NGO and asked if CSOs include Aid organisations such as Oxfam, which 
demonstrates the uncertainty of membership of the GFG field especially who the 
other sectors in the field might be and how they might be populated?  A silo mentality 
is clearly operating across the field, with less awareness of membership than might be 
expected.  
On the topic of how the architecture of the GFG effects food security (Q. Four) 
participant A (GO) chose to focus on the ad hoc nature of decision making:   
“In deciding emergency aid there is the UN and its agencies such as FAO, 
WFP, and if there is a declaration then we liaise with national-level providers.  
Many decisions are ad hoc decisions made in real time with differing sets of 
participants.  Internationally there is, for example, the CAADP system. After 
which they make their plans, involving many parties including companies.  
The US and UK liaise and say how these plans will be implemented.”  
  
This again highlights the absence of legitimate policy-making organisations like 
CAADP from the GFG field. the recognition of the centrality of the CFS as the 
legitimate policy-making body is a common theme but for some participants, despite 
this central role, governance is also perceived as becoming increasingly fragmented.  
Participant D commented:  
“Food security governance has become increasingly fragmented, leading to a 
lack of coherence and conflicting interventions. The Committee on World 
Food Security (CFS) is the legitimate policy-making organisation which 
                                                                                                                                       
CAADP should guide international agricultural development efforts across Africa which would help 
increase the effectiveness of the currently fragmented and disconnected governance system (Participant 
G).  
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should guide international efforts to ensure coherence and avoid 
fragmentation; this mandate must be respected by states.”  
  
Participant E2 (Aid) also agreed that the governance structures are diffuse and that the 
UN should invite NGOs from Less Developed Countries to remedy the democratic 
deficit.   
  
The International Organisation, (F) believed that linkages could be improved but 
without “reinventing the wheel in terms of governance” but the lack of authority,   
 “…is so diffuse because the key question is who is making the decisions? 
Who has the competencies to make decisions about what and we need to 
become much more sophisticated.”    
  
On the point on lack of lack of oversight of TNCs and how this affects global 
governance, Participant A declined to answer since it was outwith their remit to do so.   
Participant B (Aid) responded that:  
“It is unlikely that there would be a major reduction in agrifood practices of  
TNCs.  At the UN level what it was trying to do in the 1940’s it was still 
doing in the 1970’s but it all ended in 1993.46 It lost its general oversight 
especially of anti-competition regulations and corporate corporations are no 
longer monitored. For example seed companies should not be more than 25% 
ratio of the Global Governance field.  Companies should not be allowed to be 
seed and fertilizer companies to more than 25% of the GFG field.  The UN is 
making changes but they are small steps.”  
  
Also from the aid sector participant C commented that:  
“There is a balancing act since over regulation from governments produces its 
own distortions over regulations.  Over governance caused wine lakes and 
                                                
46 When the World Food Council was broken up.  
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butter mountains… International companies –food security and food safety is 
severely monitored for food security and food safety.”  
  
Participant G (Aid) commented on TNC oversight,   
“Yes there needs to be more [oversight] and they need to be partnered by 
governance partners in places where they are present and their actions need to 
be in line with governance and there needs to be stronger oversight.  And in 
places where there may not be strong government because in these places they 
are allowed to run free. Also the international financial sector and the role of 
speculation in financial markets and the role that that played in terms of 
driving up global food prices.  That is a completely unregulated sector that 
requires immediate, IMMEDIATE attention in terms of greater oversight.”  
  
This echoes the point made by the TNC participant about moving from food aid 
delivered via the WFP.  For this question, the TNC participant pointed to the 
importance of GFG investing in the agricultural economy although it should be noted 
this builds up TNCs’ customer base too:   
“So an emphasis that futures away from just delivering aid to actually 
developing agricultural and rural economics to be stronger and more resilient 
is, I think, the approach that needs to be followed. And over the years we 
should see a diminishment in the need to give food aid if we can develop the 
agricultural sector.” 47  
  
Agricultural development is here seen as compatible with TNC objectives as was 
investment in agriculture in Question Two.  The contentious form of agri-
development will be discussed in the La Via Campesina case study at the end of this 
chapter. This chimes with a view by Participant E that commercial partners and 
public-private partnerships are essential for delivery of food security.  Yet concerns 
have been raised about cherry-picking by public-private partnerships so that only the 
most profitable agricultural schemes or zones are actioned, leaving many parts of the 
globe still food insecure.  
Still on the theme of membership the next question asked for comment on the effect  
of TNCs  as members on Food Security Governance and specifically how they effect 
                                                
47 This is taken to mean NGOs and CSOs.  
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food governance itself.  Some of the Aid Organisations pointed to the increased 
demanded for private-public partnerships and, to varying degrees of appraisal, to the 
role of TNCs in food security.  Participant A replied.   
“In Food aid [the role of TNCs is], minor.  The food is purchased in the local 
market.  In food security we are seeing that it is becoming an important part of 
food security.  In research and development though there is an increasing push 
for public-private projects.”  
  
The charity which Participant E works for specialises in pursuing such private-public 
partnerships (PPP), with TNCs taking significant roles in many of their projects:   
“TNC involvement is important, for example, with partnerships such as 
Western Union, Nike, ING, Wal-Mart etc. and their activities.  They come in 
as actors (before funders) and the connection can be beneficial.  They are part 
of the global intellect which can reduce disaster risk.  50 As the agency that 
brings that together re commercial crop insurance and pastoral livestock 
insurance we ask, how can we integrate?”  
  
Of all the Aid organisations involved in these interviews, E’s organisation is the most 
TNC-facing, actively seeking out joint projects with TNCs to alleviate food 
insecurity.  They argue that such PPP can increase the Corporate Social 
Responsibility of TNCs when they are involved in shared value partnerships.   
Participant B, however, takes a directly opposite position on the involvement of TNCs 
in food security, commenting with emphasis that “They are just a disaster.” A more 
middle ground position highlighted the need for scrutiny  of TNCs was held by a 
number of participants with Participant D commenting,   
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“At the EU level TNCs could be scrutinised by a new Transparency Directive 
that applies to corporations outside of the extractive industries sector.48  [This] 
could be useful to control corporations investments and speculation”.  
  
The TNC participant (H) chose to focus on the role of NGOs which follows the 
discourse about NGOs perpetuating the ‘hunger business’:   
“I think it is more difficult for NGOs [than TNCs].  I think it depends on their 
business model how they raise money so, for some NGOs, the shock factor of 
crises is a way of stimulating funds and that is how they raise money and get 
funding for the work that they do.  They may find that developing resilient 
rural agricultural systems is less dramatic and maybe less of a fundraising 
model for them and therefore they may be less interested in doing that.    
This is again indicative and  representative of pointing out other sectors’ weaknesses 
but nonetheless resilience is a growing trend in food security policies.    
The scrutiny of other sectors/members such as IOs and Aid Orgs involved in GFG is 
also important in addition to TNC scrutiny.   Aid organisation participant E2 again 
emphasised the need for change in NGOs’ activities to address systemic economic 
problems:   
“NGOs have had a slow awakening.  NGOs are traditionally minded which is 
sometimes inappropriate to the change that people want to make.  More 
thinking needs to go into NGOs to find new solutions and ways of responding.  
For example developing the resilience debate in food security [which] 
highlights root causes and advocates a systemic approach otherwise their 
actions can’t always be sustained.  It is important to resolve problems with a 
vision for change, some soul searching and in collaborations with TNCs if 
necessary.”  
The International Organisation Participant (F), commented on the importance of 
scrutinising governance overall and one step towards this to overcome the silo 
mentality:   
“Different sectors need to talk to each other and different sectors/areas and 
silos challenge [governance] in the face of continuing fragility in a 21st 
century of  food insecure 1 billion people and 1 billion people micronutrient 
                                                
48 The EU Transparency Directive improves the financial disclosure and regulation of publicly traded 
companies.  
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deficient. Donors get tired and want to move onto something new but it will 
catch up with us again and again and it is the solid foundation for sustainable 
development and if we don’t tackle it we are all falling back. We might have 
huge economic growth rates but they won’t be sustainable and they will leave 
lots of people behind and inequality will grow and my wish would be that we 
focus on it and finally do what is taking us so long.”  
  
These responses present a wide range of opinions and governor’s discourses on 
scrutiny within the GFG field.  At one end of the spectrum is the viewpoint that TNCs 
work to solve food insecurity and other sectors, especially NGOs, should be 
scrutinised for perpetuating hunger by not fully addressing it, and at the other end of 
the spectrum it is proposed that TNCs urgently need to be scrutinised and assessed for 
the ‘damage’ they do to food security and that they wield too much power.  There are 
multiple viewpoints along the spectrum too; that TNCs are useful, that TNCs are 
neutral or that other sectors and governors are self-interested and therefore impede 
progress.  This demonstrates once again the disputatious and incoherency in the food 
security governance field, and evidences the analysis made by Clapp and Fuchs 
(2009) of the fragmented global food governance field and the concerns about TNC 
power in the system.  
  
The next question, ten, asked how GFG should be reformed to maximise effectiveness 
in reducing food insecurity and who should lead the reform? Participant A declined to 
give an opinion since, as a governmental organisation it was outwith their remit but 
did offer a report on their recommendations which included better use of the WFP’s 
Audit Committee to assist in monitoring the effectiveness of WFP plus strengthening 
the monitoring of the WFP, as well as increasing local and regional procurement for 
food aid.  
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Participant B (Aid) pointed to a problem with large industrialised nations dominating 
food trade and therefore global governance:   
“There is a capacity problem.  Large nations, large countries dominate the 
global trade of food.  Developing countries with ‘wobbly’ trade and poor 
negotiating teams can’t put their case to sophisticated audiences.  [You] can’t 
pull off the greenest commonwealth group and negotiate on behalf of Africa.”  
  
Participant C (Aid) highlighted this inequity of members,   
“... the capacity of the ministers in key countries [that] don’t have good 
information and economics - they are emasculated and fiddle at the edges.  
Several organisations are like that in east Africa.  10 years ago things were 
brighter but reform never happened.”  
  
Participant D (Aid) referred once more to the need for including civil society. 
Participant E again mentioned the importance of investing in social enterprises to 
resolve food insecurity and such initiatives should be driving resilience and placed at 
the heart of Global Food governance’s actions:   
“It is interesting that where there is a culture of doing so, having a social 
impact is win-win because there is more pressure from the shareholders.  
Investment is important in making social enterprises and sometimes this 
means overcoming prejudices.  For example Coca Cola has a strategy for 2025 
to bring 20 million women into the value chain so in Nigeria they are 
retraining the women  (voluntarily) to be micro retailers for coke. Training is a 
workforce initiative which gives them options.  It raises their morale since 
they are an employee and they receive training whether they go on to become 
a micro retailer or not.”  
  
Participant G (Aid) again emphasized links to agriculture and the importance of not 
thinking in siloed ways.:   
“In particular,  it is knowing how to better link food security and agriculture to 
positive nutrition outcomes and there is quite a bit of work in various forms at 
global level and at local level; to work on that; to not think in a siloed way.  It 
is about achieving food security when there are many other things which are 
important for a household in achieving overall a high level of welfare.”  
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The TNC Participant (H) also criticises siloed ways of thinking in governance and 
comments on the linkages between infrastructure and agricultural trading policies and 
food pricing policies whereas a more ‘holistic’ approach is needed to resolve food 
insecurity.   
As semi-structured interviews, some of the participants responded with additional 
points and discussion or, if they asked for a prompt on reforms, they were asked 
which policy innovations or which issues GFG actors should be prioritise.  This 
approach brought out a range of themes and points not already covered in the 
interviews.  
Participant C pointed out the usefulness of the work of FoodNet in East Africa who do 
post-harvest monitoring and agricultural enterprises.  They also pointed out the need 
for a Global Action Plan for food security alone.  On the issues that the G8/G20 
should prioritise participant E2 said:  
“Long term: one, more money in countries re information on food balance 
sheets –there has been no improvement. Two, [look at] RATIN in East Africa: 
more like that in Africa and Asia re info on process. Three, national 
governments more careful regarding food bulking Four, don’t have 
commodity markets running. Five, food aid should be local procurement. Six,  
the farm bill –reduce subsidies. Lastly, provide opportunities.” 49  
  
Participant E1 discussed food waste and the food and water network:   
“60% of food security is agriculture.  So projects and solutions like the 
agrifood mobile where smallholder farmers facilitate the provision of the 
finance for trade.  Mobile technology is used to bundle agricultural and the 
financial aspects together.  It is a multiple partnership which facilitates trade 
                                                
49 This is the Regional Agricultural Trade Network. The major task of RATIN is to supply traders with 
improved early marketing and trade information which can lead to more efficient and competitive 
transactions in food trade between surplus and deficit regions in East Africa (African Growth and 
Development Policy Modeling Consortium, 2014).  
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because the smallholder can access credit through his or her mobile, it 
increases their financial literacy and they can meet their agriculture 
requirements on the mobile platform, promotes communication and improves 
co-ordination.”  
  
Also on the theme of policy innovations, Participant G commented on the need for 
greater oversight  of financial markets and improved trade policies:   
“I would like to see reformed trade policy…I think that trade has major 
impacts on food security so reform international trade policy and, as I said 
before, greater oversight of financial markets and I think both those things 
would do quite a lot in terms of broader policy to influence greater food 
security.”  
  
This enabled the work of FoodNet, RATIN and the agrifood mobile to be researched 
and linked into this research and Participant G’s call for regulation reiterates the 
points by Harvey in the literature review on regulation of financial markets (Harvey, 
2006).  
Interview Results Summary   
  
In summarising the interview results, the main themes in the answers of course 
correspond to the questions’ themes.   For example when gauging the effectiveness of 
GFG (Question two) or the architecture of the GFG field (Question five).  These 
develop the themes of governance architecture and effectiveness, dynamics, 
membership, power,  and legitimacy derived from the Field Analysis.  But the 
interview participants also each responded in a unique way, sometimes 
communicating what they wanted to say or answering from the context of their own 
experience, position or sector.  Additionally, as a semi-structured interview there were 
a number of points made which offered supplementary opinions and analysis.  
Together the answers offer a range of endogenous views of the GFG field.  These are 
now summarized, grouped by sector or thematically, depending on the overlap 
between participants’ answers.   
The Aid Organisation participants outlined a number of factors impeding effective 
governance including the trade policies of multilateral agencies (participant B), lack 
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of effective global trade regulation and equitable trade agreements within the 
international economic system thereby creating lack of access to Western markets for 
developing countries  (participant C).  The lack of responsiveness of the GFG system 
in reacting to rising food prices as well as underinvestment in public goods and 
infrastructure was highlighted by  participant D. The UN is also seen as a factor in 
food insecurity by participants E1 and E2 in that it is an ineffective ‘super-talker’ and 
caught perpetually in food aid delivery for emergency situations. The CFS in 
particular is seen as not being strategic (G), having a top-down policy that is 
controlled by UN bodies and associate bodies (also Participant G) and the CFS’s High 
Level Panel of Experts needs global coordinated action (G).   
National governments’ exact responsibility in GFG was raised by the TNC participant 
(H) who commented that the UN is a forum for discussion but executive power 
ultimately rests with national governments. This moves the agency from the global or 
international level to the national level.  So that private sector actors deliver food 
security but only national governments can create the enabling environment for 
private sector players e.g. public infrastructure.  
Viewpoints on improving GFG also varied widely with Participant A (GO) 
commenting that logistical problems of food aid such as better targeting and also 
internal controls of agencies were key.  Better inter-agency coordination, co-operation 
between the governors, and ‘more and better’ fora that are more inclusive to include 
smallholder producers (since CSO give credibility and legitimacy to the secretariat 
but UN needs to “talk to everyone more freely”) were proposed as improvements by 
Participants B (Aid).   
Better information about production levels of food across countries would also help 
improve GFG since the current system is too slow to update with information such as 
market prices.  This would enable better food balance sheets, and give earlier 
indications of price volatility.  Also the need for better food stores and working more 
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closely with governments, especially in India and Asia  was raised by Participant C. 
Other measures mean that national governments should be more careful on food 
bulking, and commodity trading on essential foodstuffs should also be stopped.  Food 
aid should use local procurement and also provide opportunities for local workforces.   
 Participant D proposed that the EU should support a multi stakeholder CFS to enable 
it to emerge as the foremost intergovernmental forum and the EU should also support 
on-going CFS guidelines especially on Principles for Responsible Investment (RAI) 50 
and also promote credibility of the global fund for social protection for 48 least 
developed countries (also Participant D).   
Participant G proposed better organisation of GFG and wider participation of global 
actors, especially stakeholders from Africa (although it is recognized that the CFS is 
an important step).  GFG also needs to be government and civil society-led suggested 
Participant G.  The WFP has the central role in GFG and the TNC participant viewed 
it as quite effective in emergency assistance, but the WFP should aim to improve its 
effectiveness in prevention and implementing sustainable farming. Participants E1, E2 
and G believe that crises may be addressed but the root causes of the crises are never 
properly addressed. Also there is a lack of resources going into rural communities to 
build capacity and resilience amongst subsistence farmers.  Developing agriculture in 
developing countries could diminish the need for food aid and civil society (meaning 
NGOs) could move away from aid delivery to resilience-building programmes.  TNCs 
are stakeholders in the UN process but are not the organisations with executive power 
since these are mostly national governments stated Participant H, (TNC).  The UN 
comes out with guidelines which “don’t go anywhere” unless national governments 
adopt and implement them.  Stakeholders give input and information into the UN 
process, but do not make the decisions.   
                                                
50 The Committee on World Food Security (CFS) adopted the voluntary Principles for Responsible 
Investments in Agriculture and Food Systems in 2014. The Principles aim to promote responsible 
investment in agriculture and food systems to support the right to adequate food in the context of 
national food security. Investing responsibly in agriculture and food systems is seen as essential for 
enhancing food security and nutrition, creating decent employment opportunities, eradicating poverty, 
fostering social and gender equality, and ensuring sustainable development. In 2012 the CFS also 
endorsed the Voluntary Guidelines on the Responsible Governance of Tenure of Land, Fisheries and 
Forests in the Context of National Food Security.  These guidelines call upon all parties to “ensure 
that tenure aspects of land, fisheries and forests are addressed when preventing and preparing for 
natural disasters and their responses to them”.  This includes drought (Global Mechanism, 2014).  
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Question four asked if there were four main sectors within GFG (see Chapter Three).  
Suggestions included national governments and the need for a more inclusive regional 
differentiation.  Specifically including actors from Africa who function outside of UN 
governance (such as the key players in CAADP) were the answers which deviated 
most from this question. Some also commented on the need for clarity on who was an 
IO, an NGO or CSO in GFG terms.   
On the topic of the architecture of GFG Participant A pointed out when responding to 
international emergencies, ad hoc decisions were made in real time by agencies such 
as the UN, WFP and FAO and decisions involved different sets of participants.  Very 
often the US and UK liaise to say how these plans will be implemented. Participant D 
indicated that the architecture is more than diffuse - commenting on the “increasingly 
fragmented” nature of GFG with no coherence and conflicting interventions and the 
mandate of the CFS is not always respected by states.  Enabling outside of an 
emergency is a major failing of the GFG, proposed participants E, since GFG does 
not happen to the level required plus civil society is not connected with international 
counterparts since they are such “small players”. So new formats of GFG are required 
to involve small players since they are not currently ‘invited in’ to the UN cluster.   
The UN has fixed ways of working and works mostly with governmental people and 
tends not to  ‘encourage’ NGOs in the countries they work in (Participant E1). 
Additionally there are 40 or more UN organisations in governance and so the UN 
should be regarded as a business.  National governments should also be held 
accountable due to the widely varying standards across governments.  
Linkages could be improved without starting again, proposes Participant F (IO) 
although the key question is who has the competencies to make the decisions?  GFG 
needs to become much more sophisticated.  Participant F also thought the salience of 
TNCs in GFG is a challenge for forums like the CFS, since overcoming individual 
member’s interests to make real decisions (with an example given of the CFS 
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guidelines on fisheries) conflict with national interests on food security.    Taking 
GFG onto the next stage goes beyond just agreeing on international soft law 
instruments but setting up a unitary body so that the CFS can monitor progress and 
the guidelines and recommendations of the CFS can be implemented.  More than a 
tick box exercise, a new unitary body would need to capture reality, the interests of 
members also give constraints for countries to adopt into their national legislations.    
In contrast, the TNC participant pointed to the vital, central role that TNCs play in 
establishing food security by building resilience with agricultural extension measures 
such as training farmers in growing, harvesting as well as building up local markets, 
which public sector actors do not do.  
Leaving the global governance of food in its current form is unrepresentative and 
unable to deal with the issues and so global governance reform should therefore 
address the ‘capacity problem’ in GFG, where large nations dominate the global trade 
of food and smaller countries with unstable economies cannot negotiate, proposed  
Participant B. Participant C commented that developing countries are ‘emasculated’ 
and not having good information or economies, are left not dealing with the key 
issues.  Several organisations are like this and the globalisation in East Africa is an 
example.  Reform was planned but never happened.  
Both Participants E point to the importance of workforce training and investing in 
social enterprises in partnership with TNCs, which are effective measures in reducing 
food insecurity, rather than specifically governance solutions. With such a large 
percentage of food security being agricultural projects, solutions that help the 
smallholder are of benefit.  Other policy innovations could include looking at 
population growth, food waste, the food and water networks felt Participant E2.   
Participant G saw improving links between food security and agriculture on a local 
level as key to improving food security but it was important for governors and actors 
not to think in a siloed way about food security. And the debate needs to broaden to 
think about positive outcomes for households and communities so that the view is of 
working towards establishing positive nutrition, rather than just food security. 
Reformed international trade policy and greater oversight of financial markets would 
also achieve a lot as policy innovations.  
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The scale of the problem is very large particularly in developing countries, 
commented participant H, covering basic infrastructure, cultural barriers, educating 
farmers as well as changing a system of governance which does not count the farmers 
or their need to access markets.  Governments are siloed and look at agriculture as 
separate from infrastructure, trading policies for food prices and so the real problem in 
food security governance is that it is multi-dimensional, with governments needing to 
look at all these things in a holistic way.  Participant I (CSO) takes a rights-based 
approach in their work and partnerships and the food sovereignty discourse is guiding 
principles for many of the GFG civil society actors.  
Interview Results Analysis  
  
To analyse the interview results overall, there is almost no satisfaction with the 
current GFG format across the interviewees with each commenting on the 
ineffectiveness of the main actors,  the UN and the Committee of World Food 
Security.  The WFP was also seen as a key player.  National Governments are viewed 
as having divisive interests by some, which often reflect TNCs’ interests.  Better 
coordination, information, implementation and direct action would improve the global 
governance of food.  The perception exists that many actors in the regions most 
affected by food insecurity - Africa and Asia - were left out of the global governance 
process, with a democratic deficit existing in the Global Food Governance sphere.  
There was also mention of the context of the International Economic system – 
specifically the effects of the impasse from the Doha round on developing counties.  
There was also confirmation of the ‘diffuse architecture’ of the current global 
governance (as described by Clapp and Fuchs, 2009).  There was much though not 
unanimous support for a new governance body or new governance space which could 
manage food trade, stimulate agriculture and generally improve GFG. Others felt that 
the Committee of World Food security was a step in the right direction although one 
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or two participants felt that the main agency involved in food governance - the UN - 
was perpetuating a governance system which did not work.  E1 commented that:  
“Firstly, regard the UN organisations as a business. There are 40 organisations 
of the UN in governance. Secondly hold national governments more 
accountable – since there are such different standards across national 
governments.”  
  
An interesting observation can be made that the participants articulate the discourse 
associated with their sector.  The TNC participant talks of working with farmers, 
infra-structure and access to local markets.  The International Organisation articulates 
the food justice discourse but also as part of the productionist discourse, which 
McKeon calls the dominant food governance discourse (McKeon, 2009).  The aid 
participants’ discourse varies along the spectrum of productionist (as can be seen with 
participants E) to advocacy of the civil society discourse, held by participant I.   
Participants E are in fact critical of the International Organisations and action 
programmes that serve the productionist discourse.  Whereas the Field Analyses show 
the extent of private actor power, the interview results indicate the distribution of 
power amongst actors and the competing discourses at play within the food 
governance field.  It could be said that the varying strengths of the discourses also 
reflect the democratic deficit of the global food governance field, with the dominant 
productionist discourse not only promoted by Trans National Corporations but private 
actors and, to a more muted extent, by International Organisations and  actors in other 
sectors too, such as evidenced by the interview with the aid organisation E. This adds 
another dimension to the strength of private actors like the Gates Foundation.  They 
dominate the field not only in economic and political capitals but also with discursive 
power and by promoting the productionist discourse.  This chimes with the Held and 
Hale (2001) and Biermann and Pattberg (2008) point about a dynamic and changing 
global governance system where new actors can arise and dominate the field.  In the 
case of the Gates Foundation this via multiple forms of capital, including discursively.   
This is representative of the asymmetrical power balance across the global food 
governance field, with private actors dominating and civil society organisations, along 
with their civil society discourses, marginalised at the edge of the field.    
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Another common theme was the amount of power that a few member nation-states 
hold over the system.  This neo-Realist perspective tended to sit alongside the 
Cosmopolitan perspective for some participants, whilst other participants expressed 
exasperation and frustration with the system without holding out hope for a better 
governance system – only the prospect of a substantial shock to the international 
system would enable a better governance system (participant B).  Lastly, the views on  
TNC involvement were mixed with some viewing them as a ‘disaster’ in global 
governance driving nation-states’ interests.  Some viewed them as ‘stakeholders’ in 
the food governance system but need regulated.  Three participants, E1, E2 and F, saw 
them as working in the space created by gaps in the governance system, developing 
partnerships in farmer micro finance and projects or farmer and community training.  
Comment was made that the WFP was trying to move into sustainability and 
resilience building, but is constrained by its food aid operations and obligations.  
It is interesting to note that in the main, the interview results correlate and enhance the 
Field Analysis results.  Many of the governors mentioned in the Field Analysis are 
also mentioned in the interviews.  There is nothing in the interviews to contradict the 
levels of economic capital, political capital and political legitimacy capital shown in 
the Field Analysis.  There are however some interesting omissions.  The Gates 
Foundation and the three smaller CSOs are not mentioned by the interviewees, despite 
the significant size of the Gates Foundation and the democratic importance of the 
Civil Society Organisations to the GFG field as demonstrated in the Field Analysis. 
This point is carried forward in the next part of this chapter, in the case studies on The 
Gates Foundation and La Via Campesina.  
 Overall, the available endogenous views from the GFG field seem to express some 
dissatisfaction with the governance.  Compartmentalised ways of thinking, or silos, 
are evident and there seemed little awareness of governance involvement from other 
sectors.  Except for nation-states as members of the CFS, there was almost no  
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mention of other players from the ‘international field of power’ such as the WTO, 
World Bank or Financial Organisations.   Issues such as commoditisation and TNC 
regulation were mentioned regularly and there was conflation of CSOs and NGOs by 
some of those interviewed and CSOs such as La Via Campesina not being named at 
all.  There is some mutual suspicion between sectors and some organisations do feel 
strongly about issues but have ‘parochial concerns’.  All this points to a field without 
leadership or failed leadership.  In a way, this obfuscation confirms the lack of 
cooperation and co-ordination across the field mentioned in much of the literature, 
such as Clapp and Fuchs (2009).  Clarity and change are recognised as being sorely 
needed. Recommendations and proposed remedies drawn from these interviews 
contribute to the final chapter.  In the next section four short case studies are 
considered to extend this endogenous view of the field, drawing on the knowledge of 
the structure of the Field obtained from the Field Analysis.  
Part II: Case Studies  
  
Case studies enable descriptive illustrations of points already raised in the research.   
Such real-world description completes the research picture by bringing ‘colour’ to the 
tonal measurements of the other methods used and depicts some of the detail of the 
major governors’ actions.  
Therefore the purpose of these case studies is illustrative- to enable a deeper 
understanding of one member from each of the four sectors.  This might provide the 
opportunity for a temporal comparison of these organisations in the future.  They are 
briefer than IR case studies typically are due to the multi-method research design and 
approach of this research.    
For consistency’s sake each case study follows the same format of six parts.  Firstly, a 
description of the organisation which covers history, size, income and raison d’être.  
Second is a lobbying and main ‘issues’ section.  Then, some criticisms of the 
organisations are outlined, followed by a fourth part on their role in GFG.  The fifth 
part of each case study outlines the scoring from the Field Analysis criteria of 
economic capital, political capital and legitimacy capital (detailing scoring on the 
measures of moral capital and ethical practices, inclusivity, transparency, public 
facing accountability, regulation compliance etc.).   The sixth and final part sets out 
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the conclusion of the case study.  These conclusions feed into both the summary at the 
end of this chapter and the analysis in the subsequent, final chapter.  The case study is 
designed this way to focus on and offer examples from each governor on how the 
scores were arrived at in the Field Analysis. That is, how the measures of each 
criterion were decided and how these criteria were applied to achieve the scores for 
political capital and political legitimacy.   
The first case study is Monsanto, followed by the Gates Foundation, the World Food 
Programme and, lastly, La Via Campesina. The economic capital, political capital and 
political legitimacy capital of each are looked at in more depth.    
Case Study 1: Monsanto.  
  
The largest corporation in the TNC sector, Monsanto, is an American agrochemical 
and agricultural biotechnology corporation.  Founded in 1901, Monsanto is 
headquartered in St. Louis, Missouri, USA but registered in Delaware (Monsanto 
website, 2014). With over 21,900 employees Monsanto posted revenue in 2013 of 
USD 14.8 billion (ibid). Monsanto was a major producer of plastics by 1940 and 
manufactured DDT, PCBs, Agent Orange and bovine growth hormone which were to 
become controversial products.  In 1987  Monsanto also pioneered field trials of 
genetically modified crops.  Monsanto applies the business practices of the ‘biotech’ 
industry to agriculture, for example with the cost of significant investment in research 
and development being recuperated through the enforcement of biological patents 
(Schneider, 1990), often by litigation (ETC, 2003). These business practices conflicts 
with farmers and small-holders traditions of developing, saving and sharing, plant  
varieties (Burrone, 2006).  Monsanto’s seed patenting model has been deemed 
biodiversity-threatening biopiracy by some critics (Shiva, 2012) and its role in these 
commercialisation practices, litigious defences, production of biotechnology products 
plus its insistent lobbying of governments has earned Monsanto a controversial 
reputation.  
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Monsanto positions itself as a sustainable agriculture company that delivers 
agricultural products that support farmers all around the world.  Their focus is 
empowering farmers to increase their yields, become more efficient and reduce on 
farm costs. They also strive to conserve more of the world’s resources.  Recognised as 
a rewarding employer who encourage diversity amongst its workforce, Monsanto also 
receives regularly recognition for its Corporate Responsibility initiatives (Monsanto 
website, 2014).  
However size and market dominance of Monsanto has raised concern from civil 
society groups who comment that the ‘gene giants’ (the ‘big six’ of Monsanto,  
DuPont, Syngenta, Dow, Bayer and BASF) seek ‘philanthrogopoly’ (or charity 
cartelling) to conceal their agrifood monopoly of their market dominance which looks 
like an anticompetitive oligopoly  (ETC, 2013). For example, the ‘gene giants’ 
launched a series of initiatives which includes the “false promise of cheap, post-patent 
GE seeds to mollify antitrust regulators and soften opposition to transgenics while 
advancing their collective market control” (ibid).  This philanthrogopoly tag has also 
led to criticism of the CFS due to its inclusion of the ‘gene giants’, admitting them to 
their fora and not challenging their oligopoly (despite warnings from the now former 
Special Rapporteur for the Right to Food of the impact on global biodiversity and the 
Right to Food).  Furthermore, critics of Monsanto state that the Special Rapporteur 
should “be invited to explore the private sector’s role in other multilateral agencies 
related to food and agriculture – including CGIAR” and also business practices such 
as seed cartels (ETC, 2013).    
In the United States, Monsanto spends around three quarters of a million dollars each 
month on lobbying, in particular lobbying Congress and the United States Department 
of Agriculture on GM food regulations and other biotech issues (Business Week, 
2011).  In 2008, Monsanto spent USD 8.8 million on lobbying 51 and in 2011, over 
USD 6.3 million was spent on lobbying in the US, more than any other agribusiness  
firm (Open Secrets, 2011).  Monsanto’s lobbying expenditure has increased over the 
last two years (Source Watch, 2014).  
On the political donation side of its lobbying, federal candidates received USD 
186,250 from Monsanto in the 2008 election cycle through its political action 
                                                
51 Of which USD1.5 million was to outside lobbying firms with the remainder used by in-house 
lobbyists (Business Week, 2011)  
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committee (PAC) with a 58:42 per cent ratio party split in favour to the Republicans. 
In the 2010 election cycle Monsanto gave USD 305,749 with a slightly smaller 
advantage to the Republican candidates this time of 52:48 per cent ratio although the 
2014 PAC shows a jump to a 73:27 per cent ratio party split in favour of the  
Republicans (Open Secrets, 2014) on a total contribution of USD 467,000 (ibid).52  
Monsanto is also a member of the world’s largest biotechnology trade association, the 
Washington D.C based Biotechnology Industry Organization (BIO) which has the 
following aim:    
"We create and advance industry policies on all food and agriculture 
biotechnology issues related to international affairs, government relations, 
science and regulatory affairs, and media and public affairs.  We work for a 
safe and clean supply of healthy food for a growing global population" (BIO, 
2014).     
  
In 2010-11 BIO spent a total of USD16.43 million on lobbying initiatives and 
regularly spends over US USD8 million p.a. (Open Secrets, 2010). Monsanto is also a 
member of the European Europa Bio, which is Europe’s largest Biotech industry 
organisation. Other members include Bayer and other GM organisations (Vidal, 
2011).    
Monsanto successfully lobbied the UK and US governments in the late 1990s to raise 
the legal glyphosate levels in soya beans to enable the UK to import the beans, and 
Monsanto also won over the Codex Alimentarius, (the joint FAO-WHO agency).  The 
then Agriculture Minister in the House of Lords commented on the negotiations with 
Monsanto: "all such information is kept secret" (Monbiot, 2000:267).  In the 20 
months after the 1997 British General election, Monsanto representatives held over 20 
meetings at the departments of Agriculture and the Environment and the then Labour 
                                                
52 For a full breakdown of Monsanto’s lobbying expenditure on issues see  SourceWatch’s website.  
	  	   201	   
government was later questioned in Westminster in regard to "trips, facilities, gifts 
and other offerings of financial value provided by Monsanto to civil servants"  
(Monbiot, 2000: 267).   
The representation of various interests at the Codex has, Smythe argues, historically 
enabled more input from food processors and producers and other non-state actors 
than other international organisations such as the WTO have (Clapp and Fuchs 
2009:97).    This improved participation is specifically targeted at International NGOs 
rather than Civil Society groups and it is interesting to note that of the 2,578 
participants on the Codex committees in 1993, 660 represented industry with 
Monsanto at the fore (Smythe in Clapp and Fuchs, 2009:98).  
The ‘March against Monsanto’ movement holds a day-long march across the globe 
each year to protest against GM crops and the company’s practices of disinformation 
(March Against Monsanto, 2014).  At time of writing the most recent day was May 24 
2014 and part of the campaign focussed on farmer suicide.  The movement claims:  
“In India, more than 250,000 farmers have committed suicide after Monsanto’s Bt 
cotton seeds did not perform as promised.  Farmers, left in desperate poverty, are 
opting to free their families of debt by drinking Monsanto pesticide, thereby ending 
their lives” (ibid, p2). It goes onto explain that livelihoods of farmers in other 
countries are also lost due to “ false promises, seed patenting and meticulous legal 
action on the part of Monsanto and other big agrifood interests. In many parts of 
Africa, farmers and their communities are left to choose between starving or eating 
GMOs” (ibid).  
As for its specific role in GFG, Monsanto were delegates to the Fortieth session of the 
Committee of World Food Security in 2013 and the attendee, Brian Lowry, is not 
only Deputy General Counsel for Monsanto but is also currently co- chair of the 
United States Council for International Business.53  Lowry also participates through 
the Global Business Alliance for Post-2015 Development to convey U.S. business 
views.  Other TNC delegates to the 40th session of CFS include Mars, Unilever, 
                                                
53 (Along with Tam Nguyen, Global Head of Sustainability at Bechtel Corporation). In 2014 Nguyen 
commented on the role of business in development as “Unlike the MDGs a decade ago, U.S.  
multinationals are more informed and engaged,…they have shifted from mere observers to participants 
in promoting sustainable development” (speech 18/2/2014, Chevron forum at the Center for Strategic 
and International Studies).  The CSIS also promotes genetically modified foods for resolving food 
insecurity in Africa (CSIS, 2014).  
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DANONE, Ethanol Europe and Futura Gene (CFS, 2015). As such, Monsanto is a 
stakeholder in the Committee of World Food Security, which reports annually to 
Economic and Social Council of the United Nations (ECOSOC).  
  
Even US diplomats have lobbied the EU on behalf of Monsanto and were not only 
promoting Monsanto GM food but urging retaliation on European countries which 
moved to ban GM foods  (Vidal, 2011).  Disclosed through Wikileaks in 2011, US 
diplomats in the G.W. Bush regime, including the US ambassador to France, Craig  
Stapleton, recommended a ‘military-style trade war’ on European countries that were 
moving to ban GM food, especially Monsanto corn. Stapleton is quoted as writing a 
diplomatic cable saying:   
"Country team Paris recommends that we calibrate a target retaliation list that 
causes some pain across the EU since this is a collective responsibility, but 
that also focuses in part on the worst culprits…The list should be measured 
rather than vicious and must be sustainable over the long term, since we 
should not expect an early victory. Moving to retaliation will make clear that 
the current path has real costs to EU interests and could help strengthen 
European pro-biotech voices" (ibid).   
  
This reveals a glimpse into what can only be assumed to be customary practices of 
diplomats and confirms not only the elision of political and corporate elites in the US 
but also that US Foreign Policy actions serve corporations to such an extent that  
‘retaliation’ is taken on countries which seek to reject to regulate US corporations’ 
products.  Diplomacy, it would seem, can be an extension of corporations trading 
objectives: diplomacy being business ‘by other means’.  The relationship between  
‘big business’ and US governments has always been symbiotic and there are many 
examples including of political-commercial elites elision such as Ronald Reagan and 
General Electric, Dick Cheney and Halliburton etc. The role of corporations such as 
ITT in Chile and Nicaragua, mentioned in Chapter Two, were also seen as extensions 
of US Foreign Policy.  Another example of this is the actions of Firestone in Charles  
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Taylor’s led Civil War in Liberia in 1992 (Miller, 2014).    
  
Yet the WikiLeaks exposé flips this picture around and demonstrates that US Foreign 
Policy has, at times,  actually been driven, dictated and actioned by the interests of the 
corporations.    This ‘smoking gun’ is a new dimension of apparent unctuous 
complicity with at least the Bush-era US government towards Transnational 
Corporations. This reframes the food security governance debate by begging the 
question ‘where it satisfies the interests of the agrifood corporations, is the ineffective 
global governance of food in fact a sought outcome - a deliberate ‘state of play’?  By 
extending this logic, there is also a question of the ‘extent of the intent’, that is, ‘is 
this ineffective GFG maintained by corporations of the world’s superpower?’  This 
recasts the other issues such as ‘food aid as a sticking plaster’ and ‘the Hunger  
Business’ mentioned in this and the preceding chapter.  Do practices such as 
philanthrogopoly serve as a facade for furthering corporate profiteering? If so then 
this would be, to return to the typology of ineffectiveness definitions set out in 
Chapter One, malfeasance.  And presuming that the WikiLeaks cable is a snapshot of 
commonplace current practices, it was the US Government which was malfeasant 
and, that being so, then its position as hegemon in the International System means that 
an unstable and ineffective food security regime may not necessarily be accidental but 
attributable to the protection and promotion of US corporations interests by the 
departments and agencies of the US Government, as well as the Government itself.  
This renders hollow the anti-hunger rhetoric expressed by the US Government, where 
that hunger conflicts with the US-TNC’s interests.  Judgment of the devastating and 
pernicious human cost of this apparently US-government aided domination of the 
TNCs put aside, this reframing of the food security global governance debate changes 
the causes and contributing factors and therefore alters the focus of the remedies 
towards tight regulation and scrutiny of the TNCs.  This point will be picked up again 
in the final chapter.  
  
However, without further, more recent disclosures, it cannot be fully established that 
this is an ongoing situation.  Under the Obama regime, the US-European trade 
relationship is currently being developed into a free trade area by the Transatlantic 
Trade and Investment Partnership (TTIP), which, similar to the existing Trans Pacific  
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Partnership (TPP), is a trade pact to facilitate trade, this time between the EU and 
USA.  Critics point to the likelihood of the TTIP increasing corporate power and 
disabling the ability of countries to regulate trade for public benefit whilst opening 
them up to litigation by the US for attempting to do so (Monbiot, 2013).    
  
In the Field Analysis Monsanto obtained a high total political capital score of five but 
a low total political legitimacy score of minus five, scoring a minus one in the criteria 
of moral capital (due to its practises and raison d’être, ascertained from document 
research and literature review). It also scored minus one for the legitimacy criteria of 
raison d’être, inclusivity (due to lack of representativeness, established by document 
research and research reports (McKeon, 2011) and transparency (there is little 
disclosure by Monsanto of its own practices as revealed by others, instead the 
narrative tends towards company rhetoric (see Monsanto website for examples).  For 
this reason Monsanto also scored a minus one for accountability (of its practices), 
minus one for its compliance with legal and statutory oversight (the ‘subject to 
regulation’ criterion) due to its lack of compliance with national regulation, 
particularly in developing countries and also for its efforts to lobby for regulation in 
the US and UK, which favours Monsanto’s practices.  It also scored a minus one for 
the ethical practices criterion, due to its controversial practices.  Therefore, by these 
measures, Monsanto has high political capital but low legitimacy capital in the GFG 
field.  This means that this major governor has poor legitimacy in the field.  These 
actors, such as Monsanto, who are most powerful, sustain that power in spite of their 
poor legitimacy, not because of it.   
  
Overall Monsanto’s role in GFG seems to be that by adopting the rhetoric of 
development, philanthropy and sustainability, they further their own rationale, that of 
business interests and profit seeking.  In fact, the TNC participant interviewed for this 
research said that their organisation saw their role as supporting development.  There 
is dissonance between this corporate position-taking and the practices of some TNCs 
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(as reported by smallholders such as the Adivasi and criticism by activists such as 
Shiva (2012) of seed patenting, terminator seeds and overcharging).  This leaves aside 
substantial contentions about GM crops, which some proponents state that 
technological innovation such as transgenics (new genes) or genetic modification 
have kept agricultural productivity apace with population growth (Brush, 2001; 
Sagoff 2001-2002; Trewavas, 2002, Williams, 2009).   
To conclude, the instrumental power of Monsanto is increased by lobbying 
policymakers and regulatory authorities and their attempts to influence legislative 
contexts.  It has also lobbied the US trade agenda conducted by the US Governments 
at Monsanto’s behest against other trading blocs.  Its position-taking as pro-
development and pro-poor increases perceptions of its legitimacy and influences the 
legislators who design and implement policies such as regulatory frameworks for food 
security.  As with many biotech organisations, influencing US elections is a  
significant part of Monsanto’s corporate objectives and it also increases their 
structural power (Smythe in Clapp and Fuchs, 2009: 109).  Direct participation in 
governance also augments their instrumental power although the battle for control 
over the narrative, to increase their discursive power (to “increase a normative 
consensus” according to Williams in Clapp and Fuchs, 2009:157) is more contested, 
with consumer action groups and activists applying direct action in demonstrations or 
deploying counter-propaganda techniques as a form of dissensus.  As seen from the 
interview with the TNC participant in this research, agrifood TNCs actively promote 
their business as being pro-poor, pro-agriculture and pro-development with the logic 
that increased food productivity of any manner addresses poverty alleviation and 
global hunger. This is to improve their legitimacy and moral capital. Yet behind the  
‘corporate veil’ they seek to quash rivals, from smallholders to great nations, to 
impose their products and values on the market at a toll few can afford to pay.  Of all 
the agrifood TNCs, Monsanto is the most controversial and contentious.  This 
disconnect between perception and reality, between Monsanto’s public reputation and 
their praxis is exemplified by Monsanto being awarded the 2013 World Food Prize (in 
conjunction with Syngenta) (Aronsen, 2013).  
 To establish an effective and stable food security regime, clearly the realities of TNC 
practices need to be identified and addressed. In this the voices of smallholders and 
subsistence farmers are essential, not only in bearing witness to those on-going 
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realities of TNC practices but in being able to also contribute to the remedies at global 
governance level.    
Case Study 2: The Gates Foundation.  
  
The next case study, the Bill and Melinda Gates Foundation, was founded in 2000 and 
alongside the Gates, a third partner is Warren Buffet.  B&MGF is reportedly the 
largest ‘transparently operated’ private foundation in the world (Bates, 2012: iv).  The 
primary global aims of the foundation are to promote global healthcare, global 
development (its role in food security arises from the latter) and its US Division 
promotes education and has a Global Policy and Advocacy Division (Gates 
Foundation, 2014).  The operational side is the Foundation whereas the Trust is the 
investment arm both of which will cease operations 20 years after the Gates’ deaths.  
  
Based in Seattle, the Gates Foundation has an endowment of USD 40 billion 
(Desmond-Hellmann, 2014). It currently has just over 1,200 employees and has made 
grant commitments since inception of over USD 30 billion (all figures as at October 
2014) (Gates Foundation, 2014). Despite their considerable assets and the scale of its 
global operations, the B&MGF has not been researched in regard to its role in the 
Food Security field and as a result information is scant (much of the information in 
the public domain concerns their US education work).   Food Security Organisations 
(such as CGIAR), which were once publicly funded, have now formed partnerships 
with the Gates Foundation (Sell, in Clapp and Fuchs, 2009:212) and to them and 
others the Gates Foundation provides grants and research, although its focus is always 
on direct grants (Gates Foundation, 2015).  B&MGF’s programme focus on nutrition 
is in the sub-Sahara and South Asia where their  “nutrition efforts focus on delivering 
proven interventions and developing better tools and strategies for providing pregnant 
women and young children with the foods and nutrients they need”  (ibid).   
To this end their agricultural development work aims to:  
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 “… improve the nutritional impact of agricultural practices, programs, and 
policies for smallholder farmers in developing countries. Common areas of 
focus include bio fortification of staple foods, nutrition education, control of 
mycotoxins, policy and advocacy, and research” (Gates Foundation, 2014).     
Their agricultural development programme is one of their largest areas of focus and to 
date USD 2 billion has been spent on smallholders (as at October 2014). They state 
that their strategy is to listen to farmers and address their specific needs:    
“Three-quarters of the world’s poorest people get their food and income by 
farming small plots of land about the size of a football field. Most of them 
barely get by - struggling with unproductive soil, plant diseases, pests, and 
drought. Their livestock are frequently weak or sick. Reliable markets for their 
products and good information about pricing are hard to come by, and 
government policies rarely serve their interests well” (Gates Foundation, 
2014).   
From these ‘conversations’ the following priorities have been established by the Gates 
Foundation: firstly to increase farm productivity including the ability to purchase 
more robust nutritious seeds and effective tools and secondly to learn sustainable farm 
management practices and access reliable markets as well the ability to draw on 
locally relevant knowledge and emerging digital technologies (ibid).  The Gates 
Foundation state that they establish the farmer and farming community at the centre 
of policies such as fostering sustainable agricultural policies and affords those policies 
reliable and timely data through their research arm.  Also arising from these  
‘discussions’, water has very recently become a focus of the B&MGF’s food security 
strategy by way of the water-food-energy nexus, which shows the growing threat to  
food security of water scarcity, with an estimate that by 2030 almost half the world’s 
population will suffer from water scarcity and water stress (Farming First, 2014).  Yet 
the agroecology lobby are against the Gates Foundation (Greenpeace, 2014). With 
such a results-oriented strategy, more abstract activities such as lobbying do not figure 
significantly in the B&MGF’s non-education activities.  The Foundation’s size and 
limited life-span also determines the type of activities it undertakes.  There is very 
limited information available on its lobbying activities but there is evidence of the 
Foundation funding front groups, for example with the Rockefeller Foundation, 
together they formed the Alliance for a Green Revolution in Africa (AGRA) in 2006, 
as part of the ‘second green revolution’ (which promotes food production via crop 
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breeding using genetic engineering, fertilizers and pesticide.  Currently all that can be 
established in regard to lobbying activities by the B&MGF are their personal 
approaches to the American political elite including the US President and members of 
congress and the USDA (Kinzie, 2009).  The B&MGF’s grant-making operations to 
organisations are another form of influencing, as are their advertising and media 
campaigns.  
Criticisms against the Gates Foundation tend to be along the lines of their links with 
agribusinesses, such as Monsanto.  This includes the Trust Fund’s portfolio 
investment in Monsanto as well as companies like BP.  It has been criticised for 
investing in companies who themselves have been charged with aggravating poverty 
in the very developing countries where the Foundation is working to relieve poverty.  
The Foundation did respond that it could use its voting rights to influence the 
practices of the companies it invests in but it is unknown if this is the case  (Source 
Watch, 2014).   
  
The former Special Rapporteur for Food Security, Olivier De Schutter has criticised 
private actors who will not invest in agroecology because it does not open new 
markets for agrichemicals or GE seeds saying:   
“To them, sustainability means bringing private innovation to the developing 
world. The Gates Foundation can donate billions to the fight against hunger, 
but when private companies like Monsanto stand to benefit, it makes feeding 
the world look like a for-profit scheme” (Ludwig, 2011).   
  
One such example is that the B&MGF have investments in GM crop centres 
(Stevenson, 2013).  
This commercial/philanthropic conflict also arises from the contrasting raison d’être 
of both the Gates Foundation and the Trust. The Foundation is primarily philanthropic 
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whereas the Trust’s raison d’être is to increase investment and so the term 
‘philanthrocapitalist’ is applied to both the Trust and the Foundation.  By way of 
comparison, LVC has a raison d’être to improve the influence of its members and 
promote agroecology, gender equality and food security yet with its low economic 
and political capital LVC is completely eclipsed and marginalised by much more 
significant governors, earning these goliaths the title:  ‘The Lords of the Harvest’ 
(Charles, 2002).   
As with their lobbying activities, the B&MGF’s involvement in governance receives 
little profile.  At the 39th session of the Committee on World Food Security (2012) 
their partner organisation CGIAR was involved in the annual plenary. As of 2013 
CGIAR is also a member of the CFS Bureau and Advisory Group under the status of   
‘International Agricultural Research Bodies’ (the only member under this status). At 
the 40th session (2013) FIAN sent eight delegates under the civil society and NGO 
section of the membership, LVC 15 and Urgenci two delegates whereas under the 
Private Sector and private philanthropic foundations section, the Gates Foundation 
sent seven delegates.54  At the 41st session (2014) LVC sent 14, but Gates only four.   
However for the CFS Bureau 2013-15 the Gates Foundation is listed as a member of 
the CFS Advisory group, being one of two Private Sector/Philanthropic Foundations, 
the other being the International Agri Food Network (FAO, 2014).  This increased 
discursive power may account for the decreasing number of delegates being sent to 
the annual plenary each successive year.  
  
As discussed in the Field Analysis, the B&MGF’s economic capital is significant for 
the field.  At USD 36 billion p.a. it dwarfs other organisations and has ten times the 
annual income of the Word Food Programme, although part of this is for education 
initiatives.  In the Field Analysis the B&MGF scored highly in political capital (six) 
and slightly less high for legitimacy capital (five) and is the largest, most significant 
‘aid’ organisation in the field, (although it is actually a private sector philanthropic 
organisation).  For political capital it achieved a full score of one for most criteria of 
                                                
54 DANONE are also in this section (1 delegate) as are E-pure (2 delegates) Ethanol Europe (1) Futura 
Gene (1) and the International Zinc association, Mars, Monsanto, Unilever, Yara who all had 1 
delegate except Yara who presented 2. Observers include mostly academics and also organisations 
such as the World Farmers Organisation (CFS, 2014)  
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both variables but scored a zero for lobbying since the measure of this criteria is that 
its expenditure is less than USD 5 million per annum (= score of one) but more than 
USD 1 million p.a. (score of minus one).  Combined with the high economic capital 
score, this makes the Gates Foundation a powerful player in the GFG field.  
  
The Gates Foundation scored one for each criteria of political legitimacy except for a 
zero score in accountability and a zero in subject to regulation.  The measure for the 
accountability criterion is that the organisation is publicly accountable for its  
practices.  The measure for the ‘subject to regulation’ criterion is that it is subject to 
regulation internationally as well as its home country. Paradoxically, whilst the 
B&MGF is transparent with an apparently open governance (so a score of one for 
transparency) and clear disclosure of its income and management structure, the 
B&MGF is not fully accountable in that, as a private foundation, some of its activities 
seem to be covert.  For example, it has become clear from undertaking this research 
that the Gates Foundation and Trust are not accountable for some of their field 
activities, relationships with TNCs, partnerships with NGOs and civil society actors 
such as CGIAR, investments and lobbying activities.  Since there is partial 
accountability of the B&MGF evident from document research then a zero score was 
awarded for accountability.  The zero score in ‘subject to regulation’ criterion is 
awarded by completing the measure ‘not proven’ in regard to its compliance with 
legal and statutory oversight’.  
  
In sum, the B&MGF offers an interesting anachronism for the field of GFG.  It is 
economically powerful and extremely active in some areas of the field, it has some 
legitimacy on the basis of its work to achieve food security yet, along with the Gates  
Trust, it is a privately owned commercial enterprise with a humanitarian raison d’être 
that choses to be transparent but not completely accountable. With good political 
access yet, with no apparent lobbying and no political agenda, it is still part of what  
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Overbeek called ‘the current neoliberal agenda’ (Overbeek, 2004; see also Weller, 
2003).  It behaves as many private foundations do in the US.  It has no grass roots 
base, it discloses what it needs to, to comply with accounting and legal statutory 
regulations in the US and has many philanthropic objectives yet selects those 
objectives carefully.  Unlike some private philanthropic foundations it does not do so 
piecemeal but has strategies for future activities, including, unusually, its own closure.    
  
In averring any roles or actions in GFG, preferring direct action projects, perhaps it 
silently condemns the GFG for its inaction and ‘super talker’ status (as described by 
interview participant E).  Another way to look at it is that perhaps the B&MGF does 
take a position or role in the GFG.  In its results orientated projects it does what the 
UN and agencies and the CFS do not do, or do too little.  It uses its economic and 
political capital to take action.  
Case Study 3: The World Food Programme.  
  
The next case study, the World Food Programme, was formally established in 1963 
and is the food assistance branch of the United Nations and the world's largest 
humanitarian organization” fighting hunger worldwide” (WFP, 2014). The WFP 
reaches more than 80 million people annually providing food assistance in 75 
countries (ibid). Headquartered in Rome and with an executive board of over 36 
member states, it has more than 80 country offices around the world with a staff of 
just under 12,000 people (as at 2011) of whom 90% operate in the field. It is a 
member of the United Nations Development Group and part of its Executive 
Committee and is voluntarily funded (ibid).  The WFP operations are funded by 
donors such as world governments, corporations and private bodies amongst others, 
with the latter donating around USD 500 million from 2008-12. In 2011, the WFP's 
total revenue was USD 3.73 billion (ibid).    
The WFP works with a number of official partners in emergencies and development 
projects.58  It describes itself as the UN’s food aid arm and the four objectives of its 
current strategic plan are, firstly, to save lives and protect livelihoods in emergencies. 
Secondly, to support food security and nutrition and (re)build livelihoods in fragile 
settings and following emergencies.  To reduce risk and enable people, communities 
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and countries to meet their own food and nutrition needs and, lastly, to reduce under 
nutrition and break the intergenerational cycle of hunger (WFP, 2014).  
There is also little information on lobbying by the WFP.  Lobbying monitoring 
websites such as Open Source state that is below the threshold of USD 10,000 (Open 
Secrets, 2014). It does campaign for fundraising however, targeted at corporations and 
the general public.  
  
The WFP has been criticised by some development economists and political leaders, 
particularly from the African continent. Kenyan economist James Shikwati has 
explicitly criticised the WFP and their role commenting that "aid to Africa does more 
harm than good" (Thielke, 2005).  According to Shikwati, food aid increases 
corruption of local kleptocrat politicians and boosts local black markets which in turn 
depresses prices for local farmers, "no one can compete with the UN's World Food  
Program" (ibid). Shikwati also claims that the WFP “are in the absurd situation of, on 
the one hand, being dedicated to the fight against hunger while, on the other hand, 
being faced with unemployment were hunger actually eliminated" (ibid).  The former 
President of Senegal, Abdoulaye Wade, echoed these sentiments during the 2008 
Food Crisis when he criticised the WFP and the FAO for exacerbating the price rises: 
“[The FAO/WFP is a] waste of money largely spent on doing very little…the current 
situation is largely its failure and the cries of alarm will not help at all" (BBC, 2008).  
Wade went on to comment that FAO's work was duplicated by other bodies that 
operated more efficiently, such as the UN's International Fund for Agricultural 
Development and that the FAO should be scrapped.  Wade also called for the FAO to 
be relocated from Rome to a country in Africa (ibid).   
Other criticisms of the WFP include a lack of ‘grass roots’ partners and the low 
amount of food bought in local markets (and surplus dumping) although the WFP 
have countered this by pointing to 1.7 million tonnes of food bought in developing 
	  	   213	   
countries in 2011 through their cash and vouchers food assistance tools (WFP, 2014). 
In general, criticism of the WFP is attributable to their position as an UN body, 55 and 
this also extends to the CFS which is an offshoot of the FAO.   
The CFS consists of a Secretariat, Bureau and Advisory Group, High Level Panel of 
Experts (HLPE) and has an annual plenary.  Although only nation-states can be 
members of the CFS Bureau,56  there are five participant categories in the Advisory 
group component of the ‘Bureau and Advisory group’: UN agencies and other UN 
bodies;  civil society and non-governmental organizations; 57 international agricultural 
research institutions; international and regional financial institutions such as the 
World Bank, the IMF, regional development banks and the World Trade Organisation 
and, lastly, private sector associations and philanthropic foundations. The CFS 
comments that:  
“The Advisory Group helps the Bureau advance the Committee’s objectives in 
particular to ensure linkages with different stakeholders at regional, 
subregional and local levels and to ensure an ongoing, two-way exchange of 
information” (FAO, 2014).   
                                                
55 Failure of the UN generally can be ascribed to its genesis and structure.  Freedman points to the 
Charter of the United Nation which established that membership would be open to 'peace loving states' 
and so it was never imagined that the UN would be an organisation open to all countries nor function 
as a world government. Waging war or gross violation of human rights by members results in gentle 
rebukes at the UN and the founding members list of breaches is perhaps the most significant 
(Freedman, 2013).  The Security Council, specifically designed to prevent or respond to threats to 
world peace yet with the greatest powers on the council; China, Russia, France the US and the UK, is 
an extremely undemocratic structure, designed in the immediate post-World War II environment.  Each 
of these members has a permanent seat on the Security Council and the right of veto.  As a result many 
commentators believe that the UN has been left 'toothless' (Freedman, 2013: 18). Yet the UN's other 
bodies, such as the FAO, have far less powers, especially in terms of immediate and practical 
measures.  Instead their most effective significant power is passing resolutions, or decisions, which are 
not binding. As a result, most of the UN's work focuses on political information-sharing, for example 
fact-finding, discussions with experts in the field, and holding discussions across groups. Although 
these outputs are politically important, such soft powers mean that crises or issues are rarely resolved 
in a way that is meaningful to people's lives.  
56 More widely, the membership of the CFS is open to all Member States of The Food and Agricultural 
Organization (FAO), The International Fund for Agricultural Development (IFAD) or The World Food 
Programme (WFP) and non-Member States of FAO that are Member States of the United Nations.  
57 Particularly organizations representing smallholder family farmers, fisher folks, herders, landless, 
urban poor, agricultural and food workers, women, youth, consumers and indigenous people (FAO, 
2014).  
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The Bureau is the Executive Arm of the CFS and consists of 12 member states and a 
Chair.  Observers are invited to the CFS as interested organizations relevant to the 
work to “observe entire sessions or specific agenda items” (FAO, 2014).  
The main role of the WFP in the CFS is as a member of both the Advisory group and 
also the Secretariat. 58  The CFS has a permanent Secretariat located in FAO Rome 
which includes members from the World Food Programme (WFP) and the  
International Fund for Agricultural Development (IFAD). The CFS states that the task 
of the Secretariat is to “support the Plenary, the Bureau and Advisory Group and the  
HLPE in their work” (FAO, 2014). Yet as an UN arms-length agency, WFP’s role is, 
by dint of its status, more significant than other non-UN affiliated organisations 
especially given that 36 member states form their Board. Their role in GFG is, along 
with other members of the Roman Forum, central to Food Governance.  The WFP’s 
role in GFG, however, is not limited to its role in the CFS.  It is also an active 
stakeholder in the FAO and takes other roles at the UN level.  The discursive and 
legislative power of the WFP to influence GFG is considerable, given its core 
positioning in the CFS, and its status as a member of the Roman Forum.  
In the Field Analysis the WFP scored highly for both political capital and political 
legitimacy variables, which demonstrates high levels of symbolic capital. WFP is the 
largest IO in food security with an annual income of  USD 3.7 billion (2012) and a 
staff of over 12,000.  The closest IO in terms of income is the FAO with an annual 
income of USD 2.4 billion, followed by IFAD with USD 144 million p.a.,  with much 
of this amount spent on food aid. WFP scored a six in the political capital criteria with 
a plus one in all the criteria except for high lobbying expenditure (seen as an 
                                                
58 During 2009 the Committee on World Food Security underwent reform to improve effectiveness and 
includes a wider group of stakeholders.  Another part of the reform was the creation of a High Level of 
Panel of Experts with the aim of keeping CFS up to date with emerging trends in food security and 
leading to “more informed policy debates and improve the quality, effectiveness and coherence of food 
security and nutrition policies from local to international levels” (FAO, 2014b).  
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important tool for achieving political capital), on which it scored a zero.  The measure 
for obtaining a zero score in lobbying expenditure is over USD 1 million but below  
USD 5 million p.a..  Due to WFP’s need to raise funds for crises and their salient role 
in governance, this was calculated from figures and measures available in in the 
public domain.  Its score of six for political capital sets it alongside the other Roman 
Forum organisations as well as CGIAR, the Gates Foundation and the larger of the 
charitable organisations such as Oxfam International.  WFP scored the maximum of 
seven, for political legitimacy, with a one for each criterion. This ranks it as highest 
for political legitimacy.    
Positioned with strong political legitimacy, political capital and economic capital, the 
WFP is ideally placed to drive forward agendas and lead the governance of food.  Due 
to its remit and core functions, it cannot lead the GFG field at present.  In addition is 
there a conflict of interest with the 36 members of its Board who also members of the 
CFS?  Which way does the influence flow?  More research would be needed on the 
role of the WFP’s board members in the CFS to establish this but the potential to 
realign and reform the WFP to lead GFG is there.  
Case Study Four: La Via Campesina  
  
Widely considered to be the world's most important and perhaps largest transnational 
social movement,  the fourth case study, La Via Campesina, is a civil society 
organisation,   
"a transnational movement embracing organisations of peasants, small and 
medium-scale farmers, rural women, farm workers, and indigenous agrarian 
communities in Asia, the Americas. Europe and Africa.  These groups are 
linked together through their intimate connections to the land…. [it] has 
become an increasingly visible and vocal voice of radical opposition to the 
globalisation of a neo-liberal and corporate model of agriculture” (Desmarais, 
2007:6).   
  
Via Campesina states that it is an autonomous, independent network that “represents 
an estimated 200 million peasant families globally” (Grass Roots, 2014) and seeks to 
gain legitimacy for the food sovereignty discourse.  It brings together more than 200 
million small-scale farmers and producers, landless farmers, women, youth, 
indigenous people, migrants and agricultural workers and defends small-scale 
sustainable agriculture as a way of promoting social justice and dignity” (FAO, 2014).  
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Described as the largest and most significant peasant and farm movement, LVC’s 
international profile was established following the Uruguay Round of the GATT in 
1994 (Desmarais, 2007).59  LVC continued to establish itself as a grass roots 
organisation as it emerged from autonomous peasant organisations which had grown  
in response to the “withdrawal of the state from rural areas [which] simultaneously 
weakened corporatist and clientelist control over rural organisations, even as 
conditions worsened in the countryside” (Martinez-Torres and Rosset, 2012:149). 
LVC experienced increasingly reduced success in participation in international 
debates as they sought to speak directly to International Institutions rather than 
through organisations that represent them.  By 1996 LVC was an active political actor 
at the World Food Summit convened by the FAO in Rome and lobbied the FAO to 
recognise their legitimacy by granting delegate status on the basis of their 
representation of peasants and small farmers.  They also led the anti-neoliberal 
marches at WTO conferences and demonstrated in protest against the IMF, the World 
Bank and the G8 (Desmarais, 2007).  
  
It has incorporated other organisations such as the Rural Coalition (USA) and 
advocates family farm-based sustainable agriculture. LVC’s members from over 70 
countries are divided into nine regions, which are each represented by a male and 
female at the International Coordination Committee.  Since 2013 its Secretariat has 
been based in Harare but the location rotates every four years (Via Campesina, 2014).   
“Today La Via Campesina is an international reference point for rural issues and 
problems, for social movements, for the construction of proposals, mediated by the 
legitimacy and trust forged through its years of struggle. It is a new space of 
‘citizenship’ ” (Martinez-Torres and Rosset, 2007:170; Borras, and Franco. 2009).  
  
                                                
59 The organisation was formally constituted in 1993 by farmers’ organizations from Europe, Latin 
America, Asia and Africa and originally was headquartered in Belgium.  
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Although still suffering from low visibility, LVC has recently developed more 
prominent leadership roles with issues such as gender and opposition to TNCs 
increasingly foregrounded (Martinez-Torres and Rosset, 2010).60  Through its 
member organisations LVC is also attributed with achieving regime change in 
Ecuador (2000) and Bolivia (2003) and defended the regime in Honduras (2009) 
(Edelman, 2005: 337).    
  
The main criticisms against LVC are about its non-full compliance with current global 
governance due to its position-taking on this but, as mentioned earlier in this chapter, 
there are signs of change on this with the current Secretariat.  Criticisms of their lack 
of transparency have also been addressed earlier.  No data is available on how much 
per annum income LVC receives but on funding there is the following statement: 
“The movement is funded by the contributions of its members, by private donations 
and by the financial support of some NGOs, foundations and local and national 
authorities.” (Via Campesina, 2014).  The amount given to the UK by LVC is 
estimated at around £10,000.61  However, it is assumed that its lobbying budget is 
zero, in line with other CSOs such as FIAN, who have disclosed this in their annual 
financial information.  
  
LVC has also been criticised for holding agroecology as one of its main tenets.  As the 
three pillars in the construction of food sovereignty, agroecology is promoted as an 
alternative to sustainable intensive agriculture alongside defence of land and local and 
national markets, each of them central issues for LVC.    
“As both a science and set of practices…[agroecology is] created by the 
convergence of two scientific disciplines: agronomy and ecology…as a set of 
agricultural practices agroecology seeks ways to enhance agricultural systems 
by mimicking natural processes, thus creating beneficial biological 
interactions and synergies among the components of the agroecosystem.” (De 
Schutter, Report to UN HRC, 17 December 2010, p6).   
  
                                                
60 It has an increasing profile in the anti-globalisation or ‘altermundista’ (‘another world’) movement, as 
manifested in protests against the World Trade Organization (WTO) and Free Trade Area of the 
Americas (FTAA), in the World Social Forum (WSF) process.  This includes   critiques of World Bank 
land policies  (Via Campesina 2004, Rosset, 2006; McMichael, 2006; Patel, 2006).  
61 This figure was provided confidentially by an associate of LVC in the UK.  
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LVC and other proponents of agroecology argue that agroecology continues to reject 
the science and modern technologies such as transgenic crops, of sustainable intensive 
agriculture and point to its top-down productivist technologist objectives.  
Alternatively agroecology offers a localised bottom-up to alleviate food insecurity and 
hunger, with its behavioural and socio-political causes (Kershen, 2013).  This  
‘productivist objection’ at the heart of agroecology restricts agroecology to not using 
synthetic fertilisers, relying instead on animal manures or cover crops.  This and 
modern breeding with GM plants makes agroecology very land inefficient so land use 
will need to be much larger if it is to address the predicted increase in food insecurity.  
As such agroecology may not be able to reduce agriculture’s environmental footprint 
due to the significantly increased land use needed to meet the population explosion, 
the very time when the international system needs agriculture to increase production.   
The sustainable development side of the ‘contested vision’ for agriculture’s future 
development lay the charge of prioritising ideological thinking at the door of all 
proponents of agroecology, such as the LVC, with the argument for agroecology 
based on,  
 “…political statements having little to do with science and having the purpose 
of prescribing a romantic understanding of agriculture upon farmers, whether 
farmers want that proscribed understanding or not” (Kershen, 2013:35).     
  
Aligned with the aim of bringing the farmers’ knowledge back into agronomics via 
agroecology, the main focus of LVC is the assertion of rural peoples’ rights: rights to 
farm, to own land, to produce food and, ultimately, the right to exist. In addition to 
peasants’ rights, campaigns include defending farmers’ seeds, fighting gender 
violence and sustainable agriculture/agroecology including agrarian reform.  In 
defending small-scale sustainable agriculture it defends the peasants’ way of life and 
promotes social justice and dignity. These priorities inevitably conflict with the 
“corporate driven agriculture” promoted by TNCs which LVC claims is “destroying 
people and nature” (Via Campesina, 2014).  
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La Via Campesina’s lobbying capacity is extremely limited due to lack of economic 
capital and so inclusion in UN committees and the chance to address institutions 
directly are imperative for the promotion of their agenda.  Social media and local 
organisations go some way towards mobilising support but there is a performance gap 
in influencing legislation where, for example, legislators cannot be briefed about the 
aims of the LVC nor can legislation which is counter to the interests of the LVC, be 
fought effectively.  Direct action such as marches and demonstrations do get the 
message across to the members of the public, when they are reported, which may in 
turn influence political elites and have an effect on political will, (assuming that 
politicians act according to the rational actor theory), but without economic capital, 
the political capital of civil society groups like La Via Campesina remains low, 
despite their ‘grass roots’ ‘bottom-up’ representation.  Power-sharing from those who 
dominate the GFG field becomes all the more important then, if inclusivity and 
representation are to be allowed to be incorporated into the governance system.  In 
this governance constellation the most powerful governors are gatekeepers for 
inclusion and power-sharing since those without  political or economic capital cannot 
influence the agenda except by direct action.  This is despite political legitimacy, 
which, as discussed, is not enough in the GFG field on its own to bear influence.  The  
fact that the International System means that those ‘gatekeeper governors’  produce 
guidelines and recommendations rather than actions results in the paralysis of the 
food governance system (Participants B and F commented to this effect in their 
interviews). Political lobbying, such as donations to PACs are presumed to be outwith 
the financial reach of LVC.   
  
However, LVC’s role in the FAO has strengthened recently, with an informal 
technical ‘partnership’ formed in 2013 and an informal agreement to collaborate to 
address two objectives of FAO’s five strategic objectives, 62 drawing on LVC’s field 
activities (FAO, 2014).   
  
                                                
62 FAO’s five strategic objectives include: To help eliminate hunger, food insecurity and malnutrition; 
make agriculture, forestry and fisheries more productive and sustainable; reduce rural poverty; enable 
inclusive and efficient agricultural and food systems and increase the resilience of livelihoods to 
disasters (FAO, 2014c).  
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To more adroitly examine the role of LVC in GFG, it is helpful to first disaggregate  
the term ‘civil society’ actors since NGOs and CSOs have very different experience in 
their respective roles in GFG.  Throughout this thesis the distinction is made between 
NGOs (who are not classed as Civil Society actors in this research) and 
peasant/people’s organisations (who classed as CSOs).  Desmarais sums up the 
distinction:  
 “In general NGOs have different aims, purposes, interests, organizational 
cultures and structures, and mechanisms for decision-making and 
accountability than peasant organisations… I use the term NGO when 
referring to development non-profit organizations that channel funds – 
received from private donations, governments, corporations and international 
institutions –for development projects (presumably) in support of mass-based 
organizations” (Desmarais, 2007:84).  
  
Organisations that seek funds to conduct research and run development projects on 
issues concerning the marginalised are also included in this category, for example,  
NGOs with ‘middle-class’ professionals for whom their continuance is contingent on 
such funds (Desmarais, 2007).  This professionalisation and institutionalisation tends 
to “soften the challenging nature of their claims” so NGOs act as advisors, critics, 
monitors, or ‘challengers’ to dominant forces (Rucht 1999: 218-20). As a result “the 
epistemological hegemony of modernity” dominates, (Pollack 2001:197) and 
alternative perspectives receive little space (Desmarais, 2007).    
  
Indeed the purpose of NGOs, to give voice to the voiceless, is circumvented by those 
voiceless people’s organisations (such as peasants’ organisations).  The question 
needs to be asked if the de facto effect of NGOs in global governance is to contribute 
to a situation which Hurd described as the International System maintaining the 
appearance that it is working (Hurd, 2008).  NGOs, by purporting to represent civil 
society but in reality acting as “authoritarian technocrats”, legitimise this global 
governance system which places peoples’ organisations at the very periphery of the 
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international system (if they are involved at all).  This is another layer of the ‘false 
promise of  International Institutions’ (to adapt Mearsheimer’s definition and concept, 
1994) which perpetuates a system in which the status quo means one in seven go 
hungry and NGOs, along with other institutions, have the ‘unintended effect’ of 
helping the globalisation project to consolidate. Of course NGOs are diverse and 
varied and should be not be viewed as monolithic but, it is argued here, neither should 
they be categorised as civil society actors.  Social movements such as La Via 
Campesina, which directly represent grass roots or community origins, seek inclusion, 
access and power-sharing in the international system with the view of changing it, to 
democratise sites and structure of power to redefine the world order.  This is their 
objective, not to justify the existence of proxies or intermediaries such as NGOs to 
mediate their relationship to executive power.  
  
Civil society actors involved in the GFG field also differ from each other, although all 
have very small portions of power., “…conformist or reformist views are more likely 
to be accepted within the WTO, while grassroots social movements with more critical 
views have had little if any access” (Scholte, O’Brien Williams, 1998:19).  Greater 
access and engagement stems from being closer to the sites of power (e.g. Geneva or 
Washington), as does influence over nation states.  Desmarais draws comparison 
between two civil society actors in GFG; IFAP (International Federation of 
Agricultural Producers) and LVC, pointing out that they use different strategies, have 
different ideological frameworks and represent different constituencies and interests.   
IFAP engages in dialogue with multilateral economic institutions whereas LVC’s  
“opposition to the WTO is implacable” (Desmarais 2007:26).  LVC has a rationale 
that more radical strategies and positions will address the crisis in the countryside(s).  
Desmarais comments that: “In forming the Via Campesina, they effectively created a 
progressive alternative to the IFAP” (Desmarais, 2007: 26).  
  
LVC scored low in the economic capital criteria in the Field Analysis due to its low 
income. Whilst the income of LVC is not known with any certainty, as discussed an 
estimate was made based on the income for one country (the UK) and multiplied by 
the number of countries in the coalition of LVC. An economic capital minus one 
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score is quite a straightforward categorisation according to income and consistent 
with other CSOs.  
  
The score for political capital for LVC from the Field Analysis is also low at minus 
five and this is drawn from a minus one score on the criterion of lobbying expenditure 
(with the measure of less than USD 1 million p.a. giving a score of minus one).  It is 
established that LVC does not lobby governments outwith the consultation processes.  
There were also minus one scores on the criteria of political access, role in 
governance, agenda-setting, contribution to legislative outputs and economic capital 
(as above). Together these form a minus five score.  This represents the low level to 
which LVC are admitted to the governance and legislative spheres and the relatively 
powerless position it holds in regard to agenda-setting in the global governance arena.  
It scored one on the criterion of moral capital, (with the measure being raison d’être - 
representation of peasants and gender issues plus praxis (its practices are to promote 
food sovereignty and gender representation), giving the total score for Political 
Capital of minus five.  This demonstrates one way of scoring the low level of political 
capital of an organisation which is grass roots, recently admitted and not given full 
voting rights in global governance.   
  
LVC’s total score on legitimacy capital is zero, which consists of three ‘plus one’ 
scores for the criteria of  raison d’être, inclusivity (where the measure is that an 
organisation with strong inclusion and representativeness is one) and ethical practices 
(the measure is that ethical practices raise a score of plus one). There is a score of zero 
on the criterion of subject to regulation, (where one corresponds to complete 
compliance to legal and statutory regulation and zero is ‘not proven’).  LVC had 
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negative one scores for the criteria of transparency 63 (where the measure is open 
governance equals one but closed governance equals minus one) and accountability  
(with the measure of ‘accountable for practices’ gains a measure of one and ‘not 
accountable’ is minus one).  It also scores a minus one for economic capital, as 
discussed in the political capital section preceding this.64    
  
In summary, La Via Campesina offers an important counterweight to neoliberal 
practices yet its role in global governance is still very small and restricted, despite its 
ethical practices and representation of grass roots movements.  Its uncompromising 
stance on contentious issues such as agroecology combined with its rejectionist and 
isolationist positioning are also problematic for assimilation into global food 
governance.  However, with low political capital it fights against the global status 
quo, often at high stakes.65  Its legitimacy capital score (zero) arises from its stated 
non-compliance with financial and corporate regulation disclosures.  Other CSO who 
do comply would have scored more highly on political legitimacy.  Is this an issue for 
how the value of legitimacy is constructed to fit in with a neoliberal GFG system?   
Should dissent from the system perhaps be a criterion for legitimacy?  
  
This is, of course, only a snapshot of a moment in time of a 20-year old organisation 
and the legitimacy capital may be improving and building over time.  The political 
capital may also grow over time, as more collaborative partnerships are developed.   
Allowance can be made for LVC’s relatively new status (and recent admittance to the 
GFG), compared to organisations such as WFP (at 60 years old) or some of the TNCs 
which have been around over 130 years.  The Gates Foundation, however, is the 
                                                
63 There is conjecture on the reasons for their nondisclosure which includes for reasons of perhaps 
maintaining autonomy, to protect donors, to avoid conflict (between actors and between LVC and other 
actors - often the cost of travel for social movement actors are covered by NGOs or other actors (FAO, 
IFAD, CSM) and if the budget came out maybe this would be challenged (although this justification is 
less robust) (Barling, D; correspondence dated 20 May 2014).  
64 This is a criticism of Bourdieu’s method where those actors with low economic capital have this  
‘double counted’ in both the X and Y axes.  Since those with low economic capital can only achieve a 
total score of five in each category of political capital and legitimacy capital one solution would be to 
show the political capital and political legitimacy as percentages of total possible scores allowing for 
low economic capital but this would then both lose the data on the criteria scores and result in an 
“apples and pears” comparison.  This temporal comparison could also reintroduce ‘habitus’ into the 
analysis.  
65 At the time of writing a Campesina founder, Margarita Murillo, had been murdered in Honduras and 
her son was still missing (Via Campesina, 2014; Global Witness, 2014).  
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youngest organisation here and also has a stated shelf-life, although the date of 
closure is as yet unknown.  One future research possibility is to develop a Z-axis for 
the GFG Field Analysis, where the value of Z equals time.  This could show the 
trajectory of organisations in the GFG space measured in political capital, political 
legitimacy and of course, economic capital.  This temporal comparison is a further 
modification to Bourdieu’s method.  
  
The role of La Via Campesina and other CSOs like them in global governance is 
critical to developing an effective food security regime.  To expedite this, the role of 
LVC in the international community could be increased to enable power-sharing. 
Admittance as a full member into GFG bodies and committees such as the CFS would 
raise to prominence some of the issues that LVC promotes: agrarian reform and 
water, biodiversity and trade, sustainable peasants’ agriculture, as well as food 
sovereignty.  Since only nation-states can be members of the CFS then it has a 
Westphalian bias, food sovereignty and the concept of entitlement to food remain a 
sideshow to the ‘committee-style’ approach of guidelines and soft power that 
dominate the global governance of food.  
  
Summary of the Case Studies  
  
In summary, the four case studies present the range of positions taken by one 
governor-actor in each of the four sectors in the GFG field.  Each also had declined to 
be interviewed for this research.  The issue of the WFP remit of dealing with crises 
came up in the case studies, as it did in the interviews, so the WFP is locked into 
effects-focussed rather than cause-focussed solutions.   There also seems to be an 
expectation that the WFP (or the FAO) would take a central role in GFG but instead, 
as can be seen from its genesis as a UN agency, it has evolved to responds to needs 
for food aid.  The Gates Foundation has, to some extent, plugged this gap and is 
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providing for projects to address some of the systemic causes of food insecurity, 
although there is controversy about some of its Trusts’ investments and, by 
implication, its association with agrifood TNCs such as Monsanto.  Such powerful 
private actors in the governance field is also of unknown full significance, although it 
does imply a democratic deficit, lack of scrutiny, accountability and regulation.  
If the WFP does not take a more central and active role in GFG, then that asks the 
question who should?  From the Field Analysis it can be seen that the FAO’s CFS is 
the main intergovernmental platform for this but involvement of the grass roots civil 
society groups such as La Via Campesina, is very limited.  This is echoed in the 
interview results, as is the lack of a central unitary body for global governance.  Each 
of the four case studies is involved in the CFS yet it remains hardwired to the past in 
its structure and also in its scope being a forum for discussions and guidelines.  Where 
these conflict with member states’ interests and that of TNCs (if they manipulate the 
nation-states), then the needed food security measures will fail.    
In this governance format the wicked/super wicked problem of food security can be 
seen - that the remedy put in place perpetuates the problem by conserving the status 
quo and impeding new measures that could develop in response to the critical food 
insecurity situations. The case study of LVC, however, shows that the land workers 
they represent  promote democratic inclusion.   Yet the Field Analysis scores 
discussed in each of the case studies showed the huge disparity in economic, political 
and legitimacy capitals.   Small civil society groups such as LVC cannot mobilise 
capital for political purposes, cannot agenda-set due to lack of resources and in any 
case are so recently admitted to the fora (such as the CFS) that their David and 
Goliath situation cannot change under the current system.  Private sector Goliaths 
such as Monsanto and the Gates Foundation dominate the GFG, by virtue of the scale 
of their political and economic capital, which allows them discursive and instrumental 
power.  Legitimacy is the least effective convertible symbolic capital in the GFG field 
because the system does not value it.  By not positively discriminating towards actors 
who hold legitimacy, the UN system favours hegemonic states  - the ‘peaceable 
nations’ in its charter.    
To change a global governance system such as this, structural reform, democratic 
pluralism, inclusiveness and effective results-orientated leadership (with the means to 
enforce compliance to innovative pro food-secure policies) are essential.   The 
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developing global emergency of food insecurity needs effective governance, 
especially given the context and pace of agricultural degradation from climate change. 
The next and final chapter sets out recommendations for governance and policies to 
achieve these changes.    
  
To have power in the current food governance system, more than legitimacy is 
needed. Political capital is also needed but perhaps economic capital is key.  This 
leaves little hope for power-sharing for grass roots organisations. The organisations 
who could take a leadership role in the field (e.g. FAO or IFAD) are not powerful 
enough to argue for power-sharing or, like the WFP, are charged with mitigating the 
worst effects of hunger by food aid rather than changing the logic and democratic 
participation of the field.   
  
Chapter Conclusion  
  
In conclusion, to end hunger, the entitlement to and means of acquiring food must be 
at the disposal of all across the globe.  To achieve this, effective governance is 
required.  The current GFG configuration does not achieve this so the question now 
is, how should it adapt, given it is not ‘fit for purpose’. For many, the centre of this 
issue is the smallholder/subsistence farmer and global governance needs to remove 
any obstacles between the ‘peasants’ and the sustainable seeds they need to sow, the 
fields they own and plough, the crops they tend and harvest and the access to the fair 
markets for the equitable prices on which they rely.  Until changes are made to 
happen, the status quo will continue.  A status quo where national and international 
legislative contexts which support access to markets are promoted,  legal redress for 
those smallholders who suffer from oppressive trade practices is available and the 
global governance of food becomes more democratic and effective.   Without change 
one in seven will still go hungry. By 2030 one in two may be deprived of water.  By 
2050 the sea may well be without fish. The food system is universal and so the global 
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governance of food needs to address these particular issues, since from this research it 
is clear these local and national patterns seem to be reproduced across the globe, in a 
dark mirror of globalization.  These are not lessons of equanimity, equality, 
inclusivity, participation and transparency only for the global governance of food but 
for global governance in its entirety.    
  
Exogenous shocks, such as food crises and climate change will, it seems, inevitably 
rent the International System so better inter and intra-elite co-operation between the 
governors and the governed will be essential to deal with these threats.  To fail to 
create a viable food governance field now may beg a price that all of us can ill afford 
to pay. This includes the growing numbers of food insecure within the West. The next 
and final chapter summarises the issues and analyses raised here and recommends 
changes to the GFG structure and processes to achieve a stable and effective food 
security regime.  
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Chapter Five: The Bitter Harvest  
  
“There are 2700 calories produced per person per day produced today so there is 
already plenty food to feed the present population with the present development. …As 
long as food is not a human right, we don’t have the governance structures and 
institutions to make sure that people have access to safe food and drinking water… 
Everyone is in their own silo….[For] most of the people in the sub-tropics, almost 
everyone is involved in agriculture but very few of them are growing food for 
themselves.  They are growing food for someone else and they are getting an income 
from it and then they are buying food.”    
(Professor David Battisti  ‘Climate Change and Global Food Security.  Our changing 
World Lecture Edinburgh University 4/11/2014).   
  
As illustrated in the above quote, it is clear that reform of the food governance 
institutions is needed to address the unequal access to food across the globe.  Also 
that the context of the International System and the concomitant neoliberal approach 
to global governance inhibits the establishment of an effective food security regime.  
The neoliberal approaches of International Organisations, Trans National 
Corporations and Aid Organisations in the global food governance field plus the 
exclusion of representative grass roots organisations such as La Via Campesina are 
now manifest.  These effects mean that the status quo is perpetuated.  Reform of these 
factors form part of the remedies and conclusions, as do policy recommendations in 
this final chapter.   Alternatives to reform are also considered.  
Redefining the Food Security Problem  
  
Firstly though, it is useful to revisit the original definition of the food security 
problem with the findings of this research in hand.  As discussed in Chapter One, as a 
wicked or super wicked problem, the problem of food insecurity may not be fully 
understood until the formation of a solution (Conklin, 2005). This means reframing 
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the problem in light of the insights offered by the interview respondents, the 
descriptions mapped out by the Field Analysis and the case studies.  Indeed, GFG 
failure is now identified as a key factor in the causes of chronic food security by some 
interview participants and in the case studies on the World Food Programme and 
Monsanto.  The polarity of intent may vary: perhaps misfeasance on the part of the 
World Food Programme and malfeasance on Monsanto’s part (with reference to the 
Wikileaks cable mentioned in Chapter Four).  With chronic food insecurity being 
long-term and persistent, chronic food insecurity has been caused, in part, by ongoing 
structural and organisational governance failures of short-term transient food 
insecurity.  The cumulative effect of ineffective global food governance and its 
repeated failure to deal with the systemic causes of food insecurity (but not 
necessarily the effects) means that this failure has become part of the problem.  
These research findings and analyses necessitate a reframing of the food security 
problem originally set out in Chapter One.  A reframing that adds in the failure of the 
global food governance system and the neoliberal context to the causes of food 
insecurity. This redefinition of the problem also takes into account the failure of the 
current food system and the distribution of power in the governance system anew in 
light of these research findings.   A new, more accurate description of the GFG field 
is also part of the output of this thesis. These developments form part one of this 
chapter.  Part two considers possible remedies to this recast problem and offers 
recommendations for governance and policy improvements (as well as 
methodological considerations) with the results and analyses informing  the details of 
the problem, remedies and recommendations.   This second section answers the part 
of the thesis question, ‘what can be done to establish effective food security 
governance?’  The conclusion and recommendations for the methodology are in part 
three.  Each section also relates back to relevant points in the literature.    
Part 1: Reframing The Problem.  
  
The Failure of the Current Food Governance System  
  
A significant factor in the failed food governance regime, as mentioned in the opening 
quote of this chapter, is the failure of Institutions.   As seen in the case study of the 
WFP, this is partly due to the remit and set up of International Organisations, such as 
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the UN. Some of the interviewees commented that different forms of governance and 
alternative approaches to governance are needed and that any new body or bodies set 
up to deal with food security needs power to overcome member nation-states’ and 
global governors’ competing interests and to fully include civil society organisations 
in GFG. Referring back to Tsing’s concept of ‘friction’ outlined in Chapter Two 
(Tsing, 2005) this means that conflicting social interactions would be allowed space 
in the GFG structure.  If these areas of conflict were represented democratically in 
global governance, then the effectiveness of the governance would be much enhanced 
and the democratic deficit in GFG addressed, at least in part.  
Another significant failure of the food governance system identified in the research is 
a lack of co-ordination both between the governors and across the GFG field.  This 
inter actor and intra sectorial lack of co-ordination and co-operation has proliferated 
and prevailed due to the neoliberal context, which explains the terrain of silos in the 
food governance field.  A context where commercial interests dominate and 
democratic discussions  of food security are impeded.  This lack of co-ordination and 
co-operation prevents planned cause-focussed solutions so instead ad hoc effects 
focussed actions such as food aid predominate.  Although essential to those whom 
receive it, direct food aid also disrupts local food economies and distracts from 
addressing the structural reasons for food insecurity.  As do practices by some actors, 
such as the example of excess grain dumping by USAID mentioned by Battisti in the 
quote opening this chapter.    
Governors within the GFG field benefit from this status quo to varying degrees, 
depending on their economic and political capital and raison d’être.  There is little 
evidence as yet of any ‘post neoliberal framing’ or changing logic of the field in light 
of the Post-Washington, Vienna, Beijing or Seoul consensi discussed in Chapter Two.   
The Field Analysis results present one possible ‘power map’ of the most significant 
actors in the global food governance field according to measures of economic capital, 
legitimacy and political capitals.  Dominant TNCs and IOs and marginalised CSOs 
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are represented in the Field Analysis, showing a GFG field configured by 
neoliberalism – the ‘structuring structure’ which Bourdieu identified. As seen in  
Chapter Three when measured by economic capital, international organisations and  
TNCs dominate the field with CSO a very small fraction of the field. 66  
This facilitates a new description of the GFG field.   If we recall the inner section of 
the ‘field within a field’ figure in Chapter Two (Figure 6), that is the GFG field,  then 
the GFG section can now be represented as represented in Figure 18 following.  A 
typology of discursive, executive and instrumental power is also applied to Figure 18, 
drawn from the interviews and case studies.  Figure 18 shows the centrality of private 
actors such as TNCs in the GFG field, and in concentric squares; the GFG field, the  
‘field of power’ with stakeholders who directly influence the ‘International field of 
power’ with actors from the International System who indirectly influence GFG and, 
lastly, a ‘non-inclusion field’ where some Civil Society Organisation actors, who 
should be involved in GFG but are excluded from the GFG.  To improve GFG these 
CSO actors could be moved from the periphery and included in the global food 
governance field.     
Those actors with the highest economic capital also largely dominate in political 
capital and, to a lesser extent, in legitimacy capital.  Economic capital matters 
because, according to Bourdieu, symbolic capitals are ‘interconvertible’ with each 
other.  So although not a measure of power in itself,  economic capital can convert to 
political capital or legitimacy capital. The civil society organisations are dramatically 
less significant in each of the symbolic capitals and are therefore extremely 
marginalised in GFG, to a high degree of exclusion.  Positive discrimination towards 
those stakeholders with negligible economic or political capital but some legitimacy 
capital could redress this position.    
  
                                                
66 If the Gates Foundation is removed as an outlier then in descending order of dominance the actors 
dominate as follows:  TNCs, IOs, Aid and CSO with CSOs a very small fraction of the economic 
capital (at a percentage of under 0.06% to TNCs and 0.06% to IOs). Aid organisations have economic 
capital at one third  that of TNCs’ economic capital and one half of IOs’ overall,  CSOs then, are an 
extremely small fraction of the field.   
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Figure 18    The Reframed Global Food Governance Field in detail 67 
                                                
67 Applying Field Theory and the research results to the Global Food Governance  
Field.  1 = International field, 2=Field of Power, 3= Global Food Governance Field 4.= Non-inclusion Field.  Note that although 
Civil Society Organisations are included in the Global Food Governance field, their symbolic capitals are so low as to make their 
inclusion negligible. Size of the field not indicated here. There are other fields within the International Field of power and Global 
Governance fields.  The suggested power type follows the typology of power proposed by Clapp and Fuchs (2009).  The global 
political and economic context of neoliberalism exists across all four fields.   
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Non - stakeholders  in food governance such as financial organisations, IMF, World Bank.  
). Instrumental power (  
  
  
  3 . Global Food  
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Representation Deficit 
There is little meaningful representation because the field is effectively dominated by 
actors with the most economic capital, such as private actors, as with the Gates 
Foundation.  The fragmented and incoherent architecture, lack of leadership and 
organisation’s overlapping and opaque mandates are mentioned in the interviews.  
This elision of commercial and institutional elites serves the status quo with this 
institutional/commercial elite acting as hegemons.  This relates to the domination and 
hegemony theory outlined in Chapter Two which argues that hierarchies of capitalist 
society can be reproduced, in this form in a governance field.   It was also suggested 
in the Field Analysis that legitimacy capital is the least dynamic of the symbolic 
capitals and actors in the GFG field who possess only legitimacy capital fail to reduce 
the problem of food security in this current food governance configuration.  This 
means legitimacy (in this definition at least) is not valued in the democratically 
deficient food governance field.  
Both the effect of private actors’ domination of the governance of food and also the 
idea that governance of hunger is a business in itself for some actors also came 
through in the interview results.  Some of the participants also highlighted this 
unequal distribution of power in the governance systems, as well as other issues.  The 
range of viewpoints covered issues such as, if power should rest with national 
governments because if there is little power-sharing, then power is inequitably held in 
the hands of a few, perhaps less legitimate actors. The interviews with the Aid-actors 
in particular showed that the participants viewed their involvement in GFG as  
primarily feeding into the FAO’s Committee of World Food Security, although some 
did question the constrained scope of this role.  The committee is working towards 
increased inclusion of the Civil Society Mechanism (Duncan and Barling, 2012) but 
as the Field Analysis shows, CSOs’ position in the GFG is still, at best, Davidian to 
the Goliathian TNCs, for example, Monsanto and arguably relict IOs such as the 
FAO.  
Lack of Effective Governance  
  
Another issue raised by the interview participants was a systemic lack of effectiveness 
due to the setup of the UN and the effects of this working through the system, with 
one interviewee mentioning key competencies and the overall lack of executive 
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power.  The features and practices of this current governance framework as a problem 
in the field was also identified by interview participants.  This includes a lack of 
leadership.  As discussed, it also includes the lack of cooperation between the 
governors and including the UN agencies such as the ‘Roman Forum’ who, according 
to one participant, do not “talk freely enough” with themselves or other governors.   
The silo mentality across organisations and sectors was also identified by 
interviewees and this confirms the point made earlier about operational silos of the 
IOs.  The lack of oversight of TNCs was also identified by many interviewees and 
this points to a lack of scrutinising regulation or even regulatory apparatus.  
Such ineffectiveness from failing institutions can be seen in the failure of the current 
food system, according to some interview participants.  The ineffectiveness is partly 
visible in the lack of adequate response to food prices, water problems and the rapid 
concentration of TNC agribusiness corporations.  This articulates the points made in 
Chapter Two (p.107) as well as in the Field Analysis, that TNCs in effect dominate 
the global food system. One reason offered for this growing power of TNCs is that 
devolution and globalisation have resulted in the ‘hollowing out’ of the nation-state 
(Macmillan, 2005).  Also historic and on-going failure to address the causes of food 
insecurity (participant D) has seen national governments and Institutions 
underinvesting in rural infrastructure, rural institutions and agricultural research.   
Not only TNCs or UN organisations benefit from such lack of accountability and 
democratic control.  The literature discussed that the same is true of the IMF, WTO  
and World Bank (Harvey, 2006) and this led to American investment banks’ interests 
dominating.  The example of Goldman Sachs trading food staples as derivatives was 
given in Chapter Two (Kaufman, 2011).  This is possible in a global system where 
neoliberalism is the ‘governing technology’ and by generating entitlement sets, 
facilitates who has food and who does not, often with private forces determining food 
access.  Sen’s analysis of food insecurity discussed that, at an individual level, food 
insecurity can arise as the entitlement sets are politically engendered and that 
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entitlement arises from ‘functionings’ which shape the level of capabilities and 
endowment individuals possess (Sen, 2011).  These determine who has food and who 
does not.  In short, globalisation allows ‘accumulation by dispossession’ and this  
‘recycled imperialism’ and on-going exploitation remains an unmet moral imperative.   
The rationale for who accumulates and whom is dispossessed is political with, this 
thesis argues, neoliberal logic effectively acting as apportioner. 68  
Measures to Improve Food Security  
  
A number of measures to improve food security were identified by the interview 
participants, such as addressing the global trade policies of multilateral agencies with 
global trade regulation and engendering the compliance needed to create a more even 
playing field.  Subsidy levels were also identified as needing urgently monitored and 
addressed to establish a fairer food system, since subsidies lower the price of food 
traded. To this same end, developing countries also need better facilitation of access 
to markets.  A few participants also identified the current international and national 
food price management system as being too slow to update with market prices. The 
weakness of food aid delivery generally was also identified in the research results 
with some interview participants proposing addressing specific issues such as; 
inefficiencies, logistical issues such as better stores and procurement. Better recipient 
targeting as well as improving nutritional deficiencies of food aid and better internal 
control of agencies were also mentioned.   These failures in the current food system 
could be remedied by a unitary body for global food management implementing new 
policy directions.  Without such a central body, the current GFG field with the 
characteristics already described is not configured to resolve such issues (and also has 
a track record for not doing so).    
As with the TNCs, the neoliberal approach of the IOs has also failed to solve food 
insecurity because the solutions conflict with their raison d’être and organisational 
logics.  They reproduce the structures of power and knowledge divined by history and 
institutional frameworks (e.g. membership, serial limited reforms etc.).  The ‘North’, 
                                                
68 This describes the relationship between global food governance and the individual  - its impact on 
plates of food in that the failure of GFG means that corporate forces dominate, dictating which crops 
are grown where, the seeds, the fertilizer used to propagate the seeds, the yield and the price sold at 
market.  This capability dictates food availability and the price that smallholders can access food at (the 
functionings).  
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therefore, is an agent of food insecurity by proxy through GFG failure or by nation-
states setting their foreign policy objectives to coerce their trade agenda, (as seen in 
the leaked cable in the Wikileaks release). Note also the liberal governance model, 
outlined in Chapter one, where indigenous values are replaced with liberal ones, so 
IOs can command civil populations (Tsing, 2009). These factors combine to erode 
indigenous agricultural structures and practices, along with the geographical spaces 
such as indigenous arable fields and forests,  where livelihoods can flourish. 
Therefore, what is needed is a new governance framework where governance adopts a 
balanced approach that represents indigenous values and the grass roots organisations 
that represent them.    
So with the failure of food security governance, the problem of food security now 
adds the ‘failure of global food governance’ to the factors and causes in Table 7 
(below) which could be remedied by effective global food governance. This shows 
that the failure of global food governance is both a cause and a factor of food 
insecurity in itself by dint of its failure to remedy other factors and causes.  The 
failure of GFG is catastrophic in the severity of the magnitude of its consequences.  
The international  and national fields of power still influence the global governance 
field and this can be seen on issues like commoditisation and the neoliberal context.  
Reform of the GFG field or a new governance model would therefore have a 
multiplier effect on resolving food insecurity, once it is reconfigured to remedy the 
factors and causes under its remit as well as reform of itself.  The specific features of 
this governance failure are shown in Table 7 following.  
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Global Food  
Governance Failure  
Proposed Remedies  Suggested 
Remit  
Unequal distribution 
of power  
Reform. Inclusion. Power-sharing  IOs, N-S, CSO  
Configuration of 
power  
Reform  IOs, N-S, AID 
Orgs, CSO  
Elision of economic  
and institutional elites 
(hegemons)  
Transparency. Reform.  Form New 
international panel (like IPCC)  
International 
panel, N-S, CSO  
Fragmented and 
incoherent architecture  
Reform. New central unitary body (like 
defunct Food Council). Integration of 
“Roman forum’.  
Panel. IOs.  
Lack of effectiveness  Leadership. New body  IOs, N-S, Panel  
Overlapping and 
opaque mandates  
Improve co-ordination. Reform  Panel  
Lack of leadership by 
IO  
New body  Panel, IO  
Lack of coordination 
by IO  
New body  Panel, IO  
Little meaningful 
representation  
Expand membership. Improve inclusion  IO, N-S, panel,  
body, Aid orgs,  
CSO  
Legitimacy not valued  Expand membership. Power-
sharing. Positive discrimination 
towards civil society organisations.  
All. Panel. 
Body.  
Governors benefit 
from status quo  
Revise distribution of power in the 
governance field  
Panel. Body. 
CSO.  
Neoliberal context 
configures the field  
Code of practice for governors.  Establish 
elements of democracy across field  
All. Panel. Body  
Lack of coordination 
across governors.   
Leadership and architecture  All body. Panel.  
Lack of cause-focused 
solutions  
New body. Establish priorities to address 
systemic chronic food insecurity  
IO, N-S, Panel  
Organisational silos  Internal Organisational reform.  IO  
Practices of Financial 
institutions from 
field of power  
Regulation  N-S, panel.  
Body. CSO.  
Democratic deficit 
across field  
Creation of new body could address 
power-sharing and revise executive power 
base.  
Panel. Body, 
Aid, IO, CSO  
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TNC practices  Regulation  Panel. Body, 
Aid, IO, CSO  
Aid orgs governance  Improve co-ordination of charitable  Aid, IOs Body  
actions funnelled into 
feeding into CFS  
organisations.  Perhaps a sectorial 
federation or coalition?  
 
Lack of regulation of 
TNCs and private 
actors  
International mechanism for regulation 
(which may cover other governance areas 
such as climate change).  Legal reform to 
ensure redress/compliance.  
IOs, panel, body  
CSO marginalised and 
grass roots exclusion  
Power-share with CSO.  Include other 
actors.  Increased economic and political 
support for CSOs.  
CSO, IO, panel.  
Gender blind policies 
and practices  
Gender-inclusive policies and reform 
agenda  
All  
Indigenous 
agricultural practices 
overlooked  
Prioritise pro-environmental agricultural 
objectives and policies  
All  
  
Table 7:   Features of Global Food Governance Failure  
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Part 2: Remedies and Recommendations  
  
This new conceptualisation of the problem also offers new remedies in addition to the 
existing panoply of known remedies. From the literature review, the ‘building blocks’ 
for better global food governance include reforming the CFS, establishing the Right to 
Food (as mentioned by Battisti above), smallholder and gender equality, integration of 
the ‘Rome Agencies’, regulation of TNCs (specifically barring any political role) and 
lastly including more non-state actors in the GFG (McKeon, 2009).69  McKeon also 
proposed that global results-orientated strategies for reducing food insecurity should 
be pursued and actioned rather than only guidelines.  McKeon proposes a Global 
Strategies Framework as a more incorporative democratic model of governance.  
Taking the constituent elements of the problem from both the literatures and research 
results the following remedies can be recommended, some of which incorporate these 
building blocks.  
1.   Regulation and Scrutiny of TNCs  
  
Firstly, it is proposed that regulation and scrutiny of TNCs should be sought and 
initiated.  This could be along the lines of the EU Transparency Directive and 
involvement in the global governance processes should be conditional on compliance 
with such regulation.  As stakeholders in the current governance processes, the format 
of the regulation would inevitably be negotiated with the TNCs but other stakeholders 
such as CSO groups could be included.  Part of this regulation could include the right 
to legal redress in the host (or donor) country for those involved in litigation, rather 
than the need to litigate in the TNC’s home country.  This would assist with the issue 
that many TNCs are registered in Delaware, U.S.A., (where corporations have the  
legal rights of an individual ‘legal person’).  The central question here is who would 
initiate such change and what would the legal framework be?  Which is the ‘executive 
                                                
69 Former FAO executive McKeon suggests creating the Global Strategies Framework for building 
capacity for effective global governance from state and non-state actors and ensuring accountability of 
not only the governing institutions but all actors in the global governance of food.  It could create the 
right initial steps towards effective governance (McKeon, 2011). Regulation of TNCs is more difficult 
to achieve although there is some scope with monitoring corporate activities and technologies, antitrust 
and fair competition rulings plus reviewing bi-lateral trade agreements and again this is a role that the 
CFS could oversee (Clapp and Fuchs, 2009).   
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power’ question in global governance and this takes us into the realm of ‘soft’ law.70  
Similar to media self-regulation, although de jure it seems like a promising mode, de 
facto self-regulation is ineffective because it conflicts with the actors' self-interest and 
often results in gestures of empty rhetoric or posturing such as poor Corporate Social  
Responsibility actions.  So, as with EU directives on corporations’ transparency and 
directives on corporate practices on similar issues such as land grabs and climate 
change, the need to establish norms and rules which are supported by regulation is 
clear but the issue is how to establish such regulation?    
One possible way is to establish a tribunal, such as with the International Criminal 
Court, so that rather than fines, (which corporations develop a cost-benefit calculus 
for) the retributive transparency and negative publicity of such cases may act a 
deterrent.  International law could be a framework through which this is examined.  
This would take a degree of international cooperation and also that the international 
laws are ratified.  As with, for example, the S.A.L.T. and Law of the Sea treaties, 
ratification is key but possible in the nexus of transnational governance and 
international law.  Compliance and enforcement are central issues, raising the 
question who could act as scrutineer?  This could be a role of a working group in a 
new central unitary body.   These questions are also being explored in climate change 
and international human rights.  
As discussed in the Field Analysis and in the literature review, part of the TNC 
problem is that of vertical integration or ‘super mergers’ mean that there is now a 
concentration of power not previously seen.  This affects not only food security and 
the developing world but also the home nations of the corporations.71  Identification 
                                                
70 A remedy for food security via international  law is an important part of solving food insecurity and 
is an area for future research.  
71 For example the ‘Alcan scandal’ of 2013-14 in the US saw TNCs profiteering from each stage of the 
aluminium process to the detriment of consumers.  An example was given of the practices where the 
warehousing of the aluminium was needlessly extended so that increased storage fees were charged to 
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of this power and agreement of the conditionality for involvement in the governance 
process would assist food prices and improve the democratic balance of the GFG field 
itself. In theory at least, anti-trust regulation could also be enforced here both at 
national and international levels to circumscribe TNC activities yet in practice with 
such laws these monopolistic practices remain.  Therefore, trade rules and trade 
agendas dominate the GFG. This is akin to the issue of lack of inadequate 
representation and democratic participation, which is discussed later in this chapter.  
But the trade agenda, set out by the G7/G8, can also mitigate the domination of 
developing countries with the cessation of excessive or pernicious trading practices.  
Cognisance of and actions on trade agendas is an important element in the 
construction of effective pro-food security policies and programmes and the 
regulation and scrutiny of TNCs is also an essential strand of GFG reform.  
2.   Rededicate The Outputs Of Existing Institutions To Actions That More 
Effectively Resolve Food Insecurity.   
The criticisms of the inefficacy of the FAO and CFS identified in the interviews 
mostly centred on lack of action.  Although credit was given to steps being taken in 
the right direction, especially in regard to inclusion of civil society organisations, the 
pace of change is still seen as being too slow and some participants felt that with the 
stakes so high, the discursive outcomes of the CFS distract from much needed actions.  
Therefore the second remedy proposed is the redesignation of the UN agencies to 
action-orientated outputs.  This means the expansion of the remit and competencies of 
the CFS committee and also reforming the FAO and other institutions.  The objective 
should be to establish a durable global food security regime.  Two modes are possible 
for this.  Either reform the institutions along the lines of more purposive physical 
outputs or consider alternatives to the international system of institution-led 
architecture.  This segues into the third proposed remedy, reforming the international 
architecture of the institutional framework.     
                                                                                                                                       
another part of the same corporation. Similarly, transportation was extended beyond what was 
practicably necessary, again ratcheting up costs and profit.   This adds cost at each stage of the 
manufacturing and distribution process with such ‘rack renting’ increasing the cost of the product. 
With costs snowballing at each stage of the production process and any rival competitors already 
acquired in the super mergers, there is no alternative but to purchase that product at that inflated price.   
In this case it was aluminium but the process  resembles the effect of super mergers on the cost of food.    
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3.   Reform of The International Architecture Of The Institutions Involved In 
Global Food Governance.   
  
As discussed the ‘one-UN’ reform process has been completed yet food insecurity is 
still not remedied.  So the questions remain how to restructure, what to restructure and 
how to further reform to best address food insecurity.  There is some support for 
improving the mandates, capacities and mechanism of existing institutions. There is 
also recognition that the reform agenda needs to reach consensus to decide on an 
effective framework to be developed.  
The question of the architecture of the system is also a question of power since power 
in the system flows from the architecture and membership.  The existing asymmetric 
distribution of power affects processes of accountability, responsibilities and 
rulemaking.  Reforming the architecture would enable a more symmetric balance of 
power and create new categories of membership – for example voting rights to 
associate members such as the La Via Campesina in the Committee of Food Security.  
This would empower the marginalised and reduce the effect of voting along the lines 
of member nation-state’s interests, where the most powerful sustain a hegemonic 
control over the global governance or voting blocs of most developed nations vote 
along trade agenda lines.  Integrating the three Roman Forum bodies would be an 
example of architectural restructuring.  This was discussed by some interview 
participants.  
Improved power sharing arising from an improved architecture would create a 
governance space where pro-poor policies and legislation could be developed and 
actioned rather than just existing as guidelines.  It would enable a governance agenda 
which addresses the key issues of food security.  Domination of legitimate grass roots 
movements could also be addressed by increased power sharing.  Then the voices of 
those closest to agriculture, the smallholders and subsistence farmers, could also be 
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included.  This would roll back the private commercial elite who act as illegitimate 
hegemons in the governance system and in the food system.  
Such a change in dynamics could see political legitimacy, currently the least 
recognised symbolic capital in the global food governance field, given more premium.   
If the field’s architecture dynamics, membership and power of the field changed then 
the field itself would also be changed.  Although Bourdieu commented that fields are 
always in flux and changing, this might see a change in the logic of the field so that it 
is more democratic and pro-poor.   There is evidence of some political will to do this 
but the rate of change needs to be increased dramatically, due to the humanitarian 
catastrophe unfolding across the globe exacerbated by predicted further effects of 
climate change on food insecurity.  
Other ways to initiate these changes to the architecture, membership and power 
dynamics are to substantially better fund CSO groups to increase their political capital 
so that their legitimacy is respected within the field.  With IOs reformed along results 
oriented goals rather than discursive outcomes, this would improve the ineffectiveness 
of the field overall and the IOs and CSOs specifically by reducing the silos.  So 
membership of the governance field, which is in an historic gridlock of the given 
status quo, could be revised so that political legitimacy is a valued capital.   The aim 
here would be to enable better governance by shaping the governance space thereby 
allowing this new corporative deliberative approach in GFG to initiate policy 
innovations that address the systemic causes of food security.   
4.   Integration/Consolidation Of Aid And Charitable Organisations.  
  
Another possible remedy arising from the Field Analysis is that aid/charitable 
organisations could consider consolidating, even in a co-operative mode.  Just like the 
proposal for integrating the Roman Forum agencies, the arguments are that it would 
allow economies of scale, avoid duplication of remits and, by coordinating in this 
way, new initiatives and policies could be developed.  This consolidation of Aid 
organisations mirrors the vertical and horizontal TNC mergers which have 
successfully added to their weight in the GFG field.  If correctly designed, it could 
also support CSOs.  If the Roman Forum agencies also integrated this would create a 
more symmetrical field with better power-sharing possible.  Many of the aid 
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organisations such as Action Against Hunger and Christian Aid provide direct food 
aid.  Instead, with aid/charitable organisations integrating, programmes such as 
community and social enterprises, agricultural initiatives or micro finance schemes 
for subsistence or smallholder farmers could be developed and consistently rolled out.  
This supports community development and targets families and the most 
disadvantaged.  These programmes could better and more systematically support 
peasant and gender issues and not only in existing schemes but also in anticipating 
food crisis and food price spirals and building resilience.  Food could flow from areas 
of surplus to areas of deficit all by using local or regionally provided food from 
markets and with local producers and distributors benefitting.  This could maintain 
sustainability and resilience, empowering subsistence farmers.  As the effects of 
climate changes continue to ratchet, this approach, rather than flying over US surplus 
grain to crisis-hit areas, will be increasingly necessary.72    
As seen in the impact on food governance of the Gates Foundation’s size, this 
integration of aid organisations would also benefit not only the functions of the aid 
organisations but the political and economic and legitimacy capital of the 
consolidated aid organisations within the field of global governance.  Rather than 
trying to reconcile competing visions, this could improve the implementation of the 
aid organisations’ aims by dint of their collective economic and political power.  Of 
course as individual organisations their genesis and raison d’être vary but it need not 
be a merger - it could be a co-operative model. For example, the role of faith aid 
organisations in food security is very significant and strong coalitions of faith 
orientated charities would prove effective both in governance negotiations and also on 
the ground.  
                                                
72 This would change the crops grown in countries in the North too but if the expected temperature 
increases due to climate change do occur then the crops grown in regions will change anyway (so 
legumes in the UK rather than continental Europe etc.)   
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5.  Develop Agriculture and Put It At The Centre Of The Initiatives.  
  
Developing community-based agriculture helps empowerment and resilience and is an 
important remedy to identify in its own right.   Regional food programmes are an 
important strand to resolving food insecurity.  The stimulus to communities of such 
initiatives reduces the precarious aspect of subsistence farming and enables food 
sovereignty.  The criticisms of agroecology outlined in Chapter Four, such as the 
impact of the lack of scientific methods on harvest yield, land use and consequently 
on food security are important considerations so agricultural developments should not 
be limited to agroecology but all types of approaches to agriculture considered.  
Each of these remedies mentioned could work towards resolving the causes of food 
security.  For example, the commoditisation of food could be resolved by a newly 
powerful central body which would establish food as a right.  With this right 
established, grain, millet and poultry could be delisted from the commodities 
exchanges.  Of course, this will be difficult to achieve.  This is about negotiation and 
political will. The TNCs will inevitably fight any delisting of food from the 
commodities exchange and ultimately divest such products from their businesses and 
fund portfolios, should delisting be successful.  Yet food trade could still continue as 
it did before since it is the fast capital not the slow capital which drives the 
substantially increasing food prices.    
6.  New Central Body – A ‘World Food Council’?  
  
The lack of a central unitary body for global development was identified in both the 
interviews and the case studies with correlating issues such as the lack of leadership 
in GFG and little grass roots representation.  Overall, TNCs’ and member states’ 
interests dominate GFG and so measures to improve food security will fail when they 
do not coincide with those interests.  The case study results also identified 
expectations that the FAO would take a central role in GFG.   As can be seen from its 
genesis as a UN agency, it has instead evolved to respond to need for food aid or to 
co-ordinate guidelines-producing committees such as the CFS.  
This new institution could be established as a new ‘World Food Council’, perhaps 
arising as a reconstituted FAO.  This would overlap with the IMF’s role but the IMF 
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is coverall rather than specifically for food security.  As well as providing leadership 
the new body could monitor prices, food trade and manage food stocks.73   
This raises the question of how to effect such change. CSOs alone cannot change even 
the CFS not to mention the whole GFG system.  It is unassailable for those marginal 
actors because, as seen in the Field Analysis, the power sits with the ‘Goliaths’.  
Instead a case for change needs to come up through the IOs, perhaps instigated by key 
activists, nation-states or a consolidated consortium of Aid organisations and CSOs.  
The other sectors in the field could agree in support but the reform in the field 
probably needs to start with the IOs, given that the other dominant group, the TNCs 
are unlikely to do so.  The chances of reform happening are small unless there is a 
tipping point to the food security regime - the ‘cataclysmic event’.  Otherwise there 
would need to be a pro-change hegemonic leader of the field to drive through the 
reforms.    
The new central body or governance space could offer the leadership needed to 
change the GFG dynamics.  This alternative to reform of the existing institutions is a 
more radical alternative governance framework, a new governance format in which 
this new body could address some of the governance problems mentioned by the 
interviewees such as; the lack of coherence in the governance of the field and the 
conflicting interventions and fragmentation as well as connect the disconnected CSO.   
Rededicating institutions and establishing this ‘World Food Council’, possibly in the 
space where the FAO or CFS exists, would be effective especially if it was given 
executive power.  Membership could be open to many to create a more diverse, 
democratically pluralistic and inclusive form of GFG. Including Africa and Asia more 
in global food  governance was recognised by some interviewees and in the literatures 
                                                
73 A cautionary note on food stocks is that similar but not identical ground has been covered on food 
stocks before, in Europe at least, with the establishment of the Common Market in 1974 when the 
Common Agricultural Policy (CAP) saw wine lakes and butter mountains as food was stockpiled.   
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as an imperative, given the prognosis for climate change in those areas and also the 
proliferation of food insecurity.    
By establishing a Global Action Plan, the new body could also change policy 
direction such as instigating and overseeing social protection policies and  a global 
fund for social protection (McKeon, 2015). It could seek to achieve nation-state 
agreement and set priorities for the next 10, 20, 30 years and even partner TNCs with 
governance partners to ensure more oversight and establish large food trading houses 
run by agencies.  Establishing an IPCC-style panel for food insecurity is another 
recommended remedy perhaps arising from an expanded  High Level Panel of experts 
(HLPE) (part of the CFS)  and this could be the cornerstone of a wider more inclusive 
panel of experts.    
Such a changed GFG space could better respond and govern the redefined problem of 
food security yet the question is how to give the new body power.  The key question 
remains of who will bring this about?  Who could take the necessary measures to 
establish an effective food security regime including all the points raised in the results 
on this research?  Additionally, if the GFG space could be changed in this way to 
respond to the redefined problem of food insecurity, how could the new body wield 
executive power?  
Comparing this to executive power in other governance regimes, such as with climate 
change, it is recommendations from the International Panel whereas in genocide it is 
prosecutions via the International Criminal Court.  The UN Convention on the  
Prevention of Genocide was instrumental in establishing the crime of genocide.  
Therefore the last recommendation returns to the Food Justice and Food Sovereignty 
discussion from Chapter Two (Bne Saad, 2009).  
7.   Establish the ‘Right to Food’.  
  
As with the Battisti quote opening this chapter, key to underpinning this new unitary 
body are the reformed institutional architecture and the democratically enhanced 
governance space, with an expanded inclusive membership is the ‘Right to Food’  
(McKean also recommends this as a building block of food governance).  This is 
recommended with the codicil that it is not enough to have a Right in itself  but a 
Rights regime around food is necessary as a statement of universality, as with all  
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Human Rights legislation.  Establishing the Right to Food could encompass the Food 
Sovereignty and Food Justice principles and initiate the development of legal and 
legislative frameworks (and legal tests etc.) to protect vulnerable communities and 
disadvantaged groups, for example, dispossessed female subsistence farmers, as well 
as those without citizenship, such as children.  It is possible that, eventually, the Right 
to Food could be used to litigate against malfeasant actors, such as TNCs.  The Right 
to Food is also emancipation or as Sen described it, development as freedom (Sen, 
2011).  But how that Right to Food is established again puts global food governance 
at the centre of the question.  
8.  Policy Recommendations.   
  
A number of  suggestions for policy initiatives arose from the interviews.  Each of 
these could contribute to establishing a food security.   The creation and 
implementation of these policies on a systemic scale would flow from a policy agenda 
created by the reformed global food governance field, with executive power flowing 
from the new World Food Council, legitimated by the democratic global food 
governance field.  International Organisations within the food governance field would 
no longer have neoliberal approaches, instead refocussing on a combined Human 
Security approach and Rights based approach, supporting the Right to Food.  Results 
orientated rather than process-orientated results would be held as a premium and 
performance of the IOs would be appraised by the World Food Council. The Bretton 
Woods Institutions, namely The World Bank and the IMF, if not reformed, could 
continue their Seoul Consensus approach, turning away from neoliberal values, 
funding groups within the GFG and the food secure policies emanating out of it, 
perhaps at country or regional-level.  All conditionality for assistance could be 
removed.  Financial organisations and the US Treasury would be delegitimised from 
the Global Food Governance field by establishing secure political boundaries to the 
field to limit the influence from the International Field of Power (see Figures 1 and 
	  	   249	   
18). The Aid Organisations consortium would continue to contribute to the 
democratic governance of GFG and through its field workers could develop policies 
such as agricultural microfinance schemes.   Civil society Organisations would 
continue to represent their members and, in partnership with the other GFG 
governors, roll out policies which address the concerns of their members.   Therefore 
both the reform and redemocratising of the currently ineffective GFG field and the 
implementation of food security policies could create a stable and effective food 
security regime.     
From the research results in this thesis the following policies were identified as 
potentially significantly contribute to a food secure world.  Firstly, a global fund for 
social protection for the 48 least developed countries could be established, possibly by 
the EU if not the reformed GFG’s ‘World Food Council’.  The fund should be fully 
supported by the new body and policies such as protection of land, fisheries and 
forests should be promoted and operationalised.  Biodiversity policies, access to fair 
markets, trade bans, tariff setting, better food balance sheets and accountability 
mechanisms should be introduced and agribusinesses delegitimised from the 
governance field to enable smallholders’ agriculture come to the fore.     
As discussed there also needs to be transparency polices, regulation and oversight of  
TNCs’ practices (including anti-competition practices), policies on price setting and 
price monitoring, gender-positive policies, pro-poor policies, agricultural policies and 
capacity building policies such as community supported agriculture schemes in urban 
and rural areas.  Increasing capabilities and capacity building measures and policies 
increase families and communities resilience to chronic food insecurity and famine by  
increasing their ‘functionings and ‘entitlements’, to use Sen’s terms (Sen, 1981). 
These policies can be enabled by reducing politico-commercial elites elision and 
increasing the power and funding of civil society groups.  Whereas private-public 
partnerships can undoubtedly be useful in initiatives such as micro-finance and farmer 
empowerment,  social protection objectives should be the gauge to avoid ‘cherry-
picking’ of the more profitable schemes.    
The predicted changes in regional cropping due to climate change should be 
articulated more so that subsistence farmers can be offered training to enable their 
adjustments to the change.  Also on the smallholder level, seed patenting and any 
cartelling , monopolistic or restrictive practices towards farmers could be outlawed.  
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Policies on cause-focussed solutions could be developed in tandem with effects 
focussed policies to address food insecurity on a structural systemic level.   It is 
suggested that the issues in both Table 3 on the food security factors and causes and 
Table 7 on the food governance failures offer a more comprehensive menu of policy 
areas which, as in the example of, say, reducing institutional silos, would improve the 
governance of food security and  contribute to the creation of a sustainable and 
resilient food secure system.     
Conclusion  
  
A thesis on a real-world problem deserves a real-world solution recommendation.  To 
start this process of transformative change, governance and policy changes could be 
presented via the Civil Society Mechanism or the High Level Panel of Experts at the 
next Committee for World Food Security plenary with the objective of influencing the 
CFS Bureau and Advisory Group.   The CFS has a role to play by negotiating action 
orientated guidelines or producing and disseminating a report, it opens up the debate 
to enable other stakeholders to contribute and for member Nation-States to debate.  If 
produced by the CFS as guidelines or a report for governance reform and the creation 
of a more enabling policy environment then the next step would be to win political 
support for the changes from others in the wider governance field and fields of power.   
 
As can be seen from the Field Analysis and interviews, a new body, a ‘World Food 
Council’ could arise from the space occupied by the FAO (and CFS) so in this 
scenario the seeds of change would come from within.  The argument for changing 
the logic of the field is to improve the governance of the field, and the argument needs 
to be made by the very governors who will be transformed.   This demonstrates the 
paradox of the solution to a super-wicked problem, in that the solution is also part of 
the problem.  Without actioning the solution of transformation, however paradoxical, 
then the status quo may continue, a status quo which will likely exacerbate hunger. If 
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this is the case, then continuing this status quo is not the best option to take.  
Transformation and reform of the GFG field is the better measure.  The democratic 
deficit and domination by private actors makes transformation more difficult yet 
better outcomes are possible and of universal benefit, ultimately.    
Lastly, there are number of methodological recommendations. The benefits of Field 
Analysis are that it allows a measurement and description of a governance space 
which facilitates the definition of a global governance problem.  The limitations of 
Field Analysis, as discussed, are that Field Analysis is neither a model nor a quasi-
positivist ‘experiment’, in that there are not independent or dependent variables.  
There are also elements of value judgments and estimation evident.  Yet it also 
revealed unknowns such as the role and position of the Gates Foundation, the 
domination of TNCs or the disproportionately small space given to CSO in the GFG 
field. Or that CSOs may not hold the most political legitimacy according to the 
nomos, or ‘rules of the game’.  So it is important to once again highlight that the 
global governance field as set out on the Field Analysis is one representation of the 
field from an adaptation of Bourdieu’s method.    
The recommendations for the individual methods are firstly to remove double 
counting of economic capital but also to appreciate that Field Analysis is, like a 
sketch, one interpretation of a real world governance configuration.  The observation 
on the case studies is that they are very useful supplementary methods to Field 
Analysis since they lend real-world examples of practices but again they can be 
subject to researcher bias and as much a construction as the Field Analysis.  These 
mini-versions of case studies suffer for their brevity yet are useful nonetheless in that 
had they been omitted, the research results would not have had the same real-world 
focus at organisational level.    
  
The interview method brings the topic to life and corroborates some points gleaned 
from the literature.  Since they offer attitudinal data then many varied perspectives 
and viewpoints are obtained so it also lets in the unknown or the unseen, more so than 
the case studies which involves self-selecting information.   On this occasion the 
range of respondents was constrained by the social capital (and economic capital) of 
the researcher, in that getting key actors at key organisations was difficult by cold 
calling.  Where participants are reluctant to get involved, as was the case here, then 
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social capital would have been helpful.   Also where possible face-to-face interviews 
would have been preferable.    
The discourses and literatures between academics and policymakers can be 
synthesised and although there is a cost to this - in that the thesis is less theoretical 
than originally envisaged - there is also a benefit in that it hopefully provides a 
stepping stone for future researchers and also proves that it is a possible format for 
other governance areas such as land grabs, climate change, genocide etc. The grey 
literatures offer useful case studies and the white literatures allow for critical thinking. 
A thesis only by literature review would not have contained the examples and the 
combination provides the springboard into analysis.  
There are a number of other lessons here.  Firstly, that another world is possible.  That 
governance structures and formats are formed by their own habitus and exist due to 
the overall historical and ideological trajectories and contexts rather than their fit to 
purpose.   But fields have logics and identifying what effective food governance 
would look like is key to making recommendations for that ‘good’ governance.  
Secondly, the importance of laying out the methods, findings and recommendations of 
this research for future research.  On-going research investigation is really a chain and 
this thesis a link in that chain so clarity is as an important part of research as 
consistency or reflexive practice.  Also the contested space that is a field works well  
for the global governance and applying ‘the field’ to other global governance issues 
would be similarly beneficial.  
Lastly, a lesson on the value of academic research in reimagining the future is also 
apparent.  Within the timespan of this research, the food security situation worsened.  
A similar situation with the privatisation of water is developing. As well as increasing 
the impetus, this sharpened the understanding that democracy needs to be practice 
rather than rhetoric, that changes which improve democracy need to be identified and 
worked towards.  Otherwise chronic hunger persists, opportunities for change are 
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squandered and food will continue to be apportioned politically.  Another future is 
desperately needed because as each day passes, 18,000 children die of starvation. 
Also, without food justice, as with social justice, there can be no peace for any part of 
the world.  This recast problem describes the ‘new face of hunger’ identified in my 
original newspaper article in 2008.  It has become apparent that there is no solution in 
hand because global food governance has failed and largely continues to fail.  
However, research investigation can suggest a reimagining of alternative future 
scenarios and, in proposing possible solutions to the ineffective global governance of 
food security, illustrate that a better world is possible.  The next step is to secure the 
political will for International Organisations and perhaps a coalition of stakeholders in 
food security to take leadership and transform the global food governance field, to 
create the effective food security governance so desperately and urgently needed.  
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Appendix 1  
Sunday Herald Newspaper (www.heraldscotland.com)  
2008: The Year Of Global Food Crisis  
8 March 2008   
Special report By Kate Smith   
It is the new face of hunger.  
A perfect storm of food scarcity, global warming, rocketing oil prices and the world population 
explosion is plunging humanity into the biggest crisis of the 21st century by pushing up food prices 
and spreading hunger and poverty from rural areas into cities.   
Millions more of the world's most vulnerable people are facing starvation as food shortages loom and 
crop prices spiral ever upwards.   
And for the first time in history, say experts, the impact is spreading from the developing to the 
developed world.   
More than 73 million people in 78 countries that depend on food hand-outs from the United Nations 
World Food Programme (WFP) are facing reduced rations this year. The increasing scarcity of food is 
the biggest crisis looming for the world'', according to WFP officials.   
At the same time, the UN Food and Agriculture Organisation has warned that rising prices have 
triggered a food crisis in 36 countries, all of which will need extra help. The threat of malnutrition is 
the world's forgotten problem'', says the World Bank as it demands urgent action.   
The bank points out that global food prices have risen by 75% since 2000, while wheat prices have 
increased by 200%. The cost of other staples such as rice and soya bean have also hit record highs, 
while corn is at its most expensive in 12 years.   
The increasing cost of grains is also pushing up the price of meat, poultry, eggs and dairy products. 
And there is every likelihood prices will continue their relentless rise, according to expert predictions 
by the UN and developed countries.   
High prices have already prompted a string of food protests around the world, with tortilla riots in  
Mexico, disputes over food rationing in West Bengal and protests over grain prices in Senegal, 
Mauritania and other parts of Africa. In Yemen, children have marched to highlight their hunger, while 
in London last week hundreds of pig farmers protested outside Downing Street.   
If prices keep rising, more and more people around the globe will be unable to afford the food they 
need to stay alive, and without help they will become desperate. More food riots will flare up, 
governments will totter and millions could die.   
Food scarcity means a big increase in the number of people going hungry,'' says the WFP's Greg  
Barrow. Without doubt, we are passing through a difficult period for the world's hungry poor.'' The  
WFP estimates it needs an additional $500 million to keep feeding the 73 million people in Africa, 
Asia and central America who require its help. We need extra money by the middle of 2008 so we 
don't have to reduce rations,'' says Barrow.   
He also points out that age-old patterns of famine are changing. "We are feeding communities of 
people we didn't expect to feed," he explains.   
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As well as being rural, the profile of the new hungry poor is also urban, which is new. There is food 
available in the markets and shops - it's just that these people can't afford to buy it. This is the new face 
of hunger.'' The food shortages will also affect western industrialised nations such as Scotland, Barrow 
says. Scarcity means that some foods will get very expensive, or disappear from supermarkets 
altogether, meaning a move to seasonal, indigenous vegetables.'' Of the 36 countries named last month 
as currently facing a food crisis, 21 are in Africa. Lesotho and Swaziland have been afflicted by 
droughts, Sierra Leone lacks widespread access to food markets because of low incomes and high 
prices, and Ghana, Kenya and Chad among others are enduring "severe localised food insecurity".   
In India last year, more than 25,000 farmers took their own lives, driven to despair by grain shortages 
and farming debts. "The spectre of food grain imports stares India in the face as agricultural growth 
plunges to an all-time low," warns India Today magazine.   
The World Bank predicts global demand for food will double by 2030. This is partly because the 
world's population is expected to grow by three billion by 2050, but that is only one of many 
interlocking causes.   
The rise in global temperatures caused by pollution is also beginning to disrupt food production in 
many countries. According to the UN, an area of fertile soil the size of Ukraine is lost every year 
because of drought, deforestation and climate instability.   
Last year Australia experienced its worst drought for over a century, and saw its wheat crop shrink by 
60%. China's grain harvest has also fallen by 10% over the past seven years.   
The UN Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change has predicted that, over the next 100 years, a one 
metre rise in sea levels would flood almost a third of the world's crop-growing land.   
A recent analysis by the Conservative Party leader, David Cameron, also pinned blame for the global 
food crunch'' on the accelerating demand for allegedly green biofuels and the world's growing 
appetite for meat.   
Meat is a very inefficient way of utilising land to produce food, delivering far fewer calories, acre for 
acre, than grain. But the amount of meat eaten by the average Chinese consumer has increased from 20 
kilograms a year in 1985 to over 50 kilograms today. The demand for meat from across all developing 
countries has doubled since 1980.   
The world's grain stocks are at their lowest for 30 years, Cameron warns. "Some analysts are beginning 
to make some very worrying, very stark predictions. And these analysts say politicians should start to 
rank the issue of food security alongside energy security and even national security."   
Another key driver is the soaring cost of oil, which last week topped $105 a barrel for the first time. As 
well as increasing transport costs, oil makes crop fertilisers more expensive.   
According to the World Bank, fertiliser prices have risen 150% in the past five years. This has had a 
major impact on food prices, as the cost of fertiliser contributes over a quarter of the overall cost of 
grain production in the US, which is responsible for 40% of world grain exports.   
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Tackling hunger has become a "forgotten" UN millennium development goal, says the bank's 
president, Robert Zoellick.   
But increased food prices and their threat - not only to people but also to political stability - have made 
it a matter of urgency," he says.   
Scottish farmers warn that food security is becoming an issue for the first time since the second world 
war. This is a perfect storm and the effects are being felt right now," says James Withers, the acting 
chief executive of the National Farmers' Union in Scotland.   
"At the same time as demand for food increases, the amount of land we have available to grow food on 
is reducing," he adds. "An area twice the size of Scotland's entire agricultural area has been swallowed 
up by Chinese towns and cities in the last 10 years.'' John Scott, a Scottish Conservative MSP who 
farms in Ayrshire, goes further. "It's almost biblical," he says. "With all the wine lakes and butter 
mountains, we've had our 20 years of plenty since 1986.'' The prospect of global food shortages is now 
Malthusian, he suggests. One response from the UK and Scotland should be to grow more of our own 
food, and to try to reverse the decline in self-sufficiency from 75% in 1986 to 60% now.   
It is possible for the UK, and the world, to feed itself, argues Robin Maynard from the Soil  
Association, but it will require big changes. He invokes the wartime spirit that saw gardens turned into 
allotments, and 50 mixed farms feeding Britain.   
This is a wake-up call,'' he says. The choices we make now will determine whether we can feed 
ourselves in the future. If we get it right we can have a thriving food economy.'' Richard Lochhead, the 
Scottish government's environment secretary, has launched a public discussion to develop Scotland's 
first food policy. "I am conscious our generation has not experienced food shortages, but we should 
never take food for granted," he says.   
"That is why the Scottish government will never allow food security to fall off the national agenda. We 
recognise the vital role of our primary producers in ensuring the long-term capacity and capability of 
our food supply." Why are we growing food to feed cars instead of people?   
The global drive for a new green fuel to power cars, lorries and planes is worsening world food 
shortages and threatening to make billions go hungry. Biofuels, enthusiastically backed by the US, UK 
and other European governments, have been sold as the solution to global warming. Making fuels from 
growing crops has been marketed as the way to cut climate pollution while continuing to drive.   
But now experts are warning that this could all be a disastrous mistake. Converting large amounts of 
land to crops for biofuels is reducing food production just when the world needs to increase it.   
Last year a quarter of the US maize crop was turned into ethanol to fuel vehicles - and the US supplies 
more than 60% of the world's maize exports. According to the World Bank, this is putting pressure on 
countries' precarious food supplies.   
"The biofuels surge makes things worse by adding high demand on top of already high prices and low 
stocks," said one of the bank's leading economists, Don Mitchell. "Ethanol and biodiesel produced in 
the US and European Union don't appear to be delivering on green promises either, making them very 
controversial."   
There are plans by more than 20 countries to boost production of biofuels over the next decade. The 
US is talking about trebling maize production for ethanol, while the European Union is aiming to make 
biofuels 10% of all transport fuels by 2020.   
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The dash for biofuels came under fire last week from the UK government's newly appointed chief 
scientific adviser, Professor John Beddington. In a speech in London on Thursday, he said that world 
food prices had already suffered a "major shock" as a result.   
Biofuels were often unsustainable, he argued. "It's very hard to imagine how we can see the world 
growing enough crops to produce renewable energy and at the same time meet the enormous demand 
for food."   
Some of the proposed biofuels schemes were "hopeless", warned Beddington, formerly professor of 
applied population biology at Imperial College, London. "The idea that you cut down rainforest to 
actually grow biofuels seems profoundly stupid."   
The Conservative Party leader, David Cameron, has also weighed into the attack on biofuels. "They are 
not a panacea," he told the National Farmers' Union last month. "Unless they are truly sustainable, they 
may well harm the environment more than protect it."   
Like environmentalists and organic food experts, Cameron latched on to one of the most telling 
statistics highlighting the competition between food and fuel. "You could feed a person for a whole 
year from the grain that produces just one tank of fuel for a sports utility vehicle (SUV)," he said.   
The same figure was used by Robin Maynard, from the Soil Association, which certifies organic food. 
"The US currently grows one-sixth of its grain harvest for cars, which is madness," he told the Sunday 
Herald.   
"It is perfectly possible for the world to feed itself, but it depends on how we are growing food. If we 
continue to grow crops to feed cars rather than people, we're in trouble."   
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Appendix 2:  Barriers To Gender-Equal Food Security.  
   
Barriers to  
Gendered Food 
Security  
Details  Global Governance 
policy solution 
possible?  
Microeconomic  
factors   
Family size, household obligations, access to wage 
labour, share in family and community decision-
making, social constrictions on land use, productivity 
and intake.  
Yes  
Macroeconomic  
factors  
Such as the emergence of neo-liberal capitalist policies 
imposed through the Washington Consensus which 
include Structural Adjustment Programs, austerity 
measures, and an emphasis on expanding export-
oriented trade at the expense of small-scale producers 
and rural development.  
Yes   
Land Law and 
inheritance  
Temporary or illegal use of land only, restrictions on 
females owning, inheriting or earning from land, 
cultural restrictions on single/married women owning 
land. Increasing privatisation ends communal lands.   
Patrilineal inheritance laws and cultures.  
Yes (land 
redistribution 
programmes) and 
No (inheritance law 
reform)  
Unpaid 
work/division of 
labour/time 
constraints  
Burden of unpaid labour: rural areas, the use of 
women’s time in agriculture is often constrained by 
obligations such as fetching water and wood, preparing 
meals for their families, cleaning, and tending to 
children and livestock.  Load bearing work too.  
Yes  
Crop Types & 
feminisation of  
Labour  
relegated to the production of subsistence crops on 
marginal land. In comparison, men tend to produce 
cash crops on land nearer to the home or marketplace 
for ease of access. The distance between a woman’s 
home, crops, and the nearest marketplace can pose 
logistical problems in transportation, and create another 
type of time constraint.  
Yes  
Access to ‘external 
world’: credit, 
technology, 
education,  markets, 
and government 
services  
  Yes  
  
 Source: Compiled from WFB, FAO, IFAD, 2009.  
Appendix 3   List Of Organisations Researched For Inclusion Into Field Analysis  
  
Organisation Name  
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1.   2020 Vision Initiative  
2.   ACF International  
3.   Action Against Hunger International *  
4.   Act Alliance  
5.   ADM  
6.   Afrique Verte  
7.   Alliance For A Green Revolution In Africa  
8.   ASEAN Food Security Information  
9.   Bayer  
10.  Bill And Melinda Gates Foundation *  
11.  Bunge  
12.  CARE  
13.  Cargill *  
14.  CARITAS International  
15.  Carrefour  
16.  Catholic Relief Services (CRS)  
17.  Commission On Human Security  
18.  Committee On World Food Security (CFS)  
19.  Community Food Security Coalition  
20.  Consultative Group on International Agricultural Research (CGIAR) *  
21.  DEFRA  
22.  DFID  
23.  Emergency Nutrition Network  
24.  ETC Group  
25.  Europe Aid  
26.  Famine Early Warning Systems Network  
27.  FIAN*  
28.  FDA  
29.  Food Aid Convention  
30.  Food And Agricultural Organisation (FAO) *  
31.  Food Ethics Council  
32.  Food First  
33.  Food For The Hungry International  
34.  Forum For Food Security  
35.  GAO  
36.  Genetic Resources Action International  
37.  Global Agriculture And Food Security Program 
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38.  Global Crop Diversity Trust  
39.  Global Food Safety Initiative  
40.  Global Partnerships For Good Agricultural Practices  
41.  GRAIN *  
42.  Grocery Manufacturers Association 43.  Help Stop Hunger  
44.   Hunger Plus Inc.  
45.   Institute For Agriculture And Trade Policy  
46.   InterAction  
47.   International  Monetary Fund (IMF)  
48.   International Alliance Against Hunger  
49.   International Assessment Of Agricultural Knowledge, Science And 
Technology For Development  
50.   International Centre For Trade And Sustainable Development  
51.   International Federation Of Agricultural Movements  
52.   International Food Policy Research Institute  
53.   International Food Standards  
54.   International Fund For Agricultural Development *  
55.   International Grains Council  
56.   International Labour Organisation  
57.   International Planning Committee  
58.   International Rice Research Institute  
59.   IOM  
60.   IPCC  
61.   Kraft Foods  
62.   La Via Campesina *  
63.   Local Food Plus  
64.   Louis Dreyfus  
65.   Lutheran World Federation  
66.   Making Markets Work Better For The Poor  
67.   Mennonite Central Committee  
68.   Mercy Corps  
69.   Metro  
70.   Monsanto *  
71.   Mosaic  
72.   NASS  
73.   National Association Of Wheat Growers  
74.   Nestle  
75.   North American Miller's Association  
76.   NRC  
77.   Overseas Development Institute  
78.   Oxfam International *  
79.   PepsiCo  
80.   Potash *  
81.   Relief International  
82.   Rockefeller Foundation  
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83.   Syngenta *  
84.   Tesco  
85.   The Global Partnership Of Agriculture And Food Security  
86.   The Hunger Project UK  
87.   Third World Network  
88.   Urgenci *  
89.   UN Conference On Trade And Development  
90.   UN Development Programme  
91.   UN High Level Task Force On Food Security  
92.   UNEP  
93.   UNFPA  
94.   UNICEF  
95.   Unilever  
96.   United States Department Of Agriculture  
97.   United States Public Interest Research Group  
98.   Wal-Mart  
99.   WCED  
100.   West African Rice Development Association  
101.   World Bank  
102.   World Food Programme (WFP) *  
103.   World Health Organisation  
104.   World Trade Organisation  
105.   World Vision * 106.    Yara  
  
*  = included in Field Analysis   
  
Additionally, a  list of the participants of the most recent session of the World Committee on 
Food Security (the 41st session) is available from here: 
http://www.fao.org/bodies/cfs/cfs41/en/  
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Appendix 4: Supplementary Tables  
  
Table A:  Symbolic Capital Table For Criteria And Measures Of Political Capital  
Criteria (resource)  Measure  
High Lobbying Expenditure? 
(economic capital)  
in excess of $5million p.a.=+1/less than 
£1million=1  
Good Political Access (social  
capital)                                      
to be determined by research into activities low 
=1/high =+1   
Role in Governance (cultural  
capital)                                      
to be determined by committee participation. Little 
or none = -1/high =+1  
Agenda-setting capability 
(symbolic capital).  
to be determined by forum-shifting power. Little or 
None =-1/High =+1  
Contribution to legislative 
outputs (institutional capital).  
to be determined by committee activity. Low 
activity and no voting rights=-1/high and voting 
rights=+1  
Moral capital  to be determined by raison d’être  and praxis 
low=1/high=+1  
Economic capital                 under $25 million p.a.=+1/$25-$50million 
p.a.=0/over $50million income p.a.=-1  
  
Table B:   Symbolic Capital Table For Criteria And Measures Of Political Legitimacy  
Criteria (resource)             Measure  
Raison d’être                       public interest=+1/ self-interested=-1  
Inclusivity                           representative=+1/non-representative=-1  
Transparency                       open governance=+1/closed=-1  
Public Facing  
Accountability                     
accountable for practices=+1/not=-1       
Subject to Regulation          Complies with legal and statutory oversight=+1=complete/0=not 
proven/not=-1  
Ethical Practices                  good=+1, neutral=0, bad =-1 (as reported)  
Economic capital   under $25 million p.a.=+1/$25-$50million p.a.=0  
/over $50million income p.a.=-1  
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Notes on Tables A and B:  Constructing the Symbolic Capital Criteria  
Table A is constructed from the criteria for political capital, constructed from criteria looking 
at legislative outputs, lobbying expenditure, committee membership etc. The second variables, 
Table B is for democratic legitimacy looking at transparency, representativeness etc.  These 
criteria are drawn from literature on democratic legitimacy (Keohane, 2011; Brassett & 
Tsingou, 2011) and political capital (Casey, 2008; Lopez, 2002).   
(Explanatory research notes on Tables 6 and 7:  Constructing the Symbolic Capital Criteria)  
The  criteria, drawn from the constituent elements of the definitions, are attributed to the GFG 
actors in the variables table (see Tables 9 and 10) and are awarded on a 3 point scale of -1 to 
+1, including 0.  The award is made on the basis of a set of measures.  The criteria and 
measures are set out in Tables 6 and 7.  As can be seen each measure is derived from aspects of 
the criteria.  So, for example, one variable of political capital is discursive power.  Discursive 
power can be gauged by criteria of lobbying expenditure, participation in key committees etc.  
The number of criteria met determines the award (-1 to +1, with -1 least and +1 highest) of the 
criteria.   
The Symbolic Capital  
Political capital, as the first type of symbolic capital proposed for this Field Analysis, is not 
oppositional to economic capital, indeed political capital is a transubstantiated form of 
economic capital.  Political capital is also the sacred principle of the global governance field in 
that  political power enables agenda-setting, the power to maintain the status quo, admit actors 
or effect change and also to determine the logic of the field. It enables structural, instrumental 
or discursive power. In a Bourdieusian formula, political capital is the sum of economic 
capital and the constituent elements of political capital.  
The second Field Analysis uses political (democratic) legitimacy as its symbolical capital.  
This is the sum of economic capital plus the constituent elements of political legitimacy.  This 
Bourdieusian way slightly contradicts the typical definition of legitimacy, which is sans 
economic capital and so this is a critique of Bourdieu’s definition of symbolic capital.  After 
all, it is possible to be politically legitimate without economic capital.  Again, legitimacy is 
placed on the X-axis, juxtaposed with economic capital on the Y-axis.  It is useful to examine 
democratic legitimacy in global governance because it offers a measurement of how 
democratic/representative the field is.  If it is not democratic then other organising power 
structures such as plutocratic or oligarchical may exist or dominate.  This provides the 
possibility of comparing the amount of political capital in the first Field Analysis with 
political legitimacy in the second.  These criteria of political power and scales of democratic 
power were constructed to evince the variables tables (see Tables 6 and 7).  
 Measuring the Symbolic Capital’s Criteria  
  
“A better global governance system necessarily requires respect for an inclusive, legitimate 
and democratic political process” (McKeon, 2011:13) 74.  Each resource, (criterion) in the 
variables table has a measure which enables a scalar value to be attributed. So the political 
                                                
74 This reflects the debate about the relationship between legitimacy and inclusiveness: that the worth 
of inclusiveness as a basis of legitimacy is perhaps of more importance to global governance because of 
the weakness of the institutional basis for legitimacy and its normative basis (see Scharpf, 2003, Risse, 
2004 and Mayntz, 2010).  
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capital variables table has high lobbying expenditure as a representation of economic capital 
and the measure for this is expenditure in excess of $5 million per annum receives a value of 
+1, between $1-5 million = 0 and less than $1 million= -1.   The value of these measures were 
applied in such a way as to ascribe a meaningful differentiation amongst the organisations. 
The data for each of these measures was obtained through financial reports, websites such the 
transparency index as well as extensive searches through the grey literature.  The second 
criterion of the political capital table is good political access (social capital), and again the 
scalar value of -1 to +1 determined by desk research as are the criteria of role in governance 
(cultural capital), agenda-setting capability (symbolic capital), and contribution to legislative 
outputs (institutional capital).  The last criteria of the political capital table, economic capital, 
is decided by measures of annual income under $25 million p.a. =-1, $25-$50 million p.a.=0 
and over $50 million p.a.=+1.  The variables were taken as the most important aspects of 
power and legitimacy of Global governance.  
The political legitimacy criteria table follows suit with a raison d'être criterion (public interest 
= +1 not proven = 0, self-interested = -1).  Again the measure was decided by publications 
from the organisations plus a number of source including grey literature  or information in the 
public domain. The inclusivity criterion has representative = +1 and nonrepresentative = -1. 
Transparency has a measure of open governance = +1 and closed governance = -1, public 
facing accountability has measure of accountable for practices = +1 and not = -1.   ‘Subject to 
regulation’ has a measure of a democratic structure or not, ethical practices has a value 
ascribed to the measure as good = +1, not proven or neutral = 0 and poor = -1 and economic 
capital, as with the political capital table has measures of annual income under $25million 
p.a. = -1, $25-$50 million p.a. = 0 and over $50 million p.a. = +1.    
There were a number of challenges in executing this approach (including the use of ‘shill’ 
consultants as members of committees such as the Committee of Food Security) but further 
research into the identification of the client-base of the consultants was sometimes required.  
The measures were consistently applied to each of the top four organisations from each of the 
four sectors to ensure consistency of the criteria. These criteria form the data for the symbolic 
capital X-axis in the Field Analyses.  As discussed, the Y-axis, economic capital is 
constructed from financial data – the income in USD for 2012.  This scalar value is 
juxtaposed against economic capital to provide the first Field Analysis which shows the 
position of these 16 organisations in the juxtaposition between Economic Capital and Political 
Capital in the GFG Field.  This is then repeated for the second Field Analysis, that of political 
legitimacy.   
Symbolic Capital Table 9: Criteria and Measures of Political Capital  
  
Similarly, the criteria for the ‘democratic legitimacy’ or ‘moral capital’ Field Analysis were 
drawn from the Global Governance literature.  Where McKeon cites transparency, inclusivity, 
accountability, representativeness and Clapp and Fuchs cite subject to regulation and 
Practices.  These also correspond to Keohane’s six standard criteria for the legitimacy of 
Global governance (2011)75, plus economic capital.   
                                                
75 Keohane defines these criteria for legitimacy within liberal democratic principles as: 1. Minimal moral 
acceptability (government institutions should not persistently commit serious injustices). 2. 
Inclusiveness  3. Epistemic quality (consisting of two qualities: institutional integrity and transparency) 
4.  Accountability and 5. Compatibility with democratic governance within countries. Multilateral 
institutions can sometimes do the opposite by a) promoting special interests b) violating the rights of 
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Symbolic Capital Table 10: Criteria and Measures of Political Legitimacy  
This is drawn from literature on democratic legitimacy.  As with political capital, the 
measures of these criteria were applied to the top four organisations from each sector to give a 
scalar value.  This gives the results for the second Field Analysis on the relationship between 
economic capital and political legitimacy in the GFG Field.  A comparison of the two Field 
Analyses of political capital and global governance Legitimacy provides an interesting tool 
for thinking about global governance not only as a contested arena of many competing actors 
but also as a realm for effective governance, policy-making, problem-solving etc.  The 
comparison between high political capital and legitimacy is examined in the results section, 
which details  which organisations have both, which have neither and which have only one 
form.  Consideration is given to questions such as are they mutually exclusive terms  and 
what can be done to ensure that organisations with high legitimacy (and a raison d’être  of low 
self-interest) can also increase political capital to ensure more effective governance over food 
security.    
Attributing the Criteria and Measures  
Firstly, data on both the legitimacy and political capital of actors in the public domain was 
sourced from primary sources, where possible.  No data source was taken at face value so 
there was cross checking and fact checking as well as examining methodologies of indices 
e.g. as with the Transparency Index.  This data was patchy so a further measure was 
undertaken to standardise and underpin the data set: twenty-one major actors in the GFG Field 
were contacted to request further data on legislative outputs, lobbying expenditure, committee 
membership and political roles in GFG.  Lastly, where this request was declined, the data was 
sought from secondary sources such as trade publications and meeting reports.    
Political access was determined from the ‘revolving door’ of personnel so databases such as 
Lexus Nexus were accessed to view the previous appointments and other positions held by 
the board/head personnel of these organisations.  
Measuring the Criteria  
Each of these criteria of the two alternative symbolic capital sets (political legitimacy and 
political capital) could then be ascribed a value from a three point scale of -1 to +1 (see 
Tables 6 and 7).    This scalar value is awarded on the basis on the measure to which the 
component is demonstrated by meeting/not meeting the criteria of each variable.  Of 
course there are risks of only subjective measuring but reflexivity in the researcher raises 
awareness of this possibility - there is however, still some subjectivity in measuring these 
criteria.  The ‘top’ organisation in each sector  was decided on by the most recent annual 
income available (2012), the top four of each sector being selected. In the first dry 
run/pilot of this Field Analysis it was clear from clustering in the field that the data for 
the two types of symbolic capital was too thin and so the data was augmented by data 
requests and further investigation in the interests in obtaining thicker, richer data.76  In its 
                                                                                                                                                
minorities c) diminishing the quality of collective deliberation. With ‘perverse effects’ such as these, 
multilateral institutions may be categorised as ‘illegitimate’ (Keohane, 2011). (ibid).  
76 An aside on obtaining the data was that it became clear that the participant observation and other 
ethnographic research which Bourdieu’s team of researchers carried out would have been necessary 
then to achieve the results for the symbolic capital in the non-digital twenty years from the 1960’s 
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entirety this research approach and process enables the symbolic capital tables for the 
two x-axes to be completed to a degree which is both methodologically viable and 
objectively vigorous enough to provide at least a measure of the economic and political 
legitimacy and power of the GFG field.  
  
     
                                                                                                                                                
onwards but interesting to reflect if Bourdieu had access to data through digital sources such as on-line 
databases and statutory instruments available for this research, if he would have needed his research 
team?    
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Appendix 5:  The Economic Capital Of The Global Good Governance Major  
Actors (With Notes)  
  
Organisation  Net 
Worth  
Annual 
Income  
No of  
Staff  
Type of 
business  
Regulation 
mode  
Public/private  Lobby 
expend 
(2012)  
FAO  
  
n/a  $2.4b  3,570  UN food 
agency (IO)  
Open  public  n/a  
CGIAR  
  
n/a  $887m  8,322  Ad-hoc  
International 
organisation  
(IO)  
Open  Public  n/a  
IFAD  
  
$1.06b  
PWB  
$144.14m  600  UN food 
agency (IO)  
Open  Public  n/a  
WFP  n/a  $3.7b  12,000  UN -Food 
agency (IO)  
Open  Public  n/a  
Bill and  
Melinda  
Gates  
Foundation  
$37b  $36b  n/a  Pro-food 
security 
Private  
Foundation  
(aid)  (PF)  
Open  private  n/a  
Oxfam  
International  
n/a  $1.26bn*  n/a  Charitable 
organisation 
(NGO)  
Open  Private – 
charity status  
n/a  
Action  
Against  
Hunger Int’l  
n/a  $63.586m  n/a  Charitable 
organisation 
(NGO)  
Open  Private – 
charity status  
n/a  
World 
Vision  
n/a  $1.019b  n/a  Charitable 
organisation 
(NGO)  
Open  Private – 
charity status  
n/a  
ADM  $28.9b  $1.24b  30,000  Food  
Merchant  
(TNC)  
Closed  Private  n/a  
Bunge  $17.6b  $430m  32,000  Food  
Merchant  
(TNC)  
Closed  Private  $1m  
Cargill  $21.8b  $1.28b  142,000  Food  
Merchant  
(TNC)  
Closed  Private  $1.2m  
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Syngenta  
  
$38b  $1.7b  27,000  Biotech 
(TNC)  
Closed  Private  $1.1m  
Monsanto  
  
$54b  $2.5b  20,000  Biotech 
(TNC)  
Closed  Private  $6m  
Bayer  
  
$76.3b  $2.57b  111,000  Biotech 
(TNC)  
Closed  Private  $6m  
Potash  
  
$39.5b  $2.14b  5,700  Fertiliser  
(TNC)  
Closed  Private  $20k  
Mosaic  
  
$23.5b  $1.9b  8,000  Fertiliser  
(TNC)  
Closed  Private  $800k  
Yara  
  
$11.7b  $1.7b  7,348  Fertiliser  
(TNC)  
Closed  Private  $150k  
La Via  
Campesina  
n/a  $2m§  10  Civil  
Society Org 
(CSO)/ 
network  
Closed  private  n/a  
FIAN  n/a  $1.96m*  50  Civil  
Society Org/ 
network  
Open  public  n/a  
GRAIN  n/a  $0.794m  n/a  Civil society 
Org/network  
Open  public  n/a  
Urgenci  n/a  $0.166m*  8  Civil  
Society Org/ 
network  
Open  public  n/a  
Catholic  
Relief  
Services  
(CRS)  
n/a  $699m  n/a  Faith-based 
organisation  
Open  public  n/a  
Act Alliance  n/a  $38.41m  25000  Faith-based 
organisation  
Open  public  n/a  
  
Table 8: The Economic Capital of the Global Food Governance major actors. Net Worth is based on 
Enterprise Value (EV) rather than Market Capitalisation as EV represents the entire cost of a business, 
including debt and equity.  Annual income is based on Net Income of private companies. All above 
figures as of June  2013 from company and NGO annual reports and figures supplied and listed on New 
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York Stock Exchange, NASDAQ and S&P Capital IQ  (McGraw Hill).  Some lobbying expenditure 
estimates for other years is available and may be used in the Field Analysis.*= converted from euros at 
historical exchange rate as at 2/4/2012 of 1.32 Euros to $. §= estimated income due to non-disclosure.  n/a 
= not available. This is rated up from income for LVC UK is £10,000 x 73 countries in network =$1.167m 
at 2/4/2012 conversion rates (1.5989).  Plus estimated secretariat running costs = (approx.) $2million, in 
line with similarly-sized FIAN. N.B. This table does not include Financial Organisations or Nation-States, 
both of whom are involved in GFG in a tangential/indirect way.   
(Explanatory Research Notes  on Table 8)  
Selection   
In Table 8 the economic capital was gathered for 23 organisations from which the final 16 
were selected for inclusion in the Field Analysis.  This was drawn from the long list of 107 
organisations (Figure 10).   This comprises four organisations for each of the four sectors of 
GFG.  The selection criteria were the top four by income in each sector and the biggest of 
each sector have also been selected as a case study in chapter four including  (World Food 
Program, Gates Foundation, La Via Campesina). Although not the largest, Cargill has been 
selected on the basis of access - that it was the only TNC to give an interview for this 
research.  Otherwise Monsanto would have been the case study.  
The International Organisations included in the Field Analysis are (in descending order of 
annual income) World Food Program ($3.7b), Food and Agricultural Organisation (FAO) 
$2.4b), International Fund for Agriculture (IFAD) ($144m) and CGIAR (formerly the 
Consultative Group for International Agricultural Research) ($887m). For the Charitable/Aid 
sector, the Gates Foundation was included, (although not of charitable status their impact on 
the field is new, significant, and deserves analysis). Their annual income is $36b. The other 
Aid organisations in descending order of annual income are Oxfam International ($1.26b), 
World Vision ($1.01b) and Action Against Hunger (63m).  For the TNC sector, one from 
each of the sub-sectors of Seeds (Monsanto), Food Merchant (Cargill), Syngenta (biotech) 
and fertiliser (Potash) to represent the spread of the TNC sector.  In descending order of 2012 
annual income they are; Monsanto ($2.5b), Potash ($2.14b), Syngenta ($1.7b) and Cargill 
($1.28b).  The Civil society Organisations included are La Via Campesina ($2m (est.)), FIAN 
($1.96m), GRAIN ($0.794m)  and Urgenci ($0.166m). The two faith-based organisations, 
although charitable were not included in the selection for Field Analysis because although 
they are significant players in food aid, their raison d’être  is propagation of faith in addition 
to food aid.   
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Appendix 6  Variables Tables For Political Capital  
  
Criteria/organisation  High  
Lobbying  
Expenditure  
Good  
Political  
Access  
Role in  
Governance  
Agenda- 
setting 
capability   
Contribution 
to legislative 
outputs  
Moral 
Capital  
Economic  
Capital  
Total 
Score  
WFP  0  1  1  1  1  1  1  6  
FAO  0  1  1  1  1  1  1  6  
IFAD  0  1  1  1  1  1  1  6  
CGIAR  0  1  1  1  1  1  1  6  
Gates  
Foundation  
0  1  1  1  1  1  1  6  
Oxfam  
International  
0  1  1  1  1  1  1  6  
World Vision  0  0  1  1  1  1  1  5  
Action Against  
Hunger Int’l  
-1  0  0  1  0  1  0  1  
Monsanto  1  1  1  1  1  -1  1  5  
Cargill  1  1  1  1  1  -1  1  5  
Syngenta  1  1  1  1  1  -1  1  5  
Potash  1  1  1  1  1  -1  1  5  
La Via  
Campesina  
-1  -1  -1  -1  -1  1  -1  -5  
GRAIN  -1  -1  -1  -1  -1  1  -1  -5  
FIAN  -1  -1  -1  -1  -1  1  -1  -5  
Urgenci  -1  -1  -1  -1  -1  1  -1  -5  
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Appendix 7:  Variables Table For Political Legitimacy  
  
Criteria/organisation  Raison  
d’être      
Inclusivity    Transparency    Accountability    Subject to 
Regulation    
Ethical  
Practices    
Economic  
Capital  
Total 
Score  
WFP  
  
1  1  1  1  1  1  1  7  
FAO  1  1  1  1  1  1  1  7  
IFAD  1  1  1  1  1  1  1  7  
CGIAR  1  1  1  1  1  1  1  7  
Gates  
Foundation  
1  1  1  0  0  1  1  5  
Oxfam  
International  
1  1  1  1  1  1  1  7  
World Vision  1  1  1  1  1  1  1  7  
Action  
Against  
Hunger Int’l  
1  1  1  1  1  1  0  6  
Monsanto  -1  -1  -1  -1  -1  -1  1  -5  
Cargill  -1  -1  0  -1  -1  0  1  -3  
Syngenta  -1  -1  -1  -1  -1  -1  1  -5  
Potash  -1  -1  -1  -1  -1  -1  1  -5  
La Via  
Campesina  
1  1  -1  -1  0  1  -1  0  
GRAIN  1  1  1  1  1  1  -1  5  
FIAN  1  1  1  1  1  1  -1  5  
Urgenci  1  1  1  1  1  1  -1  5  
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Appendix 8: Field Analysis of Global Food Governance: Symbolic Capital,  
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Appendix 9:   Appendices for Chapter 4 A: 
Pilot version of interview protocol  
  
Interview protocol for Global Food Governance        Anon ID No:    
 
  
Name of Respondent:   Job Title: 
 Company Name:   
Nationality:    
  
Introduction to Interviewer  
Hello, my name is Kathryn Smith, and, as you will know from the ethics forms, I am  
researching Global Food Governance. I would like to discuss the following topics: food  
security, the strengths and weaknesses of current  Global Food Governance and your 
evaluation of the best way to reform Global Food Governance?  With these topics in mind I’d 
like to ask you the following 30 questions.  Please feel free to expand the answer boxes to 
answer as fully and as freely as you wish - all your data will be completely  anonymised.   All 
your views are understood to be your own and not representative of your employer.   Please 
note that there is also two opt- in questions at the end for further contact and to be informed of 
the results.  Thank-you for taking the time and care to answer this.    
  
 
Section 1: Food Insecurity Issues  
 
  
 
Tell me about your organisation’s involvement in food security?  
 
  
 
  
 
What is your personal involvement in food security?   
 
  
 
  
 
  
 
  
Question 1 :  What do you think are the main causes of food insecurity?  
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Answer    
 
  
  
Question 2:  Do you agree that there is currently no stable and effective global food security 
regime?  
Answer     
 
  
  
 
  
Question 3:  What does it take to establish an effective and stable global food security regime?  
Answer    
 
  
  
 
  
Question 4 :  What are the most significant obstacles to establishing a stable food security 
regime?  
Answer    
 
  
  
 
  
Question 5 : In your opinion, to what degree are market-orientated solutions and ideology a 
factor in food security?   
Answer    
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Question 6:  What do you think is the most overlooked/unaddressed factor in food insecurity?  
Answer    
 
  
  
 
  
Question 7:  In your opinion have corporate actors exacerbated food insecurity?  
Answer    
 
  
  
 
  
Question 8:  Which change would be the biggest improvement towards establishing Global Food  
Security?  
Answer    
 
  
  
 
  
Before moving on to the next section, anything else on Food Security you would like to add or 
comment on?  
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Section 2: Global Food Governance  
  
Question 9:  How would you evaluate the effectiveness of current Global Food Governance?  
Answer    
 
  
  
 
  
Question     In your opinion, what are the strengths of the current Global Food  
10:  Governance system? Answer    
 
  
  
 
  
Question 11: In your opinion, what are the weaknesses of Global Food Governance?  
Answer    
 
   
 
  
Question   What do you think should be done to improve the Global Governance of  
12:  Food?  
Answer    
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Question 13   To what degree do the role that Trans National Corporations  (e.g. Cargill,  
Nestle, Tesco etc.) take in Global Governance positively or negatively affect  
food insecurity?  
Answer    
 
  
  
 
  
Question 14 To what degree  and in which ways do the practices of Trans National 
Corporations affect Global Food Governance? (Feel free to specify which 
practices )  
Answer    
 
   
 
  
Question In your opinion, how do the political agendas of  International Organisations 15  
(e.g. WFP, FAO etc.)  affect food security?  
Answer    
 
   
 
  
Question  In your opinion, how do the  agendas of  Aid Organisations (e.g. Oxfam,  Action 
16   Against Hunger etc.)  affect food security?  
Answer    
 
   
 
  
 
  
Question 17  Would you agree with the point which some commentators have made that  
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there is a diffuse architecture in Global Food Governance? If yes, how does  
this affect good governance of food insecurity?  
Answer    
 
  
  
 
  
Question Do you agree that there is  not enough or no oversight of International 18  
Organisations? If so how does this affect good Global Food  Governance?  
Answer    
 
  
  
 
  
Question 19  In your opinion, what could make Global Food Governance more 
inclusive/democratic? (Suggest more than one factor if preferred)  
Answer    
 
  
  
 
  
Anything else specifically on Global Food Governance you would like to add or comment on?  
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Section 3: Reform of Global Food Governance  
 
  
Question 20  To maximise effectiveness on reducing Food Insecurity, how should Global Food 
Governance be reformed?  
Answer    
 
  
 
  
 
  
 
  
  
 
  
Question 21  How and by whom should these reforms be led?  
Answer    
 
  
 
  
 
  
 
  
  
 
  
Question 22   How should the architecture of a new Global Food Governance  regime be 
constructed?  
Answer    
 
  
  
 
  
Question  23   In your opinion how should  International Organisations (e.g. FAO) involved in  
Global Food Governance be scrutinised?  
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Answer    
 
  
  
 
  
Question  24 How should  Trans National Corporations  involved in Global Food Governance be 
scrutinised?  
Answer    
 
  
 
  
  
 
  
Question 25 How should  Aid Organisations and Charities  involved in Global Food Governance be 
scrutinised?  
Answer    
 
  
  
 
  
Question 26   How should the membership of a new Global Food Governance regime differ 
from the current membership in the following areas:  
Answer  1.  International Organisations?  
  
 
  
2.   Trans National Corporations?  
  
  
 
  
3.   Aid Organisations/Charities?  
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Question 27  Which Policy Innovations should be at the forefront of reformed Global Food 
Governance?  
Answer    
 
  
 
  
Question 28  Can you detail any reforms you would consider a) essential b) desirable to Global 
Food Governance?  
Answer    
 
  
  
 
  
Question 29  Which changes in Global Governance would make the biggest  difference to Global 
Hunger?    
Answer    
 
  
  
 
  
Question 30 :  How would you evaluate the role of the G8 in ending global hunger?  
Answer    
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Question 31:  In your opinion, what is the key thing to understand about Food Security, both now 
and in the future?  
Answer    
  
  
 
  
  
  
  
 
  
Anything else on Global Food Governance reform you would like to add or comment on?  
 
  
 
  
 
  
 
  
  
 
Conclusion:  
 
  
Lastly, anything else you would like to add about this topic in general?  
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Thank-you so much for your participation.  
  
  
If you would be willing for me to contact you again in the future, please tick here:     
   
If you would like to be informed about the outcome of this research, tick here:    
  
Kathryn Smith (KS68@st-andrews.ac.uk)  
PhD student  
School of International Relations  
St. Andrews University,  
Scotland. U.K.  
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B: Final Version of Interview protocol   
  
Interview protocol for Global Food Governance        Anon ID No:    
 
  
Name of Respondent:    
Job Title:    
Company Name:    
Nationality:    
  
 
  
 
Introduction to Interviewer  
  
Hello, my name is Kathryn Smith, and, as you will know from the ethics forms,  I am  
researching Global Food Governance. I would like to discuss the following topics: food  
security, the strengths and weaknesses of current  Global Food Governance and your 
evaluation of the best way to reform Global Food Governance?  With these topics in mind I’d 
like to ask you the following 13 questions.  Please feel free to expand the answer boxes to 
answer as fully and as freely as you wish - all your data will be completely  anonymised.   All 
your views are understood to be your own and not representative of your employer.   Please 
note that there is also two opt- in questions at the end for further contact and to be informed of 
the results.  Thank-you for taking the time and care to answer this.    
  
 
  
 
Section 1: Food Insecurity Issues  
 
  
 
Tell me about your organisation’s involvement in food security?  
 
  
 
  
 
What is your personal involvement in food security?   
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Section 1: Global Food Governance  
  
Question 1:  How would you evaluate the effectiveness of current Global Food Governance?  
Answer    
 
  
  
 
  
Question   In your opinion, what do you think should be done to improve the Global  
2:  Governance of Food? Answer    
 
   
 
  
Question 3   Would you agree that there are four main sectors in the Global Food Governance 
Field: Aid Organisations, Trans National Organisation, International 
Organisations and Civil Society Organisations?  Are there any other sectors or 
groups?  
Answer    
 
  
 
  
Question 4 What is your opinion about the point which some commentator have made that 
there is a diffuse architecture in Global Food Governance?  If yes, how does 
this affect good governance of food security?  
Answer    
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Question  Do you agree that there is  not enough or no oversight of International  
5  Organisations? If so how does this affect good Global Food Governance?  
Answer    
 
   
 
  
Question 6   In your opinion, what will it take to establish effective global food governance?  
Both ideally and perhaps more realistically.  
Answer    
 
  
  
 
  
Anything else specifically on Global Food Governance you would like to add or comment on?  
 
  
 
  
 
  
 
  
  
 
Section 2: Reform of Global Food Governance  
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Question 7  To maximise effectiveness on reducing Food Insecurity, how should Global Food 
Governance be reformed?  
Answer    
 
  
 
  
 
  
 
  
  
 
  
Question 8  How and by whom should these reforms be led?  
Answer    
 
  
 
  
 
  
 
  
  
 
  
Question 9   How should the architecture of a new Global Food Governance regime be 
constructed?  
Answer    
 
  
  
 
  
Question  10  How should  Trans National Corporations  involved in Global Food Governance 
be scrutinised?  
Answer    
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Question  11 How should  International and Aid Organisations  involved in  Global Food 
Governance be scrutinised?  
Answer    
 
  
  
 
  
Question 12  Which Policy Innovations should be at the forefront of reformed Global Food 
Governance?  
Answer    
 
  
  
 
  
Question 13   Which issues should the G8 prioritise?  
Answer    
  
  
Anything else on Global Food Governance reform you would like to add or comment on?  
 
  
 
  
 
  
  
 
  
 
Conclusion:  
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Lastly, anything else you would like to add about global food governance in general?  
 
  
 
  
 
  
Thank-you so much for your participation.  
  
If you would be willing for me to contact you again in the future, please tick here:     
  
If you would like to be informed about the outcome of this research, tick here:    
Kathryn Smith (KS68@st-andrews.ac.uk)  
PhD student  
School of International Relations  
St. Andrews University,  
Scotland, UK  
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Appendix 10:   Interview Records   
Record of interviews (on attached CD).   
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